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INTRODUCTION:

THE INAUGURATION OF A HISTORICAL LEGACY
On Monday night 12 September 1994 President Francois Mitterrand appeared on

French national television to discuss his involvement with the Vichy regime during its

early years and in particular his postwar friendship with the former Vichy regime’s Police

Chief, Rene Bousquet. Rene Bousquet was charged with crimes against humanity in
1989 for his role in the Final Solution in France and was indicted in 1991. He was
assassinated 8 June 1993 and never brought to trial. Mitterrand’s controversial

friendships and his television appearance to discuss them are emblematic of ambiguities
present in French society surrounding historical memory of the period 1940-44 known as

‘"les annees noires”' and the subsequent Liberation. In many ways these years constitute

a secret misunderstood period of French history that highlight a nation with a troubled
subterranean memory, which historian Henry Rousso aptly calls the ccVichy Syndrome.”2

Rousso uses Freudian theory relating to the role of the collective memory on the
unconscious to identify a mixed collection of signs, which Rousso refers to as symptoms,

visible in particular in the politicosocial and cultural life in France. These signs reveal
the existence of a traumatism engendered by the Nazi occupation and have been

maintained and sometimes even developed after the events themselves by the French

state. Rousso argues that these symptoms reflect the difficult reconciliation of the French

with their history of “les annees noires. ”3 Indeed, until quite recently French history
from 1940 onwards was understood by most people in a simplified way.

1

“Les annees noires ” - the somber years - refers to the period in France between 1940 and

1944.
2

Henry Rousso, Le syndrome de Vichy de 1944 a nosjours (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1990), 19.

3

Ibid., 18.
1

Through the 1950s and 60s, the story of France during and immediately after World
War II was commonly understood by the public in a straightforward manner. On 3

September 1939 France declared war against Germany.4 On 10 May 1940 Panzer

Divisions, moving around the Maginot line, entered France at Sedan, in the Ardennes,

reaching the North Sea coast by the end of May. Abandoned by the British, its neighbors

either neutral or dictatorships, France was alone and could do little to confront the might
of the advancing and superior German army. On 10 June Premier Paul Reynaud’s
government took refuge in Bordeaux, leaving Paris an open city and adding to an exodus

of refugees already fleeing combat zones. Chaos, coupled with an overwhelming feeling
of a pending apocalypse reigned. An indecisive Premier lost the confidence of his

cabinet and on 16 June resigned. He was replaced by Marechai Petain, the hero of
Verdun3 and a leading lobbyist for peace in Reynaud’s cabinet. To protect the civilian

population from protracted exposure to bombing, Petain demanded an armistice, signed

on 22 June 1940. The armistice provided that the Nazi government would occupy the

north and western parts of France only.6 Under the new Constitutional Law of 10 July

4 Josserand, Vallee, Personne et Menard, Histoire (Paris: Fernand Nathan, 1950), 183. French
History textbook for students aged 15-16 years in use until 1967 states that the Second World War was the
second episode of a 30 years war (1914-1939) the twenty years of peace had been a cease fire. This image
appeared in the speeches of De Gaulle during Liberation.
5 Captain B.H.Liddell Hart, The Real War 1914-1918 (Boston: Back Bay Books, 1964), 214-223.
Beginning 21 February 1916, the German attrition offensive at Verdun underscored the effective use of
intense artillery bombardment. Counter attacks by the French proved inadequate. On 25 February Petain
took over command, improved the supply route and reorganized the front into sectors each with its own
artillery. By 1 July, 66 divisions of the French army had been used. Heavy British bombardment on the
Somme diverted the German attack. French counter offensives of the autumn retook lost positions. The
Battle of Verdun lasted from 21 February 1916 to 15 December 1916. Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War
(London: The Penguin Press 1998; reprint, New York: Basic Books, 1999), 285, (page citations refer to the
reprint edition) gives German casualties as 337,000 and the French as 377,000.
6

In November 1942 the non-occupied zone ceased to exist
2

1940 Marechai Petain became head of state and the Third Republic was dissolved.7

Many heralded Petain as the savior of France, and a shield against Nazi excesses.

Installed in Vichy, Petain’s new government supposedly saved France from a worse fate,
even though unsavory pro-Nazi elements within the Regime collaborated more forcibly.

General Charles de Gaulle formed an opposition government in exile from London.
Though the simplified historical account holds that Petain did his best to shield

France, liberation by the Resistance led by General Charles de Gaulle began in August
1944, and France, the victim of National Socialism, was delivered from the shattering

defeat of 1940 and the suffering of enemy occupation. On 25 August de Gaulle laid the
first cornerstone of a new mythical national identity in refusing to proclaim the Republic,

inasmuch as the Republic, according to de Gaulle, had never ceased to exist.8 In

declaring that the bitter defeat of 1940 had been effaced by victory gained through a

united French nation, the French understood that whatever lay in between would be

placed in parenthesis.9

This simplified story of French history left no room for an understanding of the call
of popular passions for revenge that took France to the brink of civil war in the first years
of the post war period. De Gaulle channeled these explosions into an official form of
punishment, known as the process of / ’epuration, for those who had collaborated with the

enemy. L "epuration itself clearly illustrates the tensions in French society of this period,
even though most students of French history in the first decades after the war did not
7 NA Journal officiel du 11 juillet 1940. Reproduced in Marc Olivier Baruch, Le Regime de
Vichy (Paris: La Decouverte, 1996), 15-16.

8 Declaration made before addressing the French Nation from the Hotel de Ville, Paris 25 August
1944, in response to a request to solemnly proclaim the Republic by Georges Bidault, head of the Comite
National de la Resistance. Charles de Gaulle, Memoires de guerre, tome 2 (Paris: Pion 1956), 308.
9 De Gaulle, Discours et messages pendant la guerre: 1940-1946, tome 1 (Paris: Editions Pion,
1970), 445.
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learn about the violent explosions of fratricidal hatred and revenge this process
engendered. Still, / ’epuration reflects the profound fissure of ritualistic, deeply

misogynistic and social class tensions, meshed in with ideological conflicts, running

amok during the battle for control and return to order. A law of amnesty of 6 August
1953 effectively silenced any further debate.

Much of the official French historical narrative was supported by the work of the

historian Robert Aron who derived his scholarship from the trial records of the Vichy
leaders.10 Continuing to show the Vichy years as nothing more than an interlude,
unhitching for a brief moment the French state and the French nation, Aron’s narrative

had broad appeal to Gaullists, other Right Wing elements, Communists, and Socialists.
Aron argued that the French had, because of the Vichy Regime, received preferential
treatment compared to other occupied nations.11 His narrative did not refer to I "epuration

official or otherwise. Only in 1959 did Aron begin to address the issue, basing his
statistics concerning summary executions on official documents which computed the
• 12
Again in 1967 he undertook a further examination
epures with the victims of the Nazis.

of the issue which confirmed his earlier findings.13 In fact, Aron’s interpretation re

inforced the emerging Gaullist construction of history; one that offered a simplistic and

heroic account of France’s participation in World War II and which did not address

French persecution of the Jews.

10

Robert Aron, Histoire de Vichy (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1954).

n

Ibid., 736.

12

Robert Aron, Histoire de la liberation de la France, juin 1944-mai 1945 (Paris: Fayard, 1959).
Cited by Henry Rousso in “L’Epuration en France: Une histoire inachevee” Revue d’histoire (323) janviermars 1992: 78-105. Peter Novick, L 'epuration francaise 1944-1949, preface de Jean-Pierre Rioux (Paris:
Editions Balland, 1985), 13.
13

Robert Aron, Histoire de reparation, 3 tomes (Paris: Fayard 1967-75).
4

Until the 1970s this historical interpretation remained essentially unchanged, the

tensions hidden. Coupled with French scholars generally ignoring the subject and with

very limited access to French national archives,14 there were only one or two attempts to
bring the tensions, now firmly driven underground, to the surface. The work of a German

historian, Eberhard Jaekel, was one of these.15 Jaekel in particular reversed the
perspective offered by Aron though his work escaped close examination from a

disinterested scholarly community. Another notable refutation was offered by the
penetrating probe of historian Robert O. Paxton in 1972.16 Using German and American
archives, Paxton overcame the inaccessibility of French national archives and began a
painstake deconstruction of the myths upholding the historiographical consensus
surrounding the Vichy regime. Paxton produced a strong and disturbing account of a
France which did not just accede to collaboration but which, in fact, instigated it.17 Thus

the interpretation that France collaborated only to shield the French, including the Jews,

to protect them from the worst, was presented by Paxton as a distorted version of history.
Stimulated by Paxton’s work, scholarly consensus concerning the Vichy regime’s
depth and range of collaboration developed in the following years but was not matched in

the memory of the population or in official state accounts of the period. Paxton’s work

14 National Archives are governed on this subject, classed as “non encore librement
communicables,” today by the Law 79-18 of 3 janvier 1979 - decret no. 79-1038 of 3 decembre 1979.
Access therefore requires an official demand made to the Ministry of Culture for an exemption under the
above law to inspect the archives.
15 Exceptions were Henri Michel, Vichy annee 40 (Paris: Editions Robert Laffont, 1966);
Eberhard Jaekel, Frankreich in Hitlers Europa (Stuttgart, 1966) published in France under the title La
France dans FEurope de Hitler (Paris: 1968); and Yves Durand, Vichy 1940-1944 (Paris: Editions Bordas,
1972).

16 Robert O. Paxton Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order 1940-1944 (New York: Knof,
1972, reprint Columbia University Press, 1982).
17 Ibid., 51.
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1

continued. He and Michael M. Marrus in 1981 showed that if the Nazis as early as 27

September 1940 took anti-Jewish measures in the occupied zone they did not demand

anything comparable in the unoccupied zone.18 No trace has been found of German

orders to Vichy to adopt antisemitic legislation, for example.19 The Vichy regime
repealed the Marchandeau Law on 27 August 194O20 and altogether enacted some 143
laws and actes reglementaires contributing to the isolation and victimisation of the

Jews.

"7 1

Paxton and Marrus underscored the emphasis the regime placed on its

sovereignty. The desire to restore the French administrative autonomy in the occupied
zone led to many concessions, including low priority to saving even the French citizens

among the Jews caught in roundups.22 The interpretation of the Vichy regime as a savior
was further eroded by the work of Marc Olivier Baruch, who showed that the protection
the Vichy regime allotted to its sovereignty culminated in the frenzy of roundups and
deportations in the summer of 1942 as part of a larger effort to preserve itself against

Nazi penetration of its hold on the nation.23 The scholarship of Paxton, Marrus, and
Baruch were thus fundamental in linking the depth of the Vichy regime’s collaboration to

18 Michael M. Marrus and Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews (New York: Basic
Books Inc., 1981; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 6-7.
19

Ibid., 5.

20 Ibid., 3. The loi Marchandeau of 1881, amended 21 April 1939, was repealed by Vichy, 27
August 1940. This law initially had outlawed any press attack “ toward a group of persons who belong by
origin to a particular race or religion when it is intended to arouse hatred among citizens or residents.”
Journal Officiel 25 April 1939. French newspapers were now free of legal restraints and could spread
antisemitism.
21 Michael M. Marrus, foreword in Richard H. Weisberg, Vichy Law and the Holocaust in
France. (New York: New York University Press, 1998), xv. The Statutes of 3 and 4 October 1940 are but
two examples.
22

Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France, 226.

23

Baruch, Le Regime, 55-59.
6

genocide and further demolishing the simplistic portrait of France as a victim of National

Socialism.

Historical scholarship in recent years has been prolific in attempting to both analyze
the complicated process of / ’epuration and produce statistics which either denounce the

myth of a blood bath or reinforce it, but not to fully address the entire phenomenon. The
debate over statistics of both the official and unofficial epuration continues, though a
concentration of work strongly emphasizes the statistics of the unofficial epuration.

French Historian Henry Rousso, however, wants to re-evaluate the statistics of the

official epuration instead of concentrating on the unofficial epuration.2* Rousso
concludes that I "epuration was at the least incoherent and allowed two important aspects

of collaboration to escape any attention, that of economic collaboration and collaboration
committed by the top servants of the regime. Two strong opposing points of view

emerged as to the effectiveness of Vepuration. Peter Novick and Jean-Pierre Rioux have
argued that the process was a halfhearted attempt to enable France to heal its fratricidal

wounds.2:> On the other hand Herbert Lottman leans heavily towards the existence of a
bloodbath, concerning the unofficial epuration.

A

Analyzing the organization of the

official epuration only in the departements of Haute-Savoie and the Rhone, and also

relying on trial records of Vichy leaders, Lottman concludes that the preparation and
implementation of the official epuration was carried out as planned by French jurists
• • •
27
together with democratic, as well as moderate, politicians.
Nevertheless, there appears

24

Rousso, “L’epuration en France,” 78.

25 Peter Novick, L 'epuration Francaise, 1944-1949, preface de Jean-Pierre Rioux (Paris:
Editions Bal land, 1985). Jean-Pierre Rioux, La France de la Quatrieme Republique, tome 1, L ’ardeur et la
necessite 1944-1952 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1980).
26

Herbert Lottman, L *epuration 1943-1953 (Paris: Editions Fayard, 1986).

27

Ibid., 543-544.
7

1
to be consensus of varying degrees that both forms of Vepuration were failures. Some
studies, most notably that of Rousso, deal with the dramatic quasi-unofficial epuration

episode concerning the “femmes tondues. ” Women suspected of having had liaisons
with the Nazis were publicly and ceremoniously shaved. This ceremony was followed by

parading the victims through jeering crowds, often to the accompaniment of acts of
violence. Rousso relies on cultural anthropological factors to demonstrate the intricacies
of this gender specific form of extreme collective violence. His work highlights, in some

cases, the complicity of the legal authorities in these practices, which targeted women

only.28 Still, historical scholarship is incomplete in its analysis of I’epuration. In
general, however, the bulk of the work undertaken on repuration has had the effect of

eroding the simplified story of French victimization and resistance to Nazi aggression in

France.
In 1971 the cinema, with the release of Marcel Ophuls’s film Le Chagrin et la Pitie,

became instrumental in the process of popular demythification of France’s World War II
history, giving fresh impetus to the struggling historical scholarship.29 Departing from
the French historical narrative, Ophuls did not portray a unified France. Made for French

National television, the film was not broadcast until the 1980s. Nevertheless, it did

receive limited distribution in two small cinemas in 1971 in Paris (Saint-Severin in the

Quartier Latin, and the Paramount on the Champs Elysee), provoking a wide-range of
reactions. Writing in Le Monde Pierre Viansson-Ponte declared “Chagrin et la Pitie to be

28

Rousso, “L’epuration en France,” 84-85.

29 Marcel Ophuls and Andre Harris, Le Chagrin et la Pitie (Paris: 1971) 4hrs. This film recounts
daily life in Clermont Ferrand, Massif Central, under Vichy.

8

n
a remarkable documentary....”30 Le Chagrin et la Pitie incited Francoise Giroud in
L "Express to write, “The ermine coat which Charles De Gaulle threw across the knees of
France can never hide that France lost not only the war, which was nothing, but its

honor.”31 La Nation determined that “[without De Gaulle there would have been no

French at Berlin and no victory for France.”32 Germaine Tillion, ethnologist and former
head of one of the most famous Resistance groups in Paris, Resistance du Musee de

I ’homme, argued in Le Monde that the film makers forgot to mention “collective sabotage
by the workers and the executives of Michelin of tyre production, because resistance was

not only the prerogative of one class.”33 Again in Le Monde Alfred Fabre-Luce referred

to the paradox facing historians concerning “[t]he French government [that of Laval]
-

which consented to odious deportations of foreign Jews is also that which at the hour of

peril saved the French Jewish community under threat of massive deportations. ”34 In
1993 Anne Andreu writing in L ’Evenement du Jeudi noted that with “[t]he passing of
time Chagrin et la Pitie had acquired an aura of legend and like a monument should be

visited regularly.”35 Also of significance was the film of Andre Harris and Alain Sedouy,
Francais si vous saviez.36 Released in 1973, this epic, beginning with the period 1914

30 Pierre Viansson-Ponte, Le Monde (Paris) 21 avril 1970. Note: All newspaper articles unless
otherwise stated, are reproduced with permission from the Dossiers de Presse, Fondation Nationale des
Sciences Politiques, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris, and translated by the writer.
31

Francoise Giroud, L'Express (Paris) 3 mai 1971.

32

La Nation (Paris) 8 mai 1970.

33

Germaine Tillion Le Monde (Paris) 8 juin 1971

34

Alfred Fabre-Luce, Le Monde (Paris) 8 juin 1971

35

Anne Andreu, L Evenement de Jeudi (Paris) 4 mars 1993.

36

Andre Harris and Alain Sedouy, Francais, Si Vous Saviez (Paris) 1973, 8hrs. This film was
presented in 3 episodes covering the period 1914-1972. It did not deal with the events of May 1968
considered by Harris and Sedouy as still being the reserve ofjournalists and not yet that of historians.
9
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I

and extending to 1972, attacked the Gaullist construction of history by digging into the
memory of the survivors through the technique of interview-interrogation. Using

meticulously constructed images, confrontation between eye-witnesses and their accounts
bounces off the camera for the viewer to judge. The results, states Jean-Louis Bory,
writing in Le Nouvel Observateur, is a vision of “[h]istory which is not simple; the causes
of justice stained with injustice(s); events and (even) less the participants not always what

we (the French) want them to be.”37 Andre Harris stated that his film was “[n]either a
political dossier [n]or an exhaustive history lesson.”38 Francois Furet stated in Le Nouvel

Observateur that “Transforming De Gaulle from savior to scapegoat did not represent
immense progress in the political conscious of the French or in the vision they have of
their contemporary history.”39 Francois, si vous saviez was not shown in its entirety in

one cinema in Paris but distributed by episode around different cinemas.
Literature also became another vector in the demolishing of the silence the myths had

erected. One of the most influential writers in the work of arousing the national

consciousness to meet the challenges being presented was the writer Patrick Modiano.
One of the themes recurrent in Modiano’s work is the portrayal of “les annees noires” as
void of history replaced by a puzzle of which there is no answer, as evidenced by La

Place de I ’Etoile.40 La Place de FEtoile dissimulates the tragedy of being Jewish in

clownish tales with characters such as Brasillach, Drieu la Rochelle, or Celine, situated
on a type of carousel which finally takes the reader to Place de I’Etoile, the epicenter of
the capital of pain.
37

Jean-Louis Bory, Le Nouvel Observateur (Paris) 26 fevrier 1973.

38

Le Figaro (Paris) 26 fevrier 1973

39

Francois Furet, Le Nouvel Observateur (Paris) 13 mars 1973.
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Popular rejection of the simplified story of French World War II history was also

strongly assisted by an extremely dynamic contesting press. At the forefront in drawing
public attention to many elements, including judicial inertia that protected the French

State from public scrutiny, the press encouraged the French public to begin to question its
official historical narrative. This is particularly evidenced in the affair Touvier.41 Paul
Touvier was the Regional Head of the Milice of the Rhone (Lyon) and was convicted in
1994 for crimes against humanity in connection with the execution of seven Jewish

hostages in Rillieux-la-Pape. Granted a presidential pardon by President Pompidou in

1971, L’Express published the facts, thus enabling the families of victims of Paul Touvier

to bring charges of crimes against humanity in 1973.42 His acquittal in 1992 was
accompanied by an outcry in the press and finally in 1994 when Touvier once again was
brought to trial and convicted of crimes against humanity in connection with the

execution of seven Jewish hostages in Rillieux-la-Pape. Likewise, in 1978 L ’Express

published an interview with Louis Darquier de Pellepoix, the former Vichy Regime’s
Minister of Jewish questions, living in exile in Spain.43 Pellepoix claimed that Rene
„

Bousquet

40

44

was responsible for the deportation of the Jews and especially of the Vel’

Patrick Modiano, Laplace del'Etoile (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1968).

41 Paul Touvier, Regional Head of the Milice of the Rhone (Lyon) was convicted in 1994 for
crimes against humanity concerning the execution of seven Jewish hostages, in Rillieux-la-Pape. Other
charges were dropped.
42

L'Express (Paris) 5 juin 1972.

43

L ’Express (Paris) 28 octobre 1978.

44

Rene Bousquet, General Secretary of the Police of the Vichy regime of the occupied and
unoccupied zones from April 1942 to December 1943. Bousquet received greater autonomy for the French
police under the Oberg- Bousquet Agreements 29 July 1942. He is judged by historians as being a principal
executor of the Final Solution in France. Bousquet sought exile in June 1944 in Germany but returned to
France in 1945. He was brought before the High Court of Justice in 1949 for his collaboration. He was
sentenced to a five year loss of civil rights which was immediately commuted for “acts of resistance.”
Charges of crimes against humanity were laid against Bousquet in 1989, indicted in 1991 he was never
brought to trial. He was assassinated on 8 June 1993.
11

d'Hiv roundups.45 During the night of the 16-17 July 1942 under orders from Rene
Bousquet, 13,000 Jews were rounded up and arrested by 4,500 French Police in Paris.46
They were held at Vel'd'Hiv before their deportation to Auschwitz. On 26 through 28

July roundups by the French police of Jews in the unoccupied zone occurred also under
the orders of Bousquet. Bousquet’s role did not come to light when he was initially tried

by the Haute Cour de Justice under Article 75. His sentence, loss of civil rights for five

years, was immediately commuted for “acts of resistance.” Due to this sentence and the

underlying belief in the shield thesis, Bousquet’s role had never received wide publicity

until the appearance of L 'Express article. The impact of the article on public opinion was
instrumental in charges for crimes against humanity being laid against Bousquet, even

though he never came to trial. He was a personal friend of President Francois
Mitterand.47

No doubt, the biggest press scoop was on 6 May 1981 when Le Canard Enchaine
accused the then Minister of Finance, Maurice Papon, of having participated in the

deportation of Jews from Bordeaux while a servant of the Vichy regime.48 The press

was highly implicated in re-energizing public opinion whenever judicial laxity appeared

to interfere with bringing figures such as Touvier, Bousquet and Papon to justice. Such
press coverage alerted the public to the importance of the three affairs in identifying the

45 Vet ’ d'Hiv, was a former indoor bicycle stadium used to house Jewish victims of the roundups
from Paris under the orders of the Vichy Police Chief, Rene Bousquet, before their departure to the
extermination camps.
46

Eric Conan, L’Express (Paris) 16juillet 1992.

47

Darquier, never extradited from Spain, died in 1980.

48

La Canard Enchaine (Paris) 6 mai 1981.
12

role of France in genocide. The stimulus the press provided thus helped to realign the
collective popular memory with that of the scholarly consensus that had already formed.

Eric Conan, journalist, historian and film maker, is another individual whose work

undermined the simplistic story of French World War II history. Exploiting both the
screen and the written word, Conan attempted to break down the silence the myths had
engendered. In 1990 Conan inquired into the fate of Jewish children in the camps of

Pithiviers and Beaune-la-Rolande,49 inciting such interest that Conan later developed this

inquiry into a television special and a book.50 In these two camps, situated some 80
kilometers from Paris, the French discretely sequestered thousands of Jewish children

rounded up and assembled in Vel’d’Hiv. Conan persuaded some survivors, such as

Annette Krajcer, who was 12 years old when she arrived in Pithiviers 19 July 1942, to tell
their stories. Conan’s work is a detailed and harrowing account of the children and their

previously unheard stories.
This thesis recounts the presence of the myths in French history. Chapter One

focuses on the turmoil of Liberation. It shows that in the Liberation period General
Charles de Gaulle successfully wove a series of myths which gave rise to a calculated,

contorted historical interpretation of France during the Vichy years. Symbolized in the

choice of durable commemorative sites and anniversaries, a society quavering on the
brink of civil war was an eager participant in the construction and historical assimilation
of a benign narrative of French participation in Second World War atrocities. Chapter

Two considers how the role of the historian first gave legitimacy to an unquestioned

49

Eric Conan, L ’Express (Paris) 'll avril 1990.

50 Eric Conan, Sans oublier les enfants; le camps de Pithiviers et Beaune-la-Rolande, 19 juillet16 september 1942. ( Paris: Grasset, 1991). Cited in Robert O. Paxton “Vichy Fifty Years After,” in
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Western Societyfor French History 1994. 212: 233-243.
13

historical narrative which had its roots not in archival sources, but in the transcripts of
public show trials of the prominent leaders of the Vichy regime, thereby creating a
historiography whose cornerstone was based entirely on a judicial foundation of
questionable objectivity. The groundwork in the process of demythification, as noted

previously, was laid initially by Robert O. Paxton and added to by Michael M. Marrus.

Both of these historians provided fresh impetus and new insights into the tightly woven
official version of events, giving rise to new scholarship which slowly began to chip
away at the myths. The process of demythification was then energized by a dynamic and

assertive press and media, strongly contesting the protective cloak the French state

applied to the presence of its myths.
Chapter Three considers the trial of Maurice Papon, which revealed the direct

responsibility of the French state in deportation to the German camps and the presence of
French Internment Camps operated and organized entirely by the French State where

harsh inhumane conditions led to death before deportation. Stretched out over the years

the silence the myths disseminated enabled the French State’s further hidden involvement
in atrocities overseen by its faithful servant, Maurice Papon, against Algerian

demonstrators in the streets of Paris in October 1961.

This trial also revealed a contested role for historians. When called to give evidence

in Papon’s trial as to the historical context surrounding the Vichy regime, the task Robert
Paxton faced was in effect to present a broad popular French audience with a history

lesson it had never heard, one that raised moral and ethical questions. The thin line

between scholarship and moral judgement was challenged at the trial and is a theme taken
up in this chapter.
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In order to understand the contested nature of French World War II history, it is
important to consider the process through which nationalism took hold in the 19th and

20th centuries. The Revolution left France with an unresolved heritage and the
springboard from where modem historical memory finds its sources. Popular memory of

this period is conserved within the nation through words, “Liberte, egalite, fraternite, ”
signs such as the French tricolor, and symbols, La Republique. The Third Republic,

however, was proclaimed in 1870 amidst undercurrents calling for a return to

monarchism. The cultural values of the new Republic were transmitted through national

education where a patriotic spirit was cultivated through the exclusive use of the French
language. Eugen Weber, writing about the modernization of rural France, states that

“Like migration, politics, and economic development, schools brought suggestions of

alternative values and hierarchies; and of commitments to other bodies than the local
group.”51 Imprinting on the historical memory for the future, the leaders of the Third

Republic reinforced the Republican heritage of monuments, symbols, and celebrations.

Throughout France monuments were dedicated to fallen soldiers; the construction of the

Pantheon in Paris, to entomb the Republic’s heroes; the Universal Exhibition ini889,
whose theme demonstrated the concerted union between science and culture, a reminder

of the origins of the republic, are but a few examples. In 1880 the street dances and

fireworks of the 14 July became the fete nationale with the appearance of La Marsellaise
as the national anthem. The Republic was rejuvenated until social, economic and

political stress came to the forefront around the Dreyfus affair.

Political factions

51 Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization ofRural France 1870-1914
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 338.
52 Alfred Dreyfus was a French Army Officer who was convicted of treason in 1894. Evidence
later revealed that Dreyfus, a Jew, had been wrongfully accused by the army and the fact hidden. Amidst
controversy Dreyfus was finally pardoned.
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captured the passion and energy generated by the conflict and the leaders of these

movements became instrumental in shaping political memory of the period, one which in
later years, would resound only as the years of decadence and turmoil, of threatening
Bolshevism, increased immigration, and economic stress. Herein lay the strong

xenophobia as evidenced by the theme “£a France aux Francois” of Brasillach53 to

which was added the vibrant brand of French antisemitism. Tom from the old nation,
bankrupt in its function of providing social, economic, and cultural aspirations to its

members, a new state rose. Recollections alive in the public memory from the

atmosphere of the beginning of the century nourished the Vichy regime.
The founding figures at Vichy represented the regime through long established
interpretative frameworks or recollections. For example, the continuity of antisemitism

in the political and social culture of the past came to a climax in the cataclysm of Vichy’s

own antisemitisme d’Etat. The Vichy regime enacted its own anti-semitic laws and actes
reglementaires prior to 1942 and deportation. This stigmatization, observed Michael

Marrus, resulted in “...no fewer than 143 laws and actes reglementaires generated by the
Vichy government.”54 The French nation did not unduly protest. Reflecting the 1920s

when the threat of overwhelming Bolshevism filled the inkwells of the extreme right
wing intellectual milieu, the widespread executions of Communists from June 1941

onwards, known as “le parti des fusilles ” because of the high number executed, and
their ensuing deportations, were nourished in the long established framework for the

restoration of the values of the ancien regime.55 Political leaders constructed a sanitized

53 Robert Brasillach, was a writer, virulent anti-Semite, editor and contributor to “Je suis
Partout ” newspaper. Condemned to death by the High Court of Justice he was executed in January 1945.
54

Marrus, foreword in Weisberg, Vichy Law, xv.

16

r
I

version of the Vichy past and then remembered it as they emerged as leaders of postwar
France. A fusion of belief and interest mixed in with ideology and the urge for power
shaped the historical memory of this period. This historical memory contained the

remnants of the sordid atmosphere of the Third Republic, its institutions and values
drifting in partisan squabbling, impregnated with fierce power struggles to impose a new
order and a people desperately diminishing into a numbed mass willing to succumb

toVichy and its official antisemitism in order to save itself. Memory was encouraged
through film, books and monuments to valorize the Resistance. In valorizing the
Resistance, a reshaping of the national identity occurred, as not all France was part of the

Resistance. Yet the violence surrounding the unofficial epuration illustrates the divisions

within French society in this period quite clearly.
French national identity has long been differently contested, complex and divisive.
The political Left and Right defined the nation. Thus a personal sense of French identity
stems from values permeated in the nation’s political culture. In pre-war France the
national identity of the Left claimed its values from the Revolution and a defense of

democracy. The national identity claimed by the Right of this period identified with its
defense of tradition, of race, and sovereignty. This identity was threatened by

Bolshevism, cosmopolitanism, and the decadence of modernity. Allegiance to a political
ideal of either Left or Right reflected a personal concept of national identity tied in with

family, gender, class, religion, and political affiliation. In resisting the Nazi occupation
and the Vichy regime, the Resistance defined a set of essential French values of justice

55 Jean-Pierre Rioux, La France de la Quatrieme Republique, tome 1, L ’ardeur et la necessite
1944-1952 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1980), 85. Rioux’s 75,000 executions of Communists is thought to be
exaggerated, but he also points out that sometimes the figure given is about 40,000. For more details on the
role of the French Communist Party please refer to S.Curtois, Le PCF dans la guerre (Paris: Ramsay,
1980).
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found in the revolutionary patriotic tradition. This is not to suggest that all members of
the Resistance were of the Left or that all collaborators were of the Right. National

loyalty to many of this period meant loyalty to the State, and the State during the war was
the Vichy Regime.

The anti-Nazi/Vichy Resistance divided French society into even sharper opposites.
The firm identification of the Left tradition with the moral and political stance of the anti

fascism of the Resistance, and the consequent discrediting of the Right at Liberation

became cornerstones of the popular narrative of liberation. This narrative contained the
ideals and sense of justice that had been defended by the minority of Resistance but saved

to reshape the National identity of all the French. The official epuration contributed to
this re-shaping by functioning as a tool of national reconstruction and by handing out
sentences to collaborators of “degradation nationale, ” a sanction of unworthiness to be

French.56
Still dissident identities remained. Those who had lost what it meant to be French by

witnessing the collaboration with the Germans of their countrymen or through their own

passivity in these crimes remained on the margins of society. Also marginalized from the
new jubilant national consciousness were the “absents” and survivors, whose memory
and identity was not in keeping with that of the society they found upon return. Their

slow return to France and their inability to challenge the now established memory and
new identity aided the Gaullist construction of French Word War II history. In writing on

collective memory Maurice Halbwachs states that “society will abandon its ancient

beliefs only if it is assured of finding others.”57 De Gaulle assured the French that by

56

Stripped of civil rights.

57 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1992), 187.
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accepting his myths France would have an honorable historical memory and a new
national identity.

Tied in with the French concept of National identity lies the very nation itself. The

existence of the Vichy Regime with its ideology of exclusion was an expression of the
nation at that time, an outgrowth of what had been incorporated into a national identity of

many from the beginning of the century. The ideologies and experiences of pre-war

France found their roots in the unfinished business of the French Revolution with the
total abolishment of the monarchy and alienation experienced by the church. Both would

re-energize and re-emerge towards the end of the Second Empire, nourishing the political
ideology of the French extreme right wing, principally around the affair Dreyfus of 1894.

Clearly there has never been one single national tradition within France.
The historian Michel Winock argues the importance of two facets of French
•

nationalism.

SR

First was “nationalisme ouvert,” a reflection of the optimism created by

the philosophers of the Enlightenment. At the end of the 18th century this form of

nationalism was confined to the rise of democracy and consequently the nation and
democracy became inseparable. Left nationalism found its inspiration herein, later

expressed through Socialism, its general political culture. Second was “nationalisme
ferme, ” or conservative nationalism.59 This form of nationalism expressed itself through
a pessimistic vision of the French nation, a nation requiring protection and immunization

against all supposed or imagined corruptive forces of decadence. Nationalisme ferme had
its roots in the atmosphere surrounding the defeat of 1871 and the amputation of Alsace

58

Michel Winock, Nationalisme, antisemitisme et fascisme en France (Paris: Editions du Seuil,

59

Ibid., 7.

1982), 7.
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and Lorraine. According to Winock, however, it is wrong to assume that both aspects of

French nationalism were distinct separate ideologies.60 From time to time convergence
occurred and within convergence compromise occurred. This conflictual ideological

positioning is paramount throughout the period leading to Vichy and is in itself an
expression of the complexity of French nationalism.

Conservative nationalism first found expression in 1887 around the personality of
General Boulanger. Boulangisme became a movement of rich and varied complexity,
fusing the anti-republicanism of the clergy, the disillusioned military, radicals of the right

wanting to discard Republicanism, the socialists yearning for a revolution and the

Bonapartistes and Monarchists competing for restoration. Boulangisme as a political
force faded by the end of 1889, but not without first being fused into other movements.

The outcome of the Dreyfus affair served to reinstate a thought-to-be moribund
movement of counter-revolutionaries around the poet and writer, Charles Maurras, and

his newspaper L ’Action Francaise. Maurrasisme provided a forum of expression among
the intellectual elite of conservative nationalism, denied expression in the populist
Boulangisme, and became a central voice of conservative nationalism after 1898 in the

aftermath of the Dreyfus affair. Maurrasisme survived the years and re-emerged later as
the most influential ideological component of the Vichy regime. The nationalism of
collaboration lies within the nebulousness of extreme tendencies expressed in anti-

Semitism, anti-Parliamentarianism and xenophobia and was channeled through
Maurrasisme into an important political force of the Vichy regime.

In the 1920s fascism appeared on the French political scene, Linked to French

nationalism, its relevance as an ideological component fuelling the Vichy regime is
60

Ibid., 13.
20

undeniable.61 Nevertheless, placing French fascism entirely within the folds of

conservative nationalism is misleading. Within the context of the mid 1920s French
fascism can be perceived as rising out of the ideological background of the conservative
family when in response to the presence of a Cartel des Gauches62 in government in

1924. Georges Gressent, a former soldier, known by the pseudonym of Georges Valois,
formed the first French fascist party, Faisceau. Valois’ objective was to create a nation

state that rose above parliamentary politics and social class conflict. Valois further
defined fascism as the fusion of two movements, socialism and nationalism, which were

contradictory,63 and attracting support across a wide spectrum of political ideologies.

Historian Zeev Stemhell notes the presence in the origins of French fascism of the
unexpected convergences between the nationalists of Action Francaise and the

theoreticians of a revolutionary labor movement.64 Action Francaise did not provide
grass roots support, however, to Valois and his party, and despite Valois’ overtures,

neither did the Communists show much interest; few workers adhered to Faisceau. By
1926 any hopes of a fascist presence on the political scene faded as Poincare led a new

61 Ibid., 248-292. Winock gives a detailed account of French fascism which he shows has
antisemitism as a catalyst. During the second wave in France Charles Maurras and Action Francaise, both
party and newspaper, along with the intellectuals like Robert Brasillach, contributing to the Je suis Partout
newspaper, plus writers such as Celine and Dneu La Rochelle, nourished the National Revolution of Vichy.
Robert Soucy, French Fascism: The Second Wave 1933-1939 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995),
320, refers to George Valois’s Fasceau in 1925 through to Colonel de La Rocque’s PSF as influences.
Fascism never became an independent political force in France but an ideological component of other
movements.
62 Cartel des Gauches was a left coalition party made up of the French Radical Party, the main
political expression for anticlerical and democratic forces, and the French Socialist Party (SFIO), valuing a
parliamentary republic. This coalition was in power from 1924-1926 and was led by Premier Edouard
Herriot. As a result a flurry of direct-action nationalist groups sprang up.
63

Winock, Nationalisme, 250.

64 Zeev Stemhell, La Droite revolutionnaire, 1885-1914. Les origines francaises dufascisme
(Paris: Editions due Seuil, 1978) cited in Michel Winock, Nationalisme, 251.
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right-wing government into power. French fascism went into decline resuscitating itself

through the impact of the Depression, which hit France in 1931.
The Depression and its aftermath, which included a highly favorable political climate
around the election of a new Cartel des Gauches parliamentary majority in 1932,

provided a new springboard for French fascism. This was a period that saw the
emergence of new French fascist movements situated on the political right, such as the

Croix de feu of Colonel de la Rocque, (renamed Parti Social Francais in 1938). Robert
Soucy, in his work on French fascism, observes that some fascist movements at this time
in France were genuinely left wing, at least at their inception.65 Some French
Communists, Socialists, and Radical-Socialists were attracted to Fascism, particularly

Marcel Deat of the Section Francaise de I’Internationale Ouvriere (French Socialist
Party) who sought to attract a more bourgeois element to the party, appealing to

conservative French nationalism by advocating authoritarianism. Deat’s impact on

French politics at this time was minimal, but he would later find a voice as a member of
the Vichy Regime. In 1936 the Parti Populaire Francais of Jacques Doriot, a former

Communist, emerged.66 Doriot’s personal facility to move from one ideological camp to
the other misleads many to believe Doriot and his party adhered to the principles of the

fascist movements of the left. At inception in 1936 the PPF was a conservative response
to the presence in government of the left Front Populaire led by the first Jewish Prime
Minister of France, Leon Blum. By 1937 the PPF had become a major voice in French

65

Soucy, French Fascism, 53.

66 Doriot fled to Germany in 1944 and was killed in mysterious circumstances in April 1944.
Doriot’s protege at Vichy was Joseph Damand, head of the Milice, and the Vichy Minister of Interior. He
too fled to Germany in 1944.
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fascism.67 The Vichy regime would later furnish Doriot and the PPF with an ideal

platform for the paramilitary nationalist league the PPF became. The influence the

French fascist intellectuals exercised during this period leading to the installation of

Vichy should not be underestimated. They expressed a French nationalism of exclusion
which nourished the antisemitisme de I’etat. The virulent antisemitism expressed in this

milieu contributed tothe enactment of antisemitic laws and the ease with which the
French police executed the orders of the Vichy regime to roundup and sequester the Jews

of Paris in Vel ’d’Hiv prior to deportation to the death camps. In the vanguard were
Robert Brasillach and the newspaper Je suis Partout,68 Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, and
Louis Ferdinand Celine. As with the French fascist movements, the French fascist
intellectuals represented various diverse and complex influences. For example,
Brasillach was more in tune with the Catholic royalist appeal ofMaurras’sylc/zon

Francaise than Celine who had no party allegiance, but expressed his virulent anti-

Semitism through his works, in particular Bagatelles pour un massacre69 Published in
1937 this epic expressed a number of fears and fantasies in the France of the Front

populaire 70 and includes a fictitious massacre of Cezanne, Picasso, Maupassant, Racine,
Stendhal and Zola. Bagatelles was so outrageous in its virulent antisemitism that it was

presumed to be a farce by some critiques.71 Brasillach, Maurras, and Celine were united
in their common disgust at decadence. French fascism did not come to power in France
67

Soucy, French Fascism, 204.

68 Brasillach was the editor of Je suis Partout tied to the political faction Action Francaise
which was known for its anti-democratic and antisemite position. Je suis Partout targeted the conservative
French intellectual milieu.
69

Lou is-Ferdinand Celine, Bagatelles pour un massacre (Paris: Editions Denoel, 1937).

70

Winock, Nationalisme, 374-392, refers in detail to Celine’s works.

71

Ibid., 374.
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as a united political force, but its followers propagated its ideology, and as Soucy

maintains, “helped pave the way for some of the most repressive and cruel measures of
the Vichy regime.”

79

This thesis is an attempt to explain how the conflictual historical forces converging
in the Vichy regime were re-interpreted through a rosy Gaullist construction of French

World War II experience and then contested, first by scholars and then by the press and
by film makers and ultimately in the Trial of Maurice Papon. Papon has come to

symbolize in French popular historical consciousness the bankruptcy and falsehood of

Gaullist historical constructions.

72

Soucy, French Fascism, 320.
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CHAPTER ONE

GAULLIST CONSTRUCTIONS OF FRENCH HISTORY
“All my life I have thought of France in a certain way...”1 From this often quoted

line the enigma of de Gaulle reveals one of its essential components, de Gaulle’s
relationship with France. His idea of France was the France of the Catholic bourgeoisie,
impregnated with history, where the ancien regime was regretted, but where the Republic

was defended. De Gaulle was nourished by these values, developing a strong sense of

patriotism, a patriotism of duality in which France was composed of a state and a people,
giving rise to a dramatic French destiny that was symbiotic with his own life story. De

Gaulle’s refusal to accept anything but his conception of France contributed to his

rejection of the armistice with the Germans on behalf of his people and ultimately his
refusal to admit that France could be anything other than the France at Liberation of 40
million participants in the Resistance. These ideas were at the foundation of the Gaullist
construction of history.

In stark contrast with this construction of history was the phenomena of “les annees
noires, ” which required concealment, re-shaping, or debasing of its importance. A series

of myths composed the Gaullist construction. These myths appear to have been closely
linked to one another, intertwined, as if de Gaulle was in fact weaving a tapestry, the

tapestry of France as a “certain idea.” At the Liberation of France, General Charles de

Gaulle’s refusal to proclaim the Republic on the grounds that the Republic never ceased
to exist but had been safeguarded in the Resistance experience, had a profound, long

1 Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs de guerre, tome 1 (Paris: Pion, 1954), 1. "Touie ma vie,je me suis
fait une certaine idee de la France.... ” All translations by the writer unless otherwise noted.
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reaching influence in postwar France.2 The presence of this myth allowed the judicial

and administrative bulwarks of the Republic to escape unchallenged from the defeat of

Nazism and Vichy collaboration. In addition, the idealogical initiatives of Vichy, in
particular the legal machinery of the antisemitic policies, remained unchallenged.
The Vichy regime had begun its legislative bombardment of the Jews of France with
the Statut des juifs of 3 October 1940,3 the first of no fewer than 143 laws and actes
reglementaires? The Statute of the 3 October 1940 established the French definition of a
Jew, the first step in state ostracism. The Statut des juifs of the 4 October 1940 provided

for the internment of stateless Jews in “special camps.”5 The German authorities did not
demand either statute, thus negating any idea of a German diktat.6 The fact that the

Vichy regime came up with the idea of “special camps” for stateless Jews independently

of the Nazis cannot be overemphasized, despite denial, such as those made by Xavier

2 Declaration made by Charles de Gaulle before addressing the French Nation from the Hotel de
Ville, Paris 25 August 1944, in response to a request to solemnly proclaim the Republic by Georges
Bidault, head of the Conseil National de la Resistance. De Gaulle, Memoires, tome 2. 308. Conseil
National de la Resistance, CNR, became the Provisional Government of France under the leadership of de
Gaulle, 13 September 1945.

3 Loi du 3 octobre 1940 portant statut des juifs. Extrait du Joumel Ojjiciel du 18 octobre 1940,
5323, Archives Municipales de Saint Denis cote 32 ac 46, reproduced with permission. This statute
established the French definition of “Jew,” therefore including a notion of race, going beyond the first
German ordinance. It also banned Jews from certain public functions and professions. Michael R. Marrus
and Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1981, reprint, Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1995), 12. Page citations refer to the reprint edition.

4 Richard H. Weisberg, Vichy Law and the Holocaust in France (New York: New York
University Press 1996). This work offers a detailed legalistic comparison between the Vichy Regime’s own
anti-Semite legislation and that of the Nazis.
5 Loi du 4 octobre 1940 portant statut des juifs. Extrait du Joumel Qfficiel du 18 octobre 1940,
5324. Held in Archives Municipales de Saint Denis, cote 32 ac 46 examined with permission, but
unavailable for reproduction. This Statute established “camps speciaux, ” named concentration camps in
French, for stateless people, preponderantly Jewish. See Hauptsturmfuhrer Dannecker to Sturmbannfuhrer
Zeitschel dated Paris, 28 February 1941. Archives of Yad Vashem, Israel, sous la cote V-63. Cited in
Richard H. Weisberg, Vichy Law, 37.
6

Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France, 5. See also Weisberg, Vichy Law, 38.
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Vallat, Commissioner-general for Jewish Affairs the Vichy Regime’s Commissaire des

questions juives who asserted:
I refused to visit the camps, for I didn’t want my presence there to be interpreted by
the internees as a sign of acquiescence to measures that were solely the fault of the
invader.”7

These “special camps” known as “concentration camps” contained mostly Jews,
including German-bom Jews, but also political prisoners such as Communists, gypsies,

and refugees of the International Brigades in Spain.8 These camps contributed to the
deaths of many before deportation, including the elderly and children.9 For the most part

the responsibility for the camps, numbering 93 in 1940, lay entirely with the Vichy
regime.10 The Nazis, of course, seemed pleased with Vichy’s Jewish policies. The

memorandum from SS Sturmbannfuhrer Helmut Knochen to the Military High Command

in Paris dated 28 January 1941 attests:

The French regime has reckoned with this by promulgating a law of 10 October 1940
on foreigners of the Jewish race, making it possible to gather foreign Jews in specified
concentration camps.... I suggest that a meeting of all interested parties be convened
as soon as possible at which a piecemeal solution of this problem can be set in motion
towards the final solution (Bereinigung) of the Jewish question.11
The French October Statutes, undeniably autonomous acts, ultimately became key
legislation in a basic plan of state antisemitism. Such exclusionary discourse directed not

7 Xavier Vallat, Le Nez de Cleopatre: souvenirs d’unhomme de droite 1919-1944 (Paris: 1957),
269. Cited in Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France, 165. Xavier Vallat, longtime antisemite, was Commissaire
des questionsjuives, Vichy regime.
8 Anne Grynberg, Les camps de la honte: Les internes juifs des camps francais 1939-1944
(Paris: Editions La Decouverte/Poche, 1999), 11.
9

Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France, 165.

10 Ibid., 171. Grynberg’s more recent study however, gives a revised figure of 93 French
concentration camps. The first French concentration camp, Rieucros, became operational on 23 February
1939, therefore under the Third Republic.
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only at foreign bom Jews but included French Jews, accompanied by an equally effective
propaganda campaign, presented the Jews as but one of the nefarious influences Petain

would eradicate in order to save France.

The French population was easily duped by the image of Petain as a saviour.
Propaganda fed the fears of a Bolshevik invasion as evidenced by propaganda tracts
distributed in September 1941 in the Departement de Seine et Oise, situated in the

occupied zone.72 Propaganda thus weighed heavily on the idea that the unoccupied area,
Vichy France, was a haven protected by Petain.13 German occupation of France was

extended on 11 November 1942 to include the unoccupied areas.14 “If I could not be

your sword, I tried to be your shield,”15 proclaimed Marechai Petain on 20 August 1944

as he was being removed by retreating Nazis to Germany. It was at his trial in France in
1945 that the passive Vichy image in the hands of his defenders and partisans carefully

began its reshaping. “Day after day a dagger at my throat, I struggled against German
demands,” Petain said.16 This was Petain’s defense, and that of France. As a shield the

'1 Archives of Yad Vashem, Israel, sous la cote v-64. The law of 10 October should read 4
October 1940. The Final Solution was settled at the Wannsee Conference on 20 January 1942. Weisberg,
Vichy Law, 57.
12 Departement des Yvelines (west of Paris) one of the four Departements in the Paris region,
restructured in 1968 from Departement de Seine et Oise. Archives des Yvelines therefore contain all the
material relevant to Seine et Oise prior to this date.
13

“Ze Mensonge Bolcheviste. ” Propaganda tract Archives Departementales des Yvelines sous
la cote: 1 W 64. Reproduced with permission.
14 The military defeat of France led to German occupation which was dictated initially under the
terms of an Armistice, 25 June 1940. Article 3 of the said Armistice provides that the French government
assist the Germans in exercising the rights of the occupying power in the occupied zone, i.e. the north and
Atlantic coastal areas of France, including Bordeaux. On 11 November 1942 the Germans “invaded” the
unoccupied zone of Vichy France. See March Olivier Baruch, Le regime de Vichy (Paris: Editions La
Decouverte, 1996), for a discussion of the complexities of the Vichy Regime.
15 Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order 1940-1944 (New York: Knopf
1972, reprint, Columbia University Press, 1982), 47. Page citations refer to the reprint edition.
16

Ibid., 47.
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passive Vichy regime claimed to have protected the Jewish population of the unoccupied
zone from wearing the obligatory Yellow Star.17 However, the Vichy regime’s

installation of concentration camps on French soil, and the ease in which the Vichy

regime zealously interned reserves for deportation going beyond German requirements,18

does little to support an image of Petain as a saviour and diminishes the interpretation of
France as a victim of National Socialism.
De Gaulle’s presence at the Liberation coalesced French society behind a wellstructured myth, that France had been the victim of National Socialism. Due to the long
drawn-out defeat of Germany, the Absents, were slow to return.19 The Absents included

all categories of those deported, prisoners of war who had surrendered in June 1940,

those expulsed from Alsace Lorraine, and French men and women, who either willingly
or unwillingly, had been participants in the German work force. The Absents, ignorant of
what had happened at home, and in some cases shamed into silence, thus aided the

installation of the victim myth by laying to rest any interrogation of the Vichy regime’s
17 Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France, 236-231. From 7 June 1942 all Jews over 6 years of age had
to wear on the left side of an outer garment a yellow Star of David, upon which was written in black
letters “Juif' or “Juive. ” Marrus and Paxton further point out that the Eighth ordinance of 29 mai 1942
Verordnungsblatt des Militarbefehlshabers in Frankreich 1 juin 1942 (official journal of the German
military authority in France) states that three such stars were distributed at the local commissariat of police,
charged to a textile ration card. The Vichy regime opposed these measures but as Marrus and Paxton argue
the Vichy regime was more concerned that the Yellow Star discriminated against native French Jews, thus
impacting on French opinion. Moreover, these German measures removed authority from the Vichy
Regime over discrimination, a constant concern at Vichy.
18 Ibid., 227. The first convoy left Drancy 27 March 1942 to Auschwitz. It contained 1,112 Jews
and Communists; there were 19 survivors.
19 Annette Wieviorka, Deportation et Genocide: Entre la memoire et I 'oubli (Paris: Editions
Pion, 1992), 20-21. Wieviorka contends that 140,000 persons were deported from France. This figure
includes resistants, hostages, political prisoners, common law prisoners and persons arrested during round
ups. Of these 37,025 returned. Nevertheless, these figures do not include the some 700,000 French
workers present in Germany. Megan Koreman, “A Hero’s homecoming: The Return of the Deportees to
France, 1945,” Journal of Contemporary History 32 (1) 1997 9-22, cites 2 million Absents and deportees
but gives no further breakdown of figures. See also Jean-Pierre Rioux, La France de la Quatrieme
Republique, tome 1, L ’ardeur et la necessite 1944-1952 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1980), 26. Rioux does
not include French workers or expulsions from Alsace Lorraine. The term “Absent” is therefore used by
the writer to attempt to include all categories but without actual statistical precision.
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involvement as an indigenous political force with its own ideology. Nor did the survivors

of the concentration camps find an eager audience willing to listen to their tales of
betrayal by France. Silence became the order of the day.20 This was convenient to all the

actors, including the French Communist Party, whose glorification of its heroic stance as

a unified, classless force, alone against the enemy, effaced its leadership’s earlier
reluctance to come to the aid of France and the Jews. The French Communist Party could

not be ignored as a major player on the French political scene; consequently it could not

take the risk of demise in public opinion which would jeopardize its place as an
acceptable political entity. The victim myth was thus allowed to remain unchallenged, as
did its correlate, that the Vichy regime, despite its faults, saved France from a worse fate.

Like the Communists, de Gaulle did not oppose the pasting over of the France of Nazi
partisans. Together they transposed the victim/shield myth into a new historical
narrative. Facilitated by a deepening domestic political situation and the onset of the

Cold War, these myths, accompanied by the excesses and failures of the post-war purges
known as I ’epuralion, repressed any collective or individual challenge as to national

culpability. This victim/shield myth became deeply rooted in France initially through the
public trials of the Vichy regime leaders. These trials ensured the foundations of the

myth in bypassing a legal examination of the regime’s ideological roots, and addressing
•

only the superficial role of Vichy leaders.

21

The trial records of the Vichy regime leaders

20 Wieviorka, Deportation, 76, refers to public opinion little interested in the problems of
deportation both Jewish and non-Jewish. Wieviorka further asserts that censorship prevailed initially,
especially concerning the female deportees returning from Ravensbruck, whose names were removed from
the official list published to announce their return. It was only after all the Absents returned that the full
impact of events in the camps began to take effect on public opinion. Vieviorka, Deportation, 64.
21 Eric Conan and Henry Rousso, Vichy, un passe qui ne passe pas (Paris: Editions Gallimard,
1996), 28. The authors contend that during the trial of Rene Bousquet in 1949 the High Court apparently
neglected to take into account evidence regarding the anti-Jewish policy of the Vichy regime figured in the
“dossier d’instructions. "
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in turn produced an inadequate historical scholarship, under the guidance of a Gaullist
historian, Robert Aron, whose subjective study remained the accepted official version for

twenty years. 22 Finally, and more importantly, the myth could flourish amidst a

compromised nation not predisposed to revelations and that re-incorporated into its midst
many former Vichy officials whose need for the myth reinforced.
The creation and existence of the Gaullist construction of history encouraged a warweary population to develop a collective determination to forget painful episodes of the
national past in which many had played compromising roles. One such painful episode to

both the people and the army was the defeat of 1940. At the Liberation, de Gaulle seized
the opportunity to immediately address the military defeat by proclaiming that, ‘Trance

was submerged by the German military might which precipitated France into disorder,

materially and morally, which enabled defeatism and treason to paralyze many who had
the will to win.”23 Still, divided like the France it served, the soldiers had certainly not

all exiled themselves to London. At war’s end a demoralized and compromised French
army lost out to the glorified Resistance, but de Gaulle claimed that all the French had

stood together in the Resistance to defeat the German foe.
Speaking before a military audience of a reconstituted French army almost one year
after the Liberation of Paris, de Gaulle placed the Second World War within a “thirty

year war.” De Gaulle stated that, ‘Trance discovers with lucidity what effort is needed to
repair all that this war, begun thirty years ago, has destroyed of her substance.”

O1

De
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Robert Aron, Histoire de Vichy 1940-1944 (Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1954).

23

De Gaulle, Discours et Messages pendant la guerre, tome 1 (Paris: Editions Pion, 1970), 445.

24 De Gaulle, Memoires, tome 2. 58. Speech given at the Hotel de Ville, Paris, 2 avril, 1945.
French history books in use until 1967 also refer to the “thirty year war.” See Josserand, Personne, Vallee
and Menard, Histoire: Classe de seconde (Paris: Editions Fernand Nathan, 1960), 183.
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Gaulle s vision of France included a powerful and honorable army. The imagery of the
“thirty year war” subtly excluded precise reference to the fall of France and defeat.
Encompassed within “Zes annees noires” it had been civilians, without uniform and
orders, that took France to the brink, not the army. This subtle correlation of a disorderly

civilian population of partisans fighting their own fratricidal battles, left the cleansed
army on the sidelines, ready to step in to obliterate internal divisions and restore the

values of the Republic. By wiping the slate clean, de Gaulle could then carefully place
the army back in its rightful position as a maintainer of the values of the Republic, which

had not been defeated, the Republic which never ceased to exist throughout the “thirty

year war,” while at the same time diminishing the powerful presence the heroic but
factious Resistance had among the population as a protector of France. The “thirty year
war” fused the victory of 1918 into the victorious Liberation by the French of France,

carefully eclipsing events in between. This was de Gaulle’s way of re-interpretating

French military failures at German hands in the twentieth century.
De Gaulle’s construction of history still echoes in many villages and towns
throughout France today, wherever war monuments commemorate a list of soldiers who

have fallen in the service of France in the twentieth century. More often than not the
dead soldiers of the Second World War appear as an appendix, their names engraved on

as an addition to the First World War, further reiterating the image of the “thirty year
war.”25 The emergence of the image of the “thirty year war,” to honor a France unified

in resistance against the enemy, did not accurately represent reality. Juxtaposed against
the Gaullist historical construction of unity and honor was the boiling civil unrest that

25

Henry Rousso, Le Syndrome de Vichy de 1944 a nos jours (Paris: Editions du Seul, 1990), 38.
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emanated from the downfall of the Vichy regime and the transition towards democracy
from 1944 to 1946, known as I ’epuration.26

At the Liberation of France the Forces Francoises Libres, under the orders of Charles
de Gaulle, instigated the process of I ’epuration to remove all traces of the enemy in the

guise of collaborators. Four distinct types of collaboration, administrative, economic,

individual, and intellectual came under judicial examination. This was the official
epuration. Running parallel to the official epuration was a wholly different form, the

unofficial epuration, which also included a gender specific form known as “les femmes

tondues. ”

*7*7

L ’epuration process was not just a series of trials and executions, but rather

a cultural phenomena with deep social and political implication, characterized by three
distinct phases distinguishing I ’epuration in both time and space.

The first phase occurred during combat in the spring of 1944, followed by the period
delineating restoration of order by the Provisional Government, with another wave
no

correlated to the return of the Absents from April 1945.

Moreover, the phenomenon

was transposed onto diverse geographic situations specific to Occupied France with its
own regime of state collaboration.

29

The breadth and application of I ’epuration is thus

26 Peter Novick, L ’epuration francaise 1944-1949 with a foreword by Jean-Pierre Rioux, trans.
Helene Temois (London: 1968, trans, ed. Paris: Editions Balland, 1985). All page citations are to
translated version. This work exemplifies the early research on the complexities of I’epuration.
27 Fabrice Virgili, La France "virile. ” Des femmes tondues a la Liberation (Paris: Editions
Payot, 2000), 7.
28 Rousso, “L’epuration en France: Une histoire inachevee,” in Vingtieme Siecle Revue d’histoire
(323)janvier-mars 1992: 78-105.
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Ibid., 80.
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correlated to geographic factors, high Maquis activity,30 or the areas where massacres or
executions impacted the local population.31

In the midst of civil unrest this process was also used as a political tool to enable de
Gaulle to seize power, thus shaping both the objectives of I’epuration and its outcome.
High profile public trials of the leaders of the Vichy regime took place, the death penalty

inflicted and carried out on thirteen ministers, among others.32 The High Court, after the
Liberation, tried collaborators under Article 75 of the Penal Code of 1939 which

traditionally punished acts of "intelligences avec I’ennemi. ”33 This article, though
legally watertight, provided for non-patriotic acts of contact or dealings with the enemy

and not for the ideological involvement of the collaborators, who could not thereby be
judged as partisans of fascism or Nazism. Thus, in the trial of Raphael Alibert, his role in

enacting and carrying out the first anti-Jewish Statutes of October 1940 did not come to

light.34 The antisemitic initiatives of the Vichy Regime were consequently overlooked

or ignored as judicial procedure required evidence to prove or disprove the charges only

30 Rioux, La France, 49. Novick, L 'epuration, 17. Note: Areas such as L’Auvergne, the south
west of France, including Limoges and Bordeaux, and the region Rhone-Alpes were areas of intense
Maquis activity, often Communist inspired. Subsequently, these areas also produced in turn intense Milice
and Nazi activity both against the civilian population in reprisal and the Maquis.
31 Massacre of the Maquis on the Plateau de Glieres, near Thorens, Haute Savoie, (region of
Rhone-Alpes) 26 March 1944. On 23 August 1944, 97 Milice were brought before an improvised “Court
Martial.” 76 were executed. See Denis Chegaray and Olivier Doat, L 'epuration: Haute Savoie 1944
(Paris: 1992) La Sept, 90 mins, for further details.

32 These included Laval, Damand, de Brinon and Pucheu. Petain’s sentence was commuted by
De Gaulle. Brasillach, though not a Minister, was also executed. Jean Defresne, Histoire de la
Collaboration (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1989), 112.
33 Article 75 of the Code penal 1939 "intelligences avec I 'ennemi" - to be in contact or to have
dealings either overtly or covertly with the enemy.
34 Robert O. Paxton, “Vichy Fifty Years After,” in Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the
Western Society for French History 1994 21: 236. AN Journel Officiel 18 octobre 1940 Archives
Municipales, Saint Denis, departement Seine Saint Denis, sous la cote 32 ac 46. Raphael Alibert, Ministre
de la Justice, Vichy Regime, drafted and enacted Les Statutes ani-Juifi of 3 and 4 octobre 1940, reproduced
with permission.

34

under Article 75.35 A total of 108 cases came before the High Court under this article.
Apart from the execution of 13 ministers, one life sentence was handed down, while
other sentences ranged from hard labor to loss of civic rights.36 Early historians, such as

Robert Aron, studying "les annees noires” relied heavily on judicial documents of this
period as primary source evidence of collaboration. He did not examine the ideological

input of the Vichy Regime leadership, and consequently he produced a version of events
of the period that formed a cornerstone of the Gaullist historical construction?7
While ignoring the ideological orientation of government officials, the court did

address that of Vichy era intellectuals. For example, Robert Brassillach, the fascist

ideologist and writer, was arrested and brought to trial before the High Court in January

1945.38 He was condemned to death in this high profile trial, and executed. The literary
•

•

•

•

scholar Alice Kaplan, in a recent reconstruction of the trial of Brassillach

demonstrates

that Brasillach was an ideal scapegoat for the immediate postwar France, suffering from
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Paxton, “Vichy Fifty Years After,” 236.

36 Rousso, “L’epuration en France,” 89. The High Court had jurisdiction only for members of the
Vichy government between 16 June 1940 and 25 August 1944. This Court for example, dismissed 42
cases. Rousso emphasizes that this figure, as all figures concerning / 'epuration, must be treated with
caution. Numerical inconsistencies have created tremendous debate over the years, which has not ceased.
Rousso’s analysis deals with all the complex and controversial figures appertaining to l’epuration both
judicial and non-judiciaL He points out that scholarship is still incomplete as the Military Tribunals,
though first to function, cannot be incorporated into any work as there are no sources available to date.
Novick, L 'epuration, also deals extensively with l’epuration and its controversial figures.
37 Robert Aron, Histoire de Vichy. Historians of the period did not have access to more relevant
material, which may, or may not have appeared during the “instructions ” — the preliminary arraignment
sessions, when the accused would be faced with documents to support the accusation, neither did they have
access to the whole prosecution dossier.

38 Robert Brasillach, writer and editor in chief of Je suis Partout an extreme right wing
publication of the period, was a known virulent antisemite, and acerbic opponent of democracy. In January
1945 Brasillach was brought to trial before the High Court though he was not a minister of the Vichy
Regime. De Gaulle refused a pardon, and Brasillach was condemned to death and executed on 6 February
1945, the only writer of his calibre to receive this sentence.
39 Alice Kaplan, The Collaborator: The Trial and Execution ofRobert Brasillach (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2000).
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deep humiliation.40 Kaplan contests that “[w]ith Brasillach’s punishment, the
government committed an irrevocable act, an execution that consolidated de Gaulle’s
power....”41 In effect, Gaullists hoped that Brasillach’s execution would close the

chapter on the National Revolution of the Vichy regime, thus further exonerating the
Republic.
Despite even the presence of the myth that legally the Republic had never ceased to
exist, the Provisional Government, with de Gaulle at its head, had a difficult task in

securing control of the state in the aftermath of the war. Political stakes were high so
only the most virulent of Vichy’s legislation was repealed, the majority of civil servants
remained. Novick asserts that de Gaulle’s recommendations concerning I’epuration of

the administration were an exercise in indulgence.42 Many of the State’s servants had

been nominated before the Vichy regime’s reign and continued to serve; others had been
nominated by the Vichy regime itself. De Gaulle therefore, had to retain former Vichy
regime civil servants within the new structure, while at the same time appearing to be
carrying out I ’epuration. Consequently, one of the most difficult aspects ot reparation at

the Liberation, from a political point of view, was I’epuration of the French

administration itself.
De Gaulle’s main concern was a prompt return to normality within the legitimacy of
the Republic. As a result, / ’epuration of the French administration was, for the most part,
symbolically political in nature. This is illustrated by the choice of punishing Francois

Chasseigne, Minister of Provisions in the Vichy regime, a forceful supporter of sending
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Ibid., 229.

41

Ibid.
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Cahierspolitiques, No. 2 (juillet 1943). Cited by Peter Novick, L’epuration, 159.
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French workers to Germany, as a gesture to the Partie Communist Francais.^ The
epuration of the French administration was also uneven in its application, as evidenced

by the thoroughness exercised in the police force (in the region of Rennes for example,
there were 95 sanctions for 1,548 cases examined), limited in the army, the Ministries of

the Interior, Foreign Affairs and Colonies, and weak everywhere else.44
L ’epuration economique was even more moderate largely because of the need for the

Conseil national de la Resistance to exercise control. In some plants the presence of

Comites ouvriers de gestion or Comitespatriotiques d’enterprise 45 under the influence of

the PCF, were extremely powerful, thus justifying the demands of the state to preserve
“/a continuite de I’etat.” Domestic political considerations were, therefore, more

important than a penetrating I ’epuration of this sector. Nevertheless, some sanctions
were imposed by the CNR. One of the most well known of those punished was the
automobile company Renault. “From 1940 until 1943 the Renault automobile company
delivered more than 6 milliards de francs of war material to Germany,” announces a

leading article in Combat. 46 Louis Renault, the industrialist and prominent member of
the French business milieu, was among those arrested. Combat also reported the arrest of
the financier, Hippolyte Worms, alleged with others of having financed the manufacture

of submarines for the enemy.47 Worms did not come to trial; the court dismissed his

43 Combat (Paris) 4 septembre 1944. All newspaper articles are reproduced from the Dossiers
de Presse, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, except
otherwise stated and translated by the writer.
44

Jean-Pierre Rioux, La France, 59.

46 “L 'industriel Louis Renault est place sous mandat de depot. De 1940 a 1943 ses usines ont
livre a I'Allemagne plus de 6 milliards de francs de material de guerre. " Combat (Paris) 24 septembre
1944. Louis Renault died in prison before coming to trial.
47 “Arre stat ions de financiers et d'industriels.” Combat (Paris) 24 septembre 1944. Combat was
the left wing newspaper of a clandestine resistance cell, Combat, of which Albert Camus was a member. It
became the organ of the Resistance, and was published and distributed covertly. Camus became the editor
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case. 48 Despite conflict, de Gaulle’s plea for continute de Petal remained overridingly
the priority.
The nature and the role of the epuration initially were spelled out in the high profile

trials but slowly impatience and lassitude took over, dispersed with anger among the
population, particularly over the shortcomings of justice. Notorious culprits did go free,

as Rene Bousquet’s acquittal demonstrated. The minor figures, not having influence or
lawyers to plead their cases, were dealt with far more harshly. This category of

collaborator came before specially created courts composed of a Magistrate and four jury

members. These courts operated from 26 June 1944 until 31 January 1951 handing down
a range of sentences from imprisonment to death.49

Still another cateogory of jurisdiction existed known as "chambres civique. ” These

courts functioned from 28 August 1944 until 31 December 1949, deciding cases of “no
charge to answer” or loss of civil rights. Together these courts dealt with 132,828 cases,

pronouncing 7,037 sentences of the death penalty of which 791 individuals were
executed.50 The judicial application of administering I 'epuration raised serious

questions as to its objectivity. Both the political and economic dimensions of the official

epuration process also left festering doubts as to its objectivity and effectiveness. Most

of Combat in 1943 until 1947, and wrote the first Paris edition editorial at Liberation. Combat actively
clamoured for a thorough epuration in its columns, evidenced by the articles on Hippolyte Worms, among
others.

48 Pierre Assouline, “Georges Albertini, I’eminence grise de 1’anticommunisme,” in L ’Histoire
90 (juin, 1986): 14-28. Hippolyte Worms remained head of the Banque Worms, despite being Jewish,
throughout the Vichy period. Banque Worms was one of the most important and influential merchant
banks in France, and is known for its direct financing of the Nazi war effort and the Vichy regime.
49

Rousso, “L’epuration en France,” 88.

50 Ibid., 90. These figures must be read with caution and are cited as an example of completeness
up to the end of 1948, despite their later contradicton and inaccuracy.
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historians describe the official epuration as a failure51 that prosecuted lower level

officials much more efficiently than Vichy political leaders.
The space between war and victory is slim and within that space disorder and
injustice, companions in war, become companions also in victory. Liberation was such a

period. Widespread unofficial epuration within the space of war and victory occurred
outside of de Gaulle’s orders that justice be an affair of the state.52 In a number of areas
in France, ordinary unauthorized citizens, often settling old political scores and betrayal,

carried out high numbers of summary executions. The most reliable, though still

controversial estimates, suggest a figure of at least 4,500 summary executions occurred in
France in the months following the Liberation.53 The message of the Resistance clearly
was revenge. Calls for retributive justice came over the radio from London, or appeared
in various underground newspapers. Pierre Brossolette,54 journalist and later martyr of

the Resistance, transmitted the names of known collaborators in the French police over

Radio London.55 The newspaper, Le Populaire,56 clandestine publication of the Socialist

51 For example: Novick, L 'epuration, 298. Rioux, La France, 49-67. Francois Rouquet,
“L’epuration administrative en France apres La Liberation: Une analyse statistique et geographique,” in
Fingtieme siecle Revue d’histoire (jan-mars 1992): 106-117. Rousso, “L’epuration en France,” 78-105.
52 De Gaulle, Discours de guerre, tome II (Fribourg: 1944-45), 213. "Il nepeuty avoir d’autorite
publique qu ‘emanant d’un pouvoir responsible. Toute autre formation, en dehors du government serait
intolerable et condamnee d’avance. ”
53 Novick, L 'epuration, 126. See appendix C 317-324 for details. However, a study conducted
by Marcel Baudot, for the Comite d’histoire de la deuxieme guerre mondial, “L’epuration: bilan chiffre,
in Bulletin del’IHTP 25 septembre 1986, 37-53, offers a more recent but still partial synthesis and comes to
the figure of about 8,100 cases for 84 departements out of 90. An exact analysis with regard to the still
controversial issue of summary executions is therefore beyond the scope of this paper.
54 Pierre Brossolette, a leading member of the Resistance in the occupied zone, was arrested on a
mission in Brittany and threw himself from a window during torture.
55 Radio London. Transmission of July 1943 by Pierre Brossolette. Cited by Herbert Lottman,
L 'epuration: 1943-1945, trans. Beatrice Vieme (Paris: Fayard et Editions du Seuil, 1986), 34.
56

Le Populaire (clandestine) mars, 1943. Cited by Lottman, L 'epuration, 33.
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Party warned, after the assassination of Marx Dormoy, former Minister of Interior of the

Front Populaire: “We have sworn to avenge the killing of Marx Dormoy.” In the same
edition the editor wrote, “French Patriots will find all the traitors and settle the scores.”

The population, fearful, and persistently exposed to economic sanctions, including severe
food shortages, were easy targets for calls for retributive justice, particularly after

massacres, such as that which occurred in Ascq in 1944.57 After this massacre a
Socialist Party member commented “One day scores will be settled. The hour of

punishment will come and we will not forget the Damands,58 the Phillipe Henriots59 and

other miliciens.. .”60
Unequally distributed geographically, severe acts of spontaneous violence, seemingly

expressions of deep popular uncontrolled anger, were also present, not always correlated

to vengeance. Novick contends, for example, that some 1,955 summary executions had

no motive.61 Rumors of a Communist plot to seize power, reminiscent of La Grande

Peur of 1789, also played a role.

67

The rumors spread to include allegations of the

57 1 April 1944 in Ascq near Lille 86 men were executed by SS troops in reprisal for the
sabotage of a train.
58
Joseph Damand, Secretary-general for Maintenance of Order from December 1943. Also
Head of the Milice Vichy Regime. The death penalty was inflicted by the High Court, and Damand was
executed in October 1945.

59 Philippe Henriot, Minister of Information and the voice of Radio Vichy, Vichy Regime. He
was assassinated on 28 June 1944.
60 “Nos martyrs, ” Le Populaire, organe due Parti Socialiste, edition de la zone nord, no. 33, mai
1944. Cited in Sarah Farmer, Martyred Village: Commemorating the 1944 Massacre at Oradour-sur-Glane
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 61.
61

Novick, L'epuration, 127.

62 La Grande Peur of 1789 - originated in local panics related to the political crisis of the period
which branched out, carried by rumor, to many regions of France.
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setting up of Soviet Republics in Limoges, Toulouse, Montpellier and Nice.63 The

Gaullist historian Robert Aron contends that the F.T.P. (Francs-Tireurs et Partisans

Francois) had an order to proclaim the Dordogne region as “La Republique des Soviets
du sud de la France.”6* The Communists did not possess any military power capable of

overthrowing the Provisional Government of de Gaulle, but did enjoy immense
popularity as the “Partie des Fusilles” for their contribution to the Resistance, and
moreover were a serious contender in the immediate postwar power game.65
The Gaullist mythical united France that was juxtaposed against the fury of

/ ’epuration was captured by the pen of Jean Paul Sartre for posterity, when he described

the Insurrection Parisienne,^ His eye-witness account of events surrounding the
presence in the center of Paris (Rue de Rivoli) of the Forces Francoises Libres (de
Gaulle’s Army) and the Forces Francoises de I’lnterieur (Civilian Resistance),67 records

the presence of a different atmosphere in the streets to that expressed officially on the

balcony at the Hotel de Ville, an atmosphere where civilians, so long used to being left to
their own devices without legal restraint, represented a threat to the order and need for
63

Herbert Leuthy, France Against Herself (New York: 1955), 102. Cited by Novick,
L'epuration, 128.

64 Robert Aron, Histoire de la Liberation de la France: juin 1944-mai 1945 (Paris: 1959), 594.
Cited by Novick, L 'epuration, 128.

65 Rioux, La France, 85, cites the figure of 75,000 Communists who were executed but cautions
that the figure is more likely to be in the region of 40,000.

66 Insurrection Parisiennne —Uprising of the civilian population of Paris 19-25 August, 1944,
led by the Resistance. On the 24 August the Deuxieme Division Blindee du General Leclerc, Forces
Francoises Libres, entered Paris.
67 The Resistance was composed of 2 principal units, FTPF - Fondation des Francs tireurs et
partisans francais, known as FTP, formed by the Communists March 1942. Attached to the FTP was a
group of Communist immigrants, MOI (Main 'd'Oeuvre Immigree) composed principally of Eastern
European Jews and Spanish civil war refugees. Known only by code names, unaided by the Resistance or
the Allies in their activities, they suffered heavy casualties and received little official recognition from
either the Communists or the Gaullists at Liberation. FFI - Forces Francoises de I interieur - formed 29
December 1943, made up the second principal unit.
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legality necessary to take control of a France bordering on civil strife. Sartre wrote as
follows:

The Insurrection Parisienne marked for the first time in living memory scenes of the
crowd fraternizing with the Army. Seen for the first time ever in the same parade
under the same accolade of the crowd, civilian fighters, armed for guerrilla warfare and
ambush, for revolt and for the one sided fight behind the barricades; and the
impeccable soldiers and their officers. The crowd applauded each; obscurely
understanding the double meaning of the parade, patriotic and revolutionary.68

Sartre’s image of the scenes oil’Insurrection Parisienne, with revolution in the air,
though confined to the streets of Paris, contrasts sharply with that of others who

witnessed the Liberation, particularly those who lived through the period surreptitiously.
Revenge seemed more important than revolution. One such example is that of Leo
Bretholz. 69

Leo Bretholz was a member of a Resistance group called AJ or “Armee Juive ” in
Limoges in 1944. He was known under the code name of Max Henri Lefevre. Referring

to the liberation of Limoges in an interview concerning his experiences he states:

The collaborators were arrested, too. Unfortunately, there was also during that period a
lot of spur of the moment, perhaps hasty, emotional reaction to those that we, the
underground had perceived as being collaborators...like selling, dealing black market,
or cohorting or fraternizing with some of the German officers - including some of the
people that we had known, our own people. And it was not uncommon for someone
whom we knew who did black market, even if they were Jewish, to be executed
actually without trial, without jury, without due process. But the emotions were so
high that these things happened in...I wouldn’t just say a few cases. There were
quite...there were many. 70

68 Jean-Paul Sartre, “Un promeneur dans Paris Insurge (VII): Un Jour de Victoire parmi les
balles, ” Combat (Paris) 4 septembre, 1944.

69 Leo Bretholz, member of the Limoges cell of the Armee Juive Resistance Group. Known as
Max Henri Lefevre.
70 Leo Bretholz, interview by Linda Kuzmack on behalf of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum,
Washington DC. Transcribed and processed by the Department of Oral History of the USHMM.
September 27 1989. Reproduced with permission from the archival holdings of the USHMM
RG.50.030.0039.
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Despite attempts by de Gaulle to present France as a unified entity void of ideological

chasms, with its values safeguarded in the Resistance, France, in reality, was far from

being unified.
After four years of repression, fear, and censorship, the Liberation released

resentments and hate. Drawing upon old mysoginist currents, uncontrollable public
condemnation of women also exploded. From as early as 1943 until the beginning of

1946, women, arbitrarily accused by the population at large of having had sexual

relations with Germans, were publicly shaved. Symbolically sacrificed on the altar of
retribution and revenge, these women, “Zes tendues,” have remained voiceless. Cast out
of society by society, their “participation” in “les annees noires” is one which conjures up

shame, humiliation, and denial.
The lack of precise historical evidence has complicated the reconstruction of

/ ’epuration targeting women. Henry Rousso relies on cultural anthropological factors to
demonstrate the intricacies of this gender specific form of collective violence. His work

highlights in some cases the complicity of the legal authorities in these practices, which
targeted women specifically.71 Jacques Bounin, former Commissaire de la Republique in

Montpellier, states in his memoirs that during a meeting with the Forces Francoises de
I’Interieur he had no scruples in proposing that...“women who have slept with Germans

will be taken to the service de la prostitution they will be shaved and recorded after

having submitted to a medical examination for venereal disease.”

The philosopher,

Alain Brossat, is no less critical of the gender discrimination practiced throughout France

71 Rousso, “L’Epuration en France,” 78-105.
72 Jacques Bounin, Beaucoup d’imprudence (Paris: Stock, 1974) 155-156. Cited in Rousso,
L’epuration en France,” 84. “Les femmes qui ont couche avec les Allemands seront conduites au service de
la prostitution; elles seront tondues et mises en carte apres avoir subi un examen venerien.
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in targeting women in this ritualistic form of collective punishment.73 Brossat asserted

that the ceremonial aspect reveals the ritualistic nature expressed; women‘s heads were

shaved in a place of public prominence such as a village square or in front of a public

building. As with all rituals attention to detail was paramount. The victims were usually
placed on chairs in full public view, sometimes raised above the crowd. Male

hairdressers would begin the ritual, armed with the tools of their trade. Crowd
participation was vital.74 Some women were left with a thin pony tail at the back of the

head to be used to drag them with; some had the swastika marked on their foreheads in
black paint or wax; some were paraded nude, others partially or fully clothed; some were
forced to wear chains or harnesses used for cattle. During the parade, the crowd, which

included other women and children, would jeer, insult and in some cases physically
assault “les tondues.”15 There was a carnival element to the ritual of humiliation and
revenge.76

Eyewitness accounts survive in memoirs and autobiographies, many by Allied

troops. 77 At Sosel, near Menton, two American soldiers were eyewitnesses to the shaving
of five or six young girls in the village square. They recalled that “The next morning

they brought each girl to the small square they sat them on chairs one after the other and

73 Alain Brossat, Les Tondues: un carnaval moche (Paris: Editions Manya, 1992) et Liberation,
fetefolle, 6 juin44-8 mai 45: mythes et rites ou le grand theatre de passions populaire (Paris: Editions
Autrement, Serie Memoires, no. 30, 1994).
74 There does not appear to be any ethnographic evidence available to date where “les tondues ”
were shaved in private.
75

Brossat, Les Tondues, refers.

76 Julia Kristeva, La revolution du languagepoetique (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1974), offers a
discussion based on the anthropological interpretation of carnival. Michail Bakhtin, Le Principle
dialogique (Paris: 1981), also refers to this aspect.
77 Brossat, Les Tondues, refers.
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shaved them completely. After each shaving, the villagers, who were all present
applauded....”78 A number of photographs exist, such as the one taken by Robert Capa in
Chartres the day of its liberation.79 Moreover, some background images of “les tondues”
appear in newsreel footage of the period.80 There are also some accounts from the
press.81 Combat published an appeal to dignity by the Commandant of the Forces

Francoises de I ’Interieure oil’He de France warning that the practice must stop and that
severe punishment would be administered to those who disobeyed.82 The National

Archives of France also contain some examples of the “femmes tondues” phenomenon.
In the town of Rambervilliers, in the Vosges, returning deportees set up a “People’s
Tribunal” in a cafe and shaved the heads of about a dozen women in June 1945.83 This
incident also demonstrates the duration of the phenomenon, though it could also be

correlated to the return of deportees to the area. For the most part, however, archival
documentation on “les tondues ” is limited and subject to the discretion of the Ministry of

78 Robert H. Adleman, Colonel George Walton, The Champagne Campaign (Boston-Toronto:
Little, Brown and Company, 1969). Cited by Brossat, Les Tondues, 37.

79 Robert Capa, Photograph taken 18 aout 1944 features a tondue carrying a baby being paraded
after the “ceremony” through the streets of Chartres. Reproduced in Brossat, Les Tondues. The crowd is
visibly in a joyous mood and includes women and children. For a precise analysis of the photograph and
others consult Brossat, Les Tondues, 25-30.

80 Brossat, Les Tondues, 65. Newsreel footage with glimpses of les femmes tondues appears in
Alain Resnais, “Hiroshima mon amour. ” (France: 1959) and again in Ophuls, Le Chagrin et la Pitie
(France: 1971) though in neither film is the subject addressed, except the fictional depiction of the trauma
of a tondue interwoven with the newsreel in Resnais’s film. The screenplay of this film is by Marguerite
Duras.
81

James Wellard, Sunday Express (London) 20 August 1944.

82

Combat 4 septembre, 1944. L 'He de France is the Departement governing Paris.

Archives Nationales 72, AJ 384, Ministere de la Guerre, direction de la Gendarmerie 25 mai15 juin 1945. The incident in Rambervillers is referred to in the work of Megan Koreman, “A hero’s
homecoming: The return of the Deportees to France, 1945,” in Journal of Contemporary History 97 Vol.
32(1), 9-22.
83
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Culture.84 Though historical scholarship regarding this facet of I 'epuration, remains

incomplete, it still serves as evidence of the falsity of the Gaullist myth of unity and

honor.85
By April 1946 newspaper headlines were reporting less severe forms of punishment
for collaboration.

OX

By December 1948, 69 per cent of those condemned had been

released, and the dismantling of special courts in January 1951 did not register with the

public as being of importance.

R "7

L ’epuration had served its purpose as a safety valve in

the immediate aftermath of the war, concentrating on punishing individual crime rather
than addressing the deep significance of collective crime, or the social and political

phenomena encasing it. A law of Amnesty of 6 August 1953 effectively silenced any
further debate.
The deep divisions resulting from Occupation and collaboration were denied in
official commemoration of the war. The dishonor of the Second World War which a

stoic de Gaulle tried to dissimulate by fusing it into one vast war, could not be

commemorated other than as an addition to the First World War. Consequently, there
could be no national monument uniquely dedicated to the Second World War in France.
As a social act and practice remembering was thus confined to glorifying the
84 The French National Archives are governed on this subject, classed as “non encore librement
communicables,” by the Law 79-18 of 3 janvier 1979- decret no. 79-1038 of 3 decembre 1979. Access
therefore requires an official demand made to the Ministry of Culture for an exemption under the above
law. Even with the derogation reproduction rights are severely restricted on this subject.
85 The case of famous fashion designer Chanel is an example of the disparity in punishing
women suspected of sexual liasons with the Germans. Chanel was arrested in September 1944 but quickly
released to exile in Switzerland. Edmonde Charles-Roux, Chanel and her world (Paris: The Vendome
Press, 1981), refers.
86 “Le tarif de la Trahison est en baisse, " Le Parisien Libere (Paris) 19 avril 1946. Reproduced
with permission from the Archives Departementales des Yvelines, Versailles, France, sous la cote U5
Hp51.1.
87

Rioux, La France, 57.
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Resistance,
as evidenced by the erection of national monuments which specifically

recognized the Resistance in a sort of historical vacuum.89

De Gaulle’s France preferred to honor collective sacrifice rather than, for example,

Jewish suffering as was done even in Germany. Near Annecy, in Haute Savoie, a
roadside sign indicates “Silence: Haul lieu de la Resistance. ” Above the sign, in the

mountains of the Massif de Mont Blanc, lies the site of one of the most brutal massacres

of the Resistance. On 26 March 1944 the Wehrmacht, accompanied by the local French

Milice, killed about one third of the besieged 450 Resistance trapped in the Massif du

Mont Blanc. The survivors were deported after torture.90 From a necropole situated in
the valley below the site, in which lie 150 Resistance members’graves, a huge French
flag flies, visible for miles around. There is another roadside sign in this region which

leads to “La Maison d’lzieu” from where 44 Jewish children were betrayed by French
citizens and deported; there were no survivors.91 No monument has ever been erected by

the state there. Geographically close, these two sites remain separated in memory and
consequently in commemoration.

Collective civilian massacres also received national recognition and homage by the

state, but not many individual crimes and atrocities committed by the Das Reich Division

88 Maurice Halbwach, On Collective Memory, trans. Lewis A.Coser (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1992), 188. Refers to Halbwach’s theory that remembering is a social act and practice.

89
Mont Valerien in Paris, Plateau des Glieres, Haute Savoie, and Vercors, Departement
d’Isere, where the SS eliminated the Maquis de Vercors, 21-23 July 1944.
90 Plateau de Glieres, near Thorens, Haute Savoie. Haute lieu de la Resistance. A massacre of
the Resistance occurred here on 26 March 1944.

91 Maison d’lzieu, situated in the Departement d’Ain, secretly housed Jewish children. On 6
April 1944 they were rounded up, transported to the Prison of Montluc in Lyon, then transported via
Drancy to Auschwitz, accompanied by 7 adults. Only one adult survived. See Sabine Zlatin, Memoires de
la Dame d’lzieu, with a foreword by Francois Mitterrand (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1992).
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throughout the Limoges area did not receive attention. Near Limoges, the small market

town of Oradour sur-Glane was the site of a massacre of 642 women, children, and men,
committed by the Das Reich Division on 10 June 1944. In March 1945 de Gaulle visited

Oradour and in the next year the French State passed legislation designating Oradour a
, .

historic monument.

92

Oradour represents a rather unique opportunity to observe the

persistent tensions which exist in France. The official commemoration detaches Oradour
from its historical context. Situated in an area where there was heavy Resistance activity,
Oradour was presented not as an act of reprisal, but as a massacre of innocent French

citizens. Sarah Farmer notes that “The commemoration of Oradour perpetuates the

memory of a random massacre of French civilians uninvolved in any resistance

activity.”93 Thus, by removing Oradour from any association with the Resistance, and
moreover, emphasizing clearly that it was perpetrated by Germans, “pure” martyrdom
was achieved.

Through a decidedly political and partisan policy dictating the choice of

commemorative monuments many other sites have been overlooked by the French State

or ignored. On 16 and 17 July 1942 13,152 Jews, including 4115 children, were rounded
up by 4,500 French police under the orders of Vichy Regime’s Police Chief Rene

Bousquet in Paris and transported to VeVd’Hiv. On 31 July the adults were deported to

the extermination camps in the East. Only a few returned. At the end of August the
children were deported. Since the Liberation this site has been the scene of a discrete,

unofficial commemoration ceremony. There was no official presence until the 50 year

commemoration ceremony in 1992, when President Mitterrand attended. Still, he refused
92

93

Farmer, Martyred Village, 59.
Ibid., 57.
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to acknowledge the French state’s responsibility in the acts of persecution and crimes

associated with this site, in the center of Paris.94

Because war monuments publicly acknowledge a nation’s soldiers’ sacrifice de Gaulle
only chose sites around which the nation could unite in its loss. However, there were

losses which a war monument could not express, such as Vel’d’Hiv. How could a war

monument attest to those civilians dispatched to their deaths by their fellow citizens, or to
death from fratricide? De Gaulle not only chose sites to anchor France’s new national

memory, he also chose specific symbolic acts of reinforcement, such as entombing the
tortured remains of the Resistance martyr Jean Moulin in the Pantheon on 19 December
1964. Jean Moulin, a hero of the national combat, died at the hands of his Nazi torturers
without speaking, and thus symbolized French unity and honor.95 While Oradour-surGlane symbolized the victimization of civilians, Jean Moulin’s entombment in the

Pantheon, accompanied by pomp and ceremony, symbolized the victimization of a hero.

One after the other each symbolic memorial provided a framework around which the
French public developed its sense of historical consciousness.
Those children who attended the public schools of France in the 1950s, 60s and 70s

learned virtually nothing about the extent of the unofficial epuration or les femmes

tondues. What students were taught instead was the Gaullist construction comprised of
the victim/shield myth, the Resistance of 40 million, the hero and the innocent civilians

94

Eric Conan, L’Express (Paris) 16 July 1992. President Francois Mitterrand was heckled at the

ceremony.
95 Maurice Agulhon, De Gaulle: Histoire, symbole, mythe (Paris: Editions Pion, 2000), 81-86.
Jean Moulin was parachuted into France on 2 January 1942 with the mission of reuniting the principal
Resistance movements. He was betrayed and consequently arrested on 21 June 1943. He was tortured by
Klaus Barbie, but he died without speaking.
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suffering at German hands.96 Most of the French children who were deported did not
survive to see de Gaulle’s idea of a certain France flourish in the post-war world.

96 Josserand, Personne, Vallee and Menard, Histoire, to cite but one example.
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CHAPTER TWO
SHATTERING THE REPUBLIC OF SILENCE1
The imposing majestic Hotel Lutetia situated on the upper class Boulevard de Raspail
in Paris is frequented by the chic and sophisticated denizens of the 7th district. Its

compliant staff serves a rich and discrete clientele in salons whose walls bear witness to

another era, the Liberation.2 The ever-present past looms around the entrance; the scene

of the train loads of the survivors of deportation being processed, disinfected, dusted
down in DDT, re-humanized from hell, cannot be effaced? The very presence of these
starving hordes, skeletons of humanity, spilling out onto the select pavements, was part of

the historical legacy the French preferred to ignore. There were many possibilities in this
period for surviving victims of both the Nazis and the Vichy Regime to contribute to

historical scholarship, but there were clashing concepts of both history and memory to

contend with. The bitterness of personal memory appears to be connected to the extent to
which official versions of the events themselves ignore the personal versions. By the

time the survivors had arrived back in France, the Gaullist myths designed to protect
France from the reality of “les annees noires” were firmly in place. The population

1

Jean Paul Sartre, Situations III (Paris: Gallimard, 1949), 11-14.

2 Annette Wieviorka, Deportation et Genocide: Entre la memoire et I'oublie (Paris: Collection
Pluriel Editions Pion, 1992), 86. Wieviorka reports there is little evidence regarding events which took
place in the Hotel Lutetia in the archives. Nevertheless, from the oral history of Moshe et Elie Garbaz, Un
survivant, Pologne 1913-1929, Paris 1929-41 Auschwitz-Birkenau Jawischowitz-Buckenwald 1942-1945
(Paris: Pion, 1984), Wieviorka established that at the Hotel Lutetia the deported first had their identities
checked, then underwent medical examinations, were disinfected, and finally interrogated, before being
either hospitalized, reunited with families, or sent to transit centres.
2 Wieviorka, Deportation, 20-21. Wieviorka defines “deported to include Resistance, hostages,
people caught in the round ups, political prisoners and common law offenders. The most recent up to date
figure she furnishes is 63,085 of which 59% survived. In addition, at least 75,721 Jews were deported from
France to the extermination camps of eastern Europe, only 3% survived.
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largely ignored the harrowing sights of the people being processed in the Hotel Lutetia,
requisitioned by the Provisional Government as a reception center for the deported.4 The
view that France alone had defeated the enemy was not a welcome message to these
weary survivors. Official versions of the events were not in symbiosis with the

experiences of those who could have given French history of this period a different echo.
With individual memories not reflected in the official account and the archives

closed, historians had, for several decades, only the official version with which to work.

This was to change by the 1960s, however, when some historians began to by-pass the
French National Archives and consult alternatives. Despite difficulties, historical
scholarship slowly began to chip away at the official version of events, closely aided by

an inquisitive French press and media. One factor did not lead to the downfall of the

official version of “les annees noires, ” but rather a series of events and processes
beginning with historical scholarship, the literary scene, the cinema, and finally the
explosive role of a dynamic and assertive press. These elements are thus presented

individually in this chapter.
From the early years of postwar France, historical scholarship of “les annees noires”

rested firmly on the testimony from public trials of the Vichy leaders, which became the
foundation for the official version of events. This was a period in which a war-tom and

weary nation longed for unity. The victims of “Zes' annees noires” were, within the

context of the Vichy syndrome, not prone to revealing their contradictory narrative.

4 Wieviorka, Deportation, 89. It was not until 1985 that a commemorative plaque was placed
on the wall of the Hotel Lutetia attesting to the fact that between April and August 1945 the Hotel had been
a reception centre for most of the survivors from the Nazi concentration camps.
5 Henry Rousso, Le syndrome de Vichy de 1944 a nosjours (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1990), 157,
refers to the silence of the Jewish community of postwar France reluctant to speak out.
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A historiography whose cornerstone was entirely based on a judicial foundation

produced an interpretation of events which did not make any detailed reference to the
social actors in a complex social and political sphere. Instead, what emerged was a

reconstruction of historical events that did not contain the collective attitudes and
behaviors of the Vichy regime, or the experiences and memories of its victims. Taken up

by historians heavily reliant on the trials, with no attention to individual victim’s
memories, historical scholarship became distorted, though strongly appealing to those

advocating the dominant ideological agendas of postwar France.

Using the trial records of prominent Vichyists as a principal source of documentation,
the Gaullist historian Robert Aron produced in 1954 the standard history of the Vichy

regime, which became a paradigm for future interpretation.6 As a result of relying on the

legal interpretation and subjective commentaries from the judiciary, many of the Vichy
•

•

•

7

leaders were passively portrayed in Aron’s version of events. A senile Petain, constantly
8

under surveillance by an inner circle of virulent antisemites such as Dr. Menetrel, and
extreme right wing factionists, such as Henri du Moulin Labarthete,9 appears almost to be

an innocent bystander, politically detached from his ministers. Aron’s perspective on
Vichy’s persecution of the Jews ignored Vichy’s pursuit of its independent antisemitic

policies. Rather, Aron explained the existence of the anti-Jewish laws as evidence of the
6

Robert Aron, Histoire de Vichy (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1954).

7 Marechai Philippe Petain, Commander in Chief of the French army from 1917-18. Petain
entered politics as Minister of War in 1934. He entered the cabinet of Reynaud 18 May 1940, succeeding
him as President du Conseil, thereby demolishing the Third Republic and creating the State of France.

8 Aron, Histoire de Vichy, 179. Dr. Bernard Menetrel, a virulent anti-Semite, was the personal
physician of Petain. He became increasingly powerful in Petain’s entourage from November 1942
onwards.

9 Ibid., 176. Henri du Moulin de Labarthete, was director of Petain’s cabinet, until he was
dismissed by Laval. Petain is far removed from any association with anti-Jewish policies in Aron s account.
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loss of independence.10 Consistent with evidence from the trial records, Aron highlighted

German pressure which resulted in anti-Jewish measures. For example, the German
enactment in the occupied zone, contrary to the terms of the armistice, of a 1940 law

prohibiting movement of Jews between the two zones, raised protests from Vichy due to

its discrimatory aspect.11 Aron’s depiction of Laval12 as a Nazi sympathizer, in direct and

independent contact with the Germans, emphasized the enormity of concessions Laval
misguidingly accorded to the Nazis in a so-called exchange for independence.13 Aron

overlooked the strong defense of neutrality Laval held onto until the bitter end. Aron all

but ignored other high-ranking collaborators such as Darquier de Pellepoix.14 Aron’s
history served to reinforce the image of Laval as an unscrupulous traitor, thus justifying

Laval’s execution15 and Petain’s pardon.16 The official version of events further

10

n

Ibid., 232.
Ibid., 229-230.

12 Pierre Laval was Vice-President du Conseil of the Vichy Regime from 24 June 1940 until 13
December 1940 when he was removed from office by Petain due to upheavals in Vichy policy over
autonomy. Controversy still exists whether or not Laval’s reinstatement as Vice President 26 April 1942
until the fall of Vichy, was entirely due to German pressure.
13 Marc Olivier Baruch, Le Regime de Vichy (Paris: Editions La Decouverte, 1996), 6. Refer
also to Robert O. Paxton, “Darlan, an Amiral entre deux blocs: Reflexions sur une biographic recente, ’ in
Vingtieme Siecle 36 (1992), 11, which shows from German archives evidence not only of Laval conceding
concessions but also Pierre-Etienne Flandin and Darlan.
14 Louis Darquier de Pellepoix was a virulent anti-Semite, was the Commissioner-General for
Jewish Affairs of the Vichy regime from May 1942 until 26 February 1944, when he was removed by the
Germans for incompetence.
15 Laval came before the French High Court 4-9 October 1945 under Article 75 of the Code
Penal 1939 “intelligences avec I ’ennemi” when he received the death penalty. He was executed 15
October 1945.
16 Petain was arrested and brought to trial before the French High Court under Article 75 of the
Code Penal 1939 “intelligences avec I ’ennemi” 23 July -15 August 1945. Petain received the death
penalty which was commuted by General Charles de Gaulle. He remained in captivity on 1 He d Yeu
(situated off the Atlantic coast) until his death 23 July 1951.
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portrayed Darlan17 as the good version of Vichy, and Laval the evil version. According

to Aron, Darlan and the Vichy regime were in a dilemma, either collaboration or

Polandization of France.18 The expression “Polandization of France” referred to the total
loss of independence, and the population delivered, without defense, to the enemy, such
as when the Nazis occupied Poland in 1939.
Aron presented the policies of Darlan as a reaction to Nazi pressure. The German

archives, on the other hand, attest to Darlan’s continual pursuit of concessions in
exchange for sovereignty and cooperation,19 evidenced by the negotiations surrounding
the Protocols de Paris.

70

The German archives show that even after the invasion of the

USSR when Hitler no longer desired negotiations with the Vichy regime Darlan

increased aid and continued to claim concessions.21 The archives also reveal Darlan

resurrecting Laval’s former idea for the Nazis to launch a military operation against the

17 Amiral Francois Darlan, vice-president du Conseil, ministre des Affaires etrangeres, et de
I ’Interieur and later ministre de la Defense, Vichy Regime, 10 fevrier 1941-18 avril 1942. The Allies
captured Darlan after their invasion of Algeria in November 1942. Darlan ordered a cease-fire and was
appointed High Commissioner of French North Africa by the Allies. General de Gaulle repudiated his
appointment. Darlan was assassinated shortly afterwards, 24 December 1942 in Algiers.
18

Aron, Histoire de Vichy, 424.

19 Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order 1940-44 (New York: Knopf
1972, reprint, Columbia University Press, 1982), 123.

20 Protocoles de Paris provided for German access to Syria and North Africa, naval access to
Dakar, and to envisage military action against Great Britain and USA, in exchange for improved conditions
under the Armistice, such as a decrease in occupation costs paid to the Nazis, return of prisoners of war,
and fewer restrictions concerning the demarcation line. The Protocoles are published in DFCAA, IV, 47280 (Delegation francaise aupres de la Commission allemande d'armistice). A German text may be found in
OKW/2012 frames 3,596,066ff. Paxton, Vichy France, 117.
21

Eberhard Jacket, La France dans I'Europe de Hitler (Paris: Fayard, 1968), 285-310.
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Free French in Chad and the English colonies of West Africa, though little is known as to
the outcome of these negotiations.22

In short, the trial records reveal a pro-Nazi Laval, a senile Petain, and Darlan
maintaining neutrality in a “pay off’ for minimum collaboration, all set against the

background of a powerful Germany. The victim/shield myth thus was reinforced by
judicial evidence which allowed the historiography to remain stubbornly encroached in
distortion.

Avoidance in the trials of many crucial ideological and political issues further

removed from close scrutiny many of the “technocrats” of this particular period of Vichy
who had played leading roles in the regime and had participated in I’anti-Semitisme de
I’etat and even deportation. Inserted into the official historiography as totally passive

subordinates, many leading collaborators went unnoticed, including Paul Marion,23 an
expert in the diffusion of propaganda,24 Hubert La Gardelie, Minister of Labor, who drew

up measures which contributed to the deportation of forced labor to the Nazi war effort,

0S

and Pierre Pucheu, Minister of Interior, whose Sections Speciales Courts to judge

22 German National Archives'. Auswartiges Amt, Buro des Staatssekretars deutsch-franzosische
Beziehungen vom. 1 Oktober -Januar 1942. (Microfilm T-120, Bobine 278. 214059-64 refers. Refer to
Robert O. Paxton, “Darlan, un amiral entre Deux Blocs,” 3-19.

Paul Marion, secretaire general a I”Information et a lapropagande — also an expert on
Fascist techniques of manipulating the masses.

24 1941 Propaganda Poster exposed in France depicting Marechai Petain with the caption Etes
Vous Plus Francois Que Lui (Are you more French than he is?) United States Holocaust Memorial
Museum Photo Archives, Washington D.C. Reproduced with permission. For other examples from this
period expressing virulent antisemitism for widespread distribution by the Prefets, refer to Archives
Departementales des Yvelines, Versailles cote 1 W.65, reproduced with permission.
25 Trial of Hubert La Gardelie, Haute Cours de la Justice, Versailles, \ijuillet 1947. Archives
Departementales des Yvelines^ Versailles. RG. 2281. Contained in Compte rendus des audiences. Cote
300W.98. All citations are reproduced with permission under “derogation and translated by the writer.
La Gardelle was condemned to forced labor but quickly released. He was also one of the theoreticians of
the regime and a close personal friend of Mussolini.
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Communists considered guilty of terrorism failed to stop the Germans carrying out their
.•
26
own executions.

Over reliance on trial records, Aron s account portrayed the Vichy regime as a
feudatory politico-military satellite, forcibly restrained by Hitler. This historical

interpretation reinforced the Gaullist victim/shield myth, which became the version of
events that historians accepted as most accurately descriptive of the Vichy regime

through the 1950s.
Another element compromising historical work on the Vichy regime was
the limited access to the archives in this period. In the post-war period Decrees severely

restricted access. All public archives after 10 July 1940 could not be consulted. This
state of affairs discouraged historians from studying the period and to question the

existing historical scholarship. This state of affairs began to change however, when,
under the influence of a different political and ideological atmosphere, historians began

to diverge from the official version and began examining other sources.

The American scholar Robert Paxton authored the principal scholarship reshaping the
Gaullist construction of French history beginning in the 1960s.27 Using previously
unpublished French documents accessible in the National Archives of Germany and the

United States, Paxton shattered the existing historical consensus surrounding the Vichy
regime with the publication in 1972 of Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order 1940-

26 Paxton, Vichy France, 226-221. Despite the Sections Specials and executions the Germans
continued executing their own hostages. Pucheu, a former industrialist with close ties to Banque Worms,
left Vichy in 1943. He was arrested by the Comite francaisepour la liberation nationale in Casablanca,
tried and condemned to death. He was executed 20 March 1944.
27 Paxton, in effect, took up the threads from early research principally conducted by the German
scholar, Eberhard Jacket.
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1944™ His scholarship now represents the break between the official version of events,
insisted upon by the Vichy leaders, reinforced by Aron, and the new scholarship refuting

the victim/shield myth.
The depiction of Marechai Petain’s “National Revolution” as being imposed by the

all-powerful Germans who wanted to “Nazify” France and that as a shield,Vichy, despite
its faults, saved France from worse,29 was one such myth which came under Paxton’s

scalpel. Paxton’s analysis provided a clear distinction between what had been Vichy’s
independent decisions and what had been the results of the Nazi policies, constructing a

strong and disturbing account of a France which did not merely accede to collaboration

but which instigated it.30 His research simultaneously shattered the Gaullist myth that
France was composed of 40 million resisters.
The German archives also provided Paxton with insight into Vichy’s domestic

policies, in particular those which demonstrated the Vichy regime attempting to expand

its influence across the demarcation line into the occupied zone. Wrapped around the socalled myth of the “double game” of the Vichy regime, this issue had received little
scholarly attention. Under Paxton’s scrutiny any idea of a “double game” dissolved in

the exposure of Petain’s own words on August 21 1942. On that day Petain wrote to
Hitler proposing that “[i]n view of the most recent British aggression which took place

this time on our soil,...France participate in her own defense” and demonstrate my wish

28 Paxton, Vichy France, was published in France under the title, La France de Vichy: 1940-1944
(Paris, 1973).
29

Aron, Histoire de Vichy, 424.

30

Paxton, Vichy France, 51.
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that France make a contribution to the safeguard of Europe.”31 This desire represents a
long-sought opportunity to expand the Vichy regime’s military authority to the occupied

zone. Paxton highlights Petain’s voluntary choice of collaboration with the Germans.32

Moreover, Paxton points to the meeting Petain requested with Hitler at Montoire, in
October 1940 as further evidence of Petain’s collaboration.33

In contrast to Aron’s approach, Paxton emphasized the ideological components of
Vichy policies and found that a strong French tradition of counter-revolutionary elements

converged with the reactionary right wing to provide the ideological bases for the regime.
This was overlooked in the trial records. Paxton demonstrated that the Regime did not

lack an ideology of its own. By focusing on the Vichy regime, rather than the Nazis,
Paxton was able to show the active promotion of sovereignty through a separate French
national revolution. In pursuance of sovereignty, Rene Bousquet operated with great zeal

in promising ten thousand Jews from the unoccupied zone for deportation to the

extermination camps of eastern Europe. 34 In a second book written with Michael M.
Marrus and published in 1981, Paxton further elaborated his previous works. As Marrus

and Paxton pointed out, there were no Germans present in this period in the unoccupied

zone. It was the Vichy Statut des Juifs, enacted the 3 October 1940 by the Vichy regime
that provided for anti-Jewish measures throughout Unoccupied France. The presence of

31 Paxton, Vichy France, 304. The defense at Petain’s trial succeeded in casting doubt on the
existence of the letter. Paxton demonstrated the contrary. German National Archives — Abetz (Paris) 3627
to Ribbentrop of 22 August 1942 T-120.434/220294 refers.
32

Ibid.

33 Ibid., 75-76. Paxton cites German Foreign Office account of the meeting, printed in DGFP,
Series D, XI, nos. 212,227: 354 and 385.

34 Michael M. Marrus and Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, with a foreword by
Stanley Hoffman (New York: Basic Books Inc, 1981, reprint, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995),
232. Page citations are from the reprint edition.
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these laws and their strict application by the Vichy regime attest to the willingness of
Vichy France to participate in Nazi persecution of the Jewish population.
Paxton and Marras thus demonstrated that by supplying deportation convoys to fulfil

Nazi final solution requirements from unoccupied areas in preservation of sovereignty,

the Vichy regime put itself in the role of an active accomplice in the act of genocide; it

was not a hostage of National Socialism. Paxton and Marrus further provided evidence
that without these laws German occupation authorities could not have pursued policies
which led to the death of 77,000 Jews, one-third of them French citizens. Paxton and

Marrus further shattered the victim/shield myth.33
The criticism leveled at Paxton’s work has tended to converge around his departure

from French archival sources which critics believe gave his scholarship an erroneous and
deformed interpretation of French history.

Still, no French historians have seriously

contested his account, and few prestigious French historians studied Vichy at all until the

1970s.37
Also helping to reshape the historical narrative was the lawyer and historian Serge

Klarsfeld, who began with the 1978 publication ofZa Memorial de la Deportation des

Juifs de France y to assiduously document many aspects of Vichy’s participation in the

35

Ibid., Vichy France, 245.

36 Annie Kreigal, “Les internittences de la memoire: de 1’histoire intermediate a 1’Histoire.”
Pardes 9-\0 1989: 257.
37 Exceptions were Henri Michel, Vichy annee 40 (Paris: Editions Robert Laffont, 1966), and
Yves Durand, Vichy 1940-1944 (Paris: Editions Bordas, 1972).
38 Serge Klarsfeld, ed., La Memorial de la Deportation des Juifs de France (Paris. Centre de
documentation juive contemporaine de Paris: 1978). Also of importance, Vichy-Auschwitz, le role de
Vichy dans la solution finale, tome 1,1940-1942. tome II, 1943 (Paris: Fayard, 1983 et 1985). He is also
the President of the association, “ Sons and Daughters of Jewish Deportees of France and a prominent
lawyer of the Paris Bar.
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Final Solution. In 1991, he accidentally found the remnants of a classification system,
whose existence had long been denied by the French state, detailing names and addresses

of Jews in Paris in 1940.39

Paxton and Marrus spawned a new generation of historical scholarship on Vichy.
Opening up new dialogue, Henry Rousso in 1990 argued that “les annees noires” were a
product of disturbed subterranean memory.40 Then, together with Eric Conan in 1996,

Rousso further explored the presence of an obsession with the past, arguing that a new

perspective is necessary today to avoid the sacrilization of memory of the period.41

Some of the most recent scholarly work uses a more varied analytical approach in
particular with regard to French anti-Semitism. This can be observed in the work of

Denis Peschanski, who examines the unusual merger of the policy of exclusion of the

Vichy regime with the propaganda of unification around traditional values and the weight
carried by administrative policies.42

Still further analysis on the part of Pierre Laborie shows that oversimplification often
occurs when analyzing French antisemitism, resorting to legitimizing Vichy’s

antisemitism as no more or less than an expression of French wishes. Laborie points to

39 Le Monde (Paris) 13 novembre 1991, Serge Klarsfeld announces accidental discovery in the
Archives of secretariat d’Etat auxAncien Combattants of remnants of a “ fichier du recensement. ”
Klarsfeld withheld information for six weeks after immediately confronting the French government with
his findings. No comment was forthcoming so Klarsfeld turned to the press. All newspaper articles, unless
otherwise stated, were reproduced with permission from the Dossiers de Presse, Fondation Nationale des
Sciences Politiques, Institut d1Etudes Politiques de Paris, and translated by the writer.
40

Rousso, Le syndrome.

41 Eric Conan and Henry Rousso, Vichy, Un passe qui ne passe pas (Paris: Librairie Artheme
Fayard, 1994, reprint, Editions Gallimard, 1996), 188. Page citations are from the reprint edition.
42 Denis Peschanski, “La Francia di Vichy o la Francia sotto Vichy? Squardi sulla storiografia, ”
Richerche di Storia politico, no. 8, 1993: 75-82.
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less categorical judgements; an awakening of conscience at the singling out of Jews in
the occupied zone, ignited in particular by the roundups of the summer of 1942 which

provoked outrage. This outrage was played out in actions as revealed in a balance sheet

of figures which show a figure of 330,000 Jews living in France in 1940. This puts into
question any conscious complicity of the population as a whole in carrying out genocide.

Laborie is quick to point out, nevertheless, that despite a few isolated and muted

objections, the French made no widespread protests over the laws of exclusion and
spoliation. He observes rather a distancing of public opinion from the Vichy regime
connected more to the events of 1942 than to disgust at the Vichy regime’s virulent
•
• •
43
antisemitism.
Opposing the view of either collaboration or resistance within the

French population, Philippe Burrin argues that “accommodation” was practiced by an
immense majority, albeit often marked by complaisance or compromise, but initially
brought about through necessity.44

A new addition to the historiography is the work of Richard H. Weisberg. He

examines the question of the Vichy regime’s antisemitisme de Petal being an instrument
of legal persecution, minutely dissecting the discourse of exclusion within the
conventional French legal framework of the period.45 Weisberg reveals from his

examination of the archival records of the “private bar,” still for the most part
unexplored, that the phenomenon of religious persecution was known, tolerated and
43 Pierre Laborie, Resistants, Vichyssois et Autres (Paris: CNRS 1980). See also Pierre Laborie
“Was the France of 1940-42 Anti-Semitic” in Memory, the Holocaust and French Justice. The Bousquet
and Touvier Affairs, ed., Richard J. Golsan, trans. Lucy Golson and Richard J. Golson (Hanover, NH.
University Press of New England, 1996), 91-95.
44

Philippe Burrin, La France aVheure allemande 1940-1944 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1995),

7-8.
45 Richard H. Weisberg, Vichy Law and the Holocaust in France (New York: New York
University Press, 1998).
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implemented not only by important legal figures, but also by the ordinary practitioners of

the law.

These works demonstrate that Paxton paved the way for a new generation of

French historians who could step aside from the cumbersome judicial discourses of Aron
to create a new scholarly perspective.
Historians of the period have generated an enormous amount of wide-ranging

scholarship, which has built upon the foundations laid in the early work of both Marrus

and Paxton. Coupled with profound cultural changes in French society sprouting from
May 1968, Paxton contributed to triggering a change in the French memory. Sweeping

social, cultural and political changes promoted by a new generation of French students
created a rupture with the past. As a result, some old reticences and silences were cast

aside. Not only historians contributed to the radical change crystallized in the 1968
events. The literary world and the cinema, supported by the press, also contributed.

A short interval separates the appearance of an abundance of literature on “les annees
noires ” with that of the events of 1968. A new generation with less respect for the old

values and certainly disillusioned with both Gaullism and Communism made its voice
heard. In effect another affront to the decomposition of the myths. Literature, therefore,
became another vehicle in the demolishing the silence the myths had erected. One of the

most influential writers contributing to the arousal of the national consciousness was the
writer Patrick Modiano. One of the themes recurrent in his work is the portrayal of les
I

annees noires” void of history to be replaced by a puzzle of which there is no answer.
Of particular significance, too, was the appearance on the literary scene of works written

46

Ibid., 2.

47

Pascal Modiano, La place de I’etoile (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1968).
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by the children of some of the important Vichyists. Pascal Jardin, son of Jean Jardin,
direcleur du cabinet de Laval in 1942, published “La Guerre a neuf ans,” in 1971.4S

Two years later the literature of children of the victims of Genocide, such as Joseph
Joffo, “Un sac de billes” began to appear.49 This had, as a central theme, Joseph’s

childhood experiences of the round ups, repression, and antisemitism. Both types of
literature served to remind the readers that the parents of the authors were part of the lost

collective consciousness slowly rising from the ashes of amnesia. But the vibrant
influential literary world of France was not alone in this process of decomposition;

another facet of French cultural life took up the vanguard.

Cinema was another important vehicle in both the transmission and reinforcement of

the myths of the early postwar period. A consistent attempt by French film makers to
portray history, or the cinematic version of historical events, both partially and

personally, marked the period from the late 1950s through to 1968, with an influence on
creative output reaching into the 1990s?° Film critics call this period the “nouvelle

vague. ” 51 This so-called “personal history of the world” gave rise to a filter through
which the cinema could focus on massive trauma, and through which a re-focusing of the

French national consciousness could take place. Perhaps the earliest example of this was
in the 1956 work of Alain Resnais “Nuit et Brouillard, ” in which the subject of

48

Pascal Jardin, La Guerre a neuf ans (Paris: Les Cahiers Rouge, 1971).

49

Joseph Joffo, Un sac de billes (Paris: 1973).

50

Mathiew Kassovitz, La Haine (France: 1995), is but one recent example.

51 Emma WiIson, French Cinema since 1950: Personal Histories (Lantham: Rowman and
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999), 9-11.
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deportation, though taboo, did manage to surface.52 The film, selected for the
International Film Festival of Cannes, only appeared in a censored form.53 Cut from the
film was a scene at the Pithiviers internment camp in which a French policeman’s "kepi”

(hat) was clearly visible. The censors ordered its removal.54
In the main, however, the French cinema remained relatively in symbiosis with the

official version of the events of the Vichy period until 1971 when the film of Marcel
Ophuls, Andre Harris and Alain Sedouy, "Le Chagrin et la Pitie, ” inaugurated a definite
break with the taboo, inspiring a new voice which denounced the Vichy regime,
collaborationism, and Nazism.55

Le Chagrin et la Pitie reveals how various citizens of Clermont-Ferrand experienced
the occupation. Surprisingly, the preoccupations at the imminent fall of France were not
the vunerability of the Maginot Line or the German invasion but concern among

bourgeois women that sufficient money is collected to plant roses on the Maginot Line.56

52 Alain Resnais, Nuit et Brouillard (France: 1955), is a documentary on the concentration camps
of the Nazi Regime. Resnais recognizes the importance of place to memory but France and the French were
not his subject matter.

5j Nuit et Brouillard entered into the 1956 competition in its censored form. It was presented
“hors festival” following dipolomatic representations by France and Germany to the festival organisers.
For further details see Rousso, Le Syndrome, 263.
54

Ibid., Le Syndrome, 263.

55 Marcel Ophuls, Andre Harris and Alain de Sedouy, Le Chagrin et la Pitie. Chronique d une
ville francaise sous I'occupation (France: 1971) 4hrs. 6mins.
56 Interview of Pierre Mendes France, Le Chagrin et la Pitie. Pierre Mendes France, a member
of the Radical Socialist, was an under secretary of Treasury of the Third Republic. Imprisoned at the fall of
France, tried and convicted of treason, Mendes France escaped and joined de Gaulle in London.
Parachuted back to France, he became the Leader of the Resistance group Lorraine. Mendes France
later became a Deputy of the Radical Party in the Assemblie National and Premier in 1954. He resigned in
1955 due to criticisms of concessions he granted to Nationalists in Algeria.
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With Anthony Eden,57 concluding that perhaps, after all, the French could not have held

on, and Christian de La Maziere, a member of the Waffen SSfrancais division

“Charlemagne,” 58 an unravelling of family secrets, long laid to rest, unfolds. A flood of
documentary style images taken from newsreel, of boXh Actualites Francaise of the

Vichy regime and Nazi propaganda are interwoven between the interviews. For example,

the sharp contrast of the “other life,” in Paris, depicted by the light-hearted frivolous
songs of Maurice Chevalier,59 dramatically intervenes between testimonies and images

of chaos and hardship. The probing question style, which not only unearthed the passive

collaboration in a group of High School teachers, but also a still deeply divided
Resistance, is perhaps at its best in its treatment of La Maziere. His sincere belief in his
ideology is disturbing for his total lack of fanaticism. The unsung heros,60 simple country
people rising up against the Nazis due to distaste for the Legion Francaise,6' speak little

57 Interview of Anthony Eden, (Lord Avon), Le Chagrin et la Pitie. Anthony Eden, a respected
Member of the British Conservative Party, was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1935-1938
when he resigned due to disagreement with the appeasement policy of Neville Chamberlain. In 1940 he
became the Secretary of State for War and Minister of Foreign Affairs until 1945.
58 Wafen SSfrancaise division Charlemagne. The Waffen SS elite fighting force of the Nazis
had a French division “Charlemagne.” Le Maziere states in his interview in Le Chagrin et la Pitie that there
were 7,000 members reduced to 300 after heavy losses in the Soviet offensive in Galicia, August 1944. For
further details see Pascal Ory, Les collaborators 1940-1945 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1976), 264-268,

Interview of Maurice Chevalier, Le Chagrin et la Pitie. Controversy still reigns over the
passive/active collaboration or not, of many in the entertainment world. Maurice Chevalier is an example.
He was a famous singer of the period, who continued to perform throughout the Occupation. Ophuls uses
the songs of Chevalier as testimony of the period and in which he finds some semblance of passive
resistance. See Interview of Marcel Ophuls, Cinema 71 Numero 157, juin 1971,44.
60
Interviews of Alexis and Louis Grave, Le Chagrin et la Pitie. Betrayed by their fellow
citizens of Clermont, they were arrested and interned at Buchenwald. Members of the Maquis d'Auvergne,
this Resistance group operated in the Massif Central area of France around Clermond Ferrand and
Limoges, an area well known for actions against the Nazis and the Vichy regime despite bitter reprisals.

61 Legion Francaise formed by Xavier Vallat, composed of former combatants, was used by the
Vichy regime to maintain loyalty in every village. Patriotic ceremonies were organized in village squares,
where the Legion became almost a pseudo-government. For further details refer to Paxton, Vichy France,
790-191.
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of their ideology. The “famous” Resistance leaders,62 however, have no hesitation.

Antisemitism is demonstrated through the type of propaganda aimed at the population

and through local expressions. A shopkeeper, among others, affirms that he placed a
notice in “Le Moniteur” 63 but only to ensure that his clients knew he was a Catholic and

not a Jew. Newsreels demonstrating the virulent anti-Semitic speeches of Darquier de

Pellepoix,64 interwoven against images of various Vichy leaders65 meeting Oberg,66 head
of the SS in France, attests to Vichy collaboration undeniably at its zenith. When the
Head of the Resistance of the Limoges region states that he never once contacted the
Communists of Auvergne (le Maquis), and that he believed that their acts of resistance

were solely undertaken on behalf of Russia, the myth of the 40 million resistance
disintegrates. Scenes of popular justice and the pathetic testimony of the only woman in
the film, tondue at the liberation for her support of Petain, betrayed, tortured, and

62 Interview of Georges Bidalt, President du Conseil National de la Resistance, Le Chagrin et la
Pitie. Interview of Marcel Fouche-Degliame, head of the Resistance movement "Combat, ” Le Chagrin et
la Pitie. Interview of Emmanuel d’Astier de La Vigerie, founder of the Resistance movement
"Liberation, ” Le Chagrin et la Pitie.
63 Le Moniteur de Puy-de-Dome, newspaper published in the Departement de Piiy-de-Dome, in
the region of Auvergne, owned by Laval.

64 Speeches of Louis Darquier de Pellepoix, featured in newsreel shown in Le Chagrin et la Pitie.
A virulent outspoken anti-Semite, Darquier, successor to Xavier Vallat as Commissioner-general for
Jewish affairs of the Vichy Regime, May 1942, was removed by the Germans from his post on 26 February
1944. For further details refer to Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France, 283-339.
65 Rene Bousquet, featured in newsreel showing meetings with the Nazis in Le Chagrin et la
Pitie, was General Secretary of the Police of the Vichy Regime from April 1942 to December 1943.
Georges Hilaire, secretary general of the Minister of Interior, Vichy Regime, also appears.

66 Carl Albrecht Oberg, SS Brigadefuhrer und General major der Polizex, featured in newsreel
showing meetings with Bousquet accompanied by Hilaire, Le Chagrin et la Pitie. The Oberg-Bousquet
Agreement July 1942 marks the progression of Vichy antisemitism from a legislative state, i.e. les Statutes
anti-juives of 1940 to roundups, internment and deportation. For further details refer to Marrus and Paxton,
Vichy France, 241 -279.
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sentenced to 15 years hard labor, succinctly closes the episode on the liberation. There is
no conclusion.67
The film provoked a wide-range of reactions, but seemingly found consensus among

the critics for its achievement in seeking to divest France of its myths. L 'Humanite
described the film as “a political act, not depressing, but purifying.”68 This commentary
portrays the discordance between the Gaullists and the French Communists and the

unravelling of the once tacit agreement concerning the events of the Vichy regime. Still,
Rivarol, a publication representing the extreme right-wing faction of the French press, did

not overly criticize the film, especially as the subject of the national revolution was aired
in the film.69 Though showings were limited to only two Parisian cinemas, the film’s

reception by the French public left the French government and state television
desperately trying to keep the official collective memory afloat.70 Ophuls believed the
film suffered “...censorship by inertia.”71 The president of state television, Jean-Jacques

de Bresson, speaking before a Senate enquiry in 1971 stated that “[/]e Chagrin destroys

the myths the French still need.”

*77

This observation revealed the principal pre-

occupation of the Gaullists,73 how to maintain their power base, strongly attested

67 An examination of the techniques used by Ophuls is beyond the scope of this paper. For
further details refer to Emma Wilson, French Cinema, Philippe Pilard “Le Chagrin et la Pitie: Histoire de
quelques resistances,” in Images Documentaires, 18/19 (1994): 19-32, and Rousso, Le Syndrome, 121-138.
68

L ’Humanite (Paris) 20 septembre 1971.
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Rivarol (Paris) 23 avril, 1971.
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Rousso, Le Syndrome, 134, refers to the censorship at length.

71 Combat (Paris) 7 avril 1971.
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Philippe Pilard, “Le Chagrin et la Pitie,” 19-32.

73 General de Gaulle resigned from the presidency on 28 April 1969. He was replaced by
Georges Pompidou.
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following the events of 1968. In May-June 1968, tradition and change violently clashed

in France. This clash evoked historical parallels, the most significant to the Gaullists
being that of "les annees noires. ” Student vilification of the police led to chants of SSCRS in the street demonstrations and ensuing riots.74 These provocative chants were

reproduced on posters and banners. Rousso’s analysis of these events depicts this
provocation, and others, such as the call to fight fascism, as a bridge between the past and

the present.73 The historical allusions to the distorted past were decisively dealt with, the

Gaullists did not fully allow the past to be exhumed.
Clearly this also evidences the sense of disquiet in 1970s France over its role during
“les annees noires.” Paradoxically, one of the most virulent campaigners to prevent

diffusion of the film was the Minister of Health from 1974 to 1979, Simone Veil, herself

a survivor of deportation.76 Briefly, her opposition centered on the image the film
diffused of a cowardly, egotistical and evil France.

*7*7

She was a member of the Gaullist

political family. It was not until 1981, after much opposition, that the film appeared on
French public television.

7R

Opposition had ranged from French public television service

who ignored the film,79 to remarks of distaste and contempt from presidents80 and

74 The CRS, an ominous para-military security force, was extensively used in this period on the
streets of Paris against civilian demonstrators. This is still the case today.
75

Rousso, Le Syndrome, 119.

76 Ibid., 132. Simone Veil deported to Auschwitz in 1944 with her family was the only survivor.
In 1979 Simone Veil became a Member of the European Parliament, and was the first female to be elected
President of the European Parliament. She is currently a member of the Conseil Constitutionnel of France.
77

Ibid., 133.
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Ibid., 132.

79 With the change of government in 1981 bringing the Socialists into power Le Chagrin et la
Pitie came out of the shadows only briefly, quickly returning.
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Petanists alike,81 to the continued indignation of Simone Veil.82 L 'Express rejoiced that
the censor and silence had dissipated even before the film appeared.83 Then the film
disappeared again, reappearing only in 1994 with an estimated audience of one million.84

In viewing Le Chagrin et la Pitie from today’s perspective, there is little doubt as to its
role in divesting France of the Gaullist myths in which it had been shrouded. The
Paxtonian revolution, and the profound cultural changes emanating from May 1968
which impacted on literature and the cinema, were distinct and separate processes in
alerting the public to new interpretations of French history.

Historians, journalists and filmakers were not solely responsible for the

commencement of the realignment of the French national consciousness in the 1960s and
1970s. President Georges Pompidou, in granting Presidential pardon to the collaborator

and milicien. Paul Touvier in 1972, added the dynamite.

qr

When /'affaire Touvier

exploded it was aided by an extremely virulent press campaign. Condemned to death on
two occasions in absentia, 10 September 1946 and 10 March 1947, Paul Touvier had

slipped into obscurity, hidden by the Catholic Church. He was further protected by the

80 Afew York Times Magazine, 29 August 1971, interview of President Georges Pompidou, in
which he stated he detested the Resistance. President Giscard d’Estaing during an informal meeting with
journalists in 1979 refused to answer questions on the film angrily rejecting that the problem concerned
him. Cited by Pilard, “Le Chagrin et la Pitie,” 23.

81 Le Monde (Paris) 13 mai 1971. Alfred Fabre-Luce, writer during the Occupation and
supporter of Petain, attacked Ophuls for his lack of tact in evoking the Jewish problem. This raised
indignant protests from the Jewish community. Le Monde (Paris) 8 juin 1971 printed the protests. FabreLuce continued to object, see Rousso, Le Syndrome, 135.
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enactment of the Statute of Limitations in 1967 and by the Presidential pardon offered by

Pompidou in 1972. In 1973 Paul Touvier was charged with crimes against humanity
under a new enactment. Still, Touvier was not arrested until 1989.86
Crimes against humanity in France, as defined by the London Accords 1945,87 began
with its incorporation into French law in 1964, being declared “imprescriptible,”

therefore not subject to a statute of limitations. The text of the Accords was not

incorporated into the French legislation, nor was jurisdiction established.88 Crimes
against humanity raised ethical problems for French legislators principally as the concept

of impriscriptibility was alien in French law.89 Courts throughout the 1970s trying
Touvier’s case thus declared themselves incompetent to judge, slowing down the judicial
process. Consequently, in 1985, crimes against humanity was amended to include

“inhumane acts and persecutions, which for the sake of a State practicing a policy of

ideological hegemony were committed systematically....”90 This enabled Klaus Barbie, a

86

Paul Touvier was arrested at the Catholic Priory of Saint-Francois in Nice, 24 May 1989.

87 London Accords, 8 August, 1945, Article 6, signed by the Provisional Government of France,
the United States, United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, defines crimes against
humanity. While a detailed discussion of the London Accords and moreover, the application in France, is
beyond the scope of this thesis, it is noted that at the root of the complexity of applying the initial definition
of crimes against humanity in France lies with the notion that the Accords signed by France provided for
crimes against humanity committed by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, not French citizens.
88 The actual text of the London Accords was not included in the legislation, making it difficult
to incorporate these Statutes into French domestic law. Further, no jurisdiction was established, making it
also difficult to designate a court to judge French citizens, other than Nuremberg, which had ceased to
function. For further details refer to Conan and Rousso, Vichy, 188.
89 “Que faire de Vichy,” Esprit, mai 1992: 83-84. The law of 1964 proscribed imprescriptibility
only for crimes against humanity and not for war crimes which international conventions such as that of the
United Nations 26 November 1968 and the European Convention of 25 January 1974, later included.
France has not ratified these conventions.
90
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German and head of the SS in Lyon, to be tried for crimes against the Resistance and
not only for crimes concerning the Final Solution. The amendment was heavily

criticised.92 Among the criticism was the argument the philosopher Alain Finkielkraut,

raised in that the amendment represented a banalisation of the notion of the crimes
.

•

against humanity.

93

This was strongly evidenced when the amendment provided for

Touvier, a French citizen, to be exonerated of his charges in April 1992.94 It might be
argued therefore, that the highly complex French application of crimes against humanity

is not only interpretated and amended around judicial issues but political issues also

influence its application.
L ’affaire Touvier has not been the only controversial issue relating to “les annees

noires" laid before the French Legal System since the 1970s, but it evidences the long

drawn out process under which the judicial machine operated to protect the state, its
servants and its official myths. On 11 July 1991, the Indictments Division of the Court of
Appeals of Paris ordered Touvier’s release from detention on the grounds that his

continued detention “...is no longer necessary to the discovery of the truth.”93 The
decision was greeted with outrage both in the press and among the public. Lawyers

representing the victims continued exploring legal avenues, which abruptly came to an

end on 13 April 1992 when the Court of Appeals in Paris acquitted Touvier. The judicial
91 Klaus Barbie known as the ‘Butcher of Lyon” was the head of section IV of Sipo-SD Lyon
from 1942 until 1944.
92

Conan and Rousso, Vichy, 191.

93 Alain Finkielkraut, La Memoire vaine. Du crime contre I 'humanite (Paris: Editions
Gallimard, 1989). This work addresses many ethical issues arising from the trial of Klaus Barbie.
Finkielkraut is an eminent member of the French intelligentsia.
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opinion asserted that Vichy France was not a totalitarian state, but, rather, a conservative
and dictatorial regime of which only certain features were the product of pure fascism.96
Judicial opinion on historical interpretation has no better example. This served further to

incite public consternation, as the only crime retained from earlier proceedings out of a
total of eleven charges,

under crimes against humanity, was that Touvier ordered the

massacre of seven Jews, executed by the Milice at Rillieux-la-Pape, near Lyon. The ten
other charges were not retained by the Court of Appeals of Versailles.98 This decision,

hard on the heels of the fiftieth anniversary of the rounding up of Jews at the Vel’ d’Hiv,
appears almost as a last stand to protect the image of France, and the reaction it provoked.
They were also symptoms of the irreversible decomposition of the Gaullist historical

myths.99
From the early 1970s forward, the Gaullist construction had suffered repeated

onslaughts. Still, some of the myths managed to survive, wounded, though now openly
being questioned by the public and the press. Some of the events marking this period
revealed a nation as the trial of Klaus Barbie in Lyons demonstrated, that could deal with

German crimes, but still had not in any way begun to consider its own independent

collaboration. The implications of not doing so were manifested in new outbreaks of

96

Conan and Rousso, Vichy, 192.

97 Leila Nadya Sadat Wexler, “The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French
Court of Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again,” in Columbia Journal of Transnational Law
32:201 (1994): 289-380. This essay gives precise details of the French judicial system and its interpretation
and application of crimes against humanity.

98 Ibid., 347-348, gives a precise list of all the charges brought against Touvier under crimes
against humanity.

99 Velodrome d’Hiver known as VeTd’Hiv, former indoor bicycle stadium was used to house
Jewish victims of the roundups from Paris under the orders of the Vichyist Rene Bousquet before their
deportation to Auschwitz.
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antisemitism. The particularly sordid 1990 acts of profanity and desecration in the
Jewish cemetery of Carpentras served as vibrant reminders of ongoing French

antisemitism.100 The attempt to bring Rene Bousquet before the court to answer charges
of crimes against humanity was squashed amid allegations of protection coming from

President Mitterrand himself. Bousquet was finally indicted when all delaying tactics

were exhausted and public opinion demanded justice. Yet Bousquet was assassinated
before he came to trial on 8 June 1993.101 These attacks and strategies of defense would
not have come to the attention of the public without a dynamic, investigative press and

media.

Public outcries expressed in the media had begun with the Touvier pardon following
publication on 5 June 1972 of an article in L "Express.

102

Then in 1978 L’Express

published an interview of Louis Darquier de Pellepoix, the former Vichy regime’s
Minister of Jewish questions, living in exile in Spain.103 Darquier claimed that Rene

Bousquet was responsible for the deportation of the Jews and especially of the Vel d’Hiv
roundups. Bousquet’s role in the roundups had never received wide publicity. No doubt,

the most striking proof of the willingness of the press to forge ahead where historians had
hesitated appeared on 6 May 1981 when Le Canard Enchaine accused the then Minister

100 Acts discovered on 10 May 1990 in the Jewish Cemetery of Carpentras, near Avignon. In
total 34 tombs were violated. The militants of the Front National were strongly implicated.

101 Rene Bousquet, General Secretary of the Police of the Vichy Regime of both occupied and
unoccupied zones from April 1942 to December 1943. He received greater autonomy for the French Police
under the Oberg- Bousquet Agreements 29 July 1942. Sought exile in June 1944 in Germany but returned
to France in 1945. Imprisoned awaiting trial Bousquet was brought before the High Court of Justice in
1949 for his collaboration. He was sentenced to a five-year loss of civil rights, which was immediately
commuted for “acts of resistance.”
102

L’ Express (Paris) 5 juin 1972.

103

L'Express (Paris) 1978.
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of Finance, Maurice Papon, of having contributed to the deportation of Jews from
Bordeaux as a servant of the Vichy regime.104
Since the 1980s “les annees noires ” have continued to hit the headlines. On 13

September 1987 Jean Marie Le Pen, leader of the Front Notional, the extreme right- wing
Fascist party of France, declared to the press that the gas chambers were “a small detail in
the history of the Second Word War....”105 Countering the neo-fascist groups who

sought to uphold the Gaullist construction, Eric Conan, journalist, historian and film

maker inquired into the fate of Jewish children in the camps of Pithiviers and Beaune-laRolande, inciting such interest that Conan later developed this inquiry into a television
special and a book.106

In refusing to recognize officially that “the French State was responsible for the

persecution of and crimes committed against French Jews,” even after being petitioned
by representatives of the victims of Vel’d’Hiv, President Francois Mitterrand opened up
his own pandora’s box.107 Coupled with severe personal criticism surrounding
Mitterrand’s continued wreath laying on the tomb of Marechai Petain, and outcry at the

dismissal of charges of crimes against humanity against Paul Touvier, President
Mitterrand was heckled at a ceremony held at Vel’ d’Hiv. The ceremony was held to

104

Le Canard Enchaine (Paris) 6 mai 1981.

105 Isabelle Cuminal, Maryse Souchard, Stephane Wahnich, Virginie Wathier, Le Pen, les mots
(Paris: La Decouverte/Poche, 1998), 31. Refers to a debate during which Le Pen expressed his opinions on
World War IL Grand Jury, ET.L- Le Monde, Pierre-Jacques Truffaut, Dominique Pennequin, Andre
Passeron et Veroninque Maurus, 13 septembre 1987, texte integral, La Documentation francaise.
106 Eric Conan, Sans oublier les enfants: le camps de Pithiviers et Beaune-la-Rolande. 19juillet16 septembre 1942 ( Paris: Grasset, 1991). Cited by Paxton “Vichy Fifty Years After,” in Proceedings of
the Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History 1994. 212:233-243.
107 Conan and Rousso, Vichy, 467. The Comite Vel 'd’Hiv 42 wcaveA a refusal on the part of
President Mitterrand.
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mark the 50 anniversary of the roundups, many thought President Mitterrand’s presence

was offensive.108 The press did not tread lightly, asking adamantly for answers to
questions that did not fit in with the Gaullist construction of history. Amidst the trial of
Touvier, delaying tactics protecting Papon, and damage to the monument in homage to

the Jews assassinated by Touvier, President Mitterrand appeared on French national

television to explain his role at Vichy and his postwar friendship with Bousquet, which is
where this thesis began. At this point the French press went into action, probing and

digging away at Mitterrand’s now questionable past, which despite his death,

is still ongoing today.
Much was at stake. History had been distorted. The French state and the tendency of
Gaullist historians to theorize and compartmentalize the Vichy Regime had effectively

dissimulated this distortion. Building on what scholars such as Paxton had begun, the

press and the media had begun to peel away at the layers of the myth.

108

16 July 1992. Ceremony held at Vel’d'Hiv, to honor Jewish victims of round up 16 July 1942.
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CHAPTER THREE

A CONFRONTATION WITH HISTORY, JUSTICE AND MEMORY:

THE TRIAL OF MAURICE PAPON

In a windswept silent field lying on the outer edges of the airport of Bordeaux is the
former emplacement of the internment camp of Merignac. 1 In April 1942 Merignac was

a vital component in the French internment camp network serving the south west of

France. The camp was organized and managed entirely by the French.2 Merignac was a
staging post reserved for the sequestration of French and foreign-bom Jews and political
prisoners of the Regime en route to their final destination. Few inmates of Merignac

survived, those who did, such as Armand Szulc, preferred the shelter of silence to cover
their wounds. Merignac, its deportees, and the harsh inhumane conditions for those

awaiting deportation, slipped into obscurity, incidents and names remained sequestered,
like the prisoners themselves, in the subterranean memory of a nation implicated in

genocide.
Deportation orders,3 dated between July 1942 and June 1944, were issued from the

Prefecture de la Gironde in Bordeaux and bore the signature of Maurice Papon,

i

Merignac internment camp near Bordeaux, in the departement de la Gironde, France.

2

Armand Szulc, a child survivor of Merignac, interviewed by the writer 14 June 2000.

3 Ordres de deportation — are documents which authorized the transfer of the inmates of
Merignac to Drancy and thereon to the extermination camps of Eastern Europe, principally Auschwitz.
The orders figure in L 'acte d'Accusation, Catherine Erhel, Mathieu Aucher, Renaud de La Baume, eds, Le
Maurice Papon,
compte
rendu stenographique,
jProces de
_______________
2___ ,___
u__ ___________
o x
. tome 1 (Paris: Albin Michel, 1998), 90-181
(unofficial transcript of the court proceedings, as per French law). The orders are listed as follows, but in
addition include the names and dates of birth of the deportees. 18 July 1942, 161 persons, 26 August 1942,
443 persons, 21 September 1942, 71 persons, 26 October 1942,73 persons, 2 February 1943, 107 persons,
7 June 1943, 34 persons, 25 November 1943, 92 persons, 30 December 1943, 136 persons, 12 January
1944, 317 persons, 13 May 1944, 50 persons, and 5 June 1944,76 persons. These orders concerned only
deportation in convoys and do not include individuals who were transferred from Merignac directly to
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secretaire general de la prefecture de la Gironde4 At the Liberation these orders
disappeared. They re-surfaced with the signatory more than half a century later before

the High Court of Justice in Bordeaux.5 The orders and other documents had been found
inadvertently in February 1981 by the historian Michel Berges, who was researching

collaboration between the wine producers of Bordeaux and the Nazi amateurs of wine in
the departemental archives in Bordeaux.6 These documents, concerning the "Services

des Questions juives, ” of the Prefecture of Bordeaux, bore the signature of Maurice
Papon. Berges gave these documents to Michel Slitinsky a historian, whose name, as an

escapee from the roundups organized in Bordeaux by Maurice Papon, appeared on one of
the documents. Slitinsky transmitted these documents to the newspaper Le Canard

Enchaine which, after verification, published two of the documents.7 Papon was a top

French civil servant and Minister of President Giscard d’Estaing at the time of
publication. Papon’s brilliant prefectorial career led him to represent the French State,
Drancy and on to Auschwitz. A total of 1,690 persons featured in I’acte d’Accusation de Maurice Papon.
L’acte d'Accusation was published in its entirety by L’Humanite (Paris) April 1998, 15-34.
4 Erhel et al., Le Proces de Maurice Papon, to/we 1,90-181. Unless otherwise noted all
translations by the writer.
5 Trial of Maurice Papon October 1997 to April 1998 before the Cour d’assises de la Gironde,
Bordeaux, charged with “Complicity to Assassination” and “Crimes against Humanity.” On 2 April 1998
Papon was found guilty of crimes against humanity, the charges of complicity to assassination were
dismissed by the Jury. He received a 10 year sentence, which he immediately appealed. He lost this appeal
automatically under French law, as he did not appear before the court at Bordeaux to answer the appeal,
having fled the country beforehand. Extradited back to France he was arrested and placed in prison to
serve his sentence pronounced in Bordeaux, without appeal. His case for inhumane incarceration due to his
age is at present before the European Court of Human Rights.
6

Amo Klarsfeld, La Cour, les Nains et le Bouffon (Paris: Editions Robert Laffont, 1998), 154.

7 Le Canard Enchaine (Paris) 6 mai 1981. The two documents published that day were an order
to transport a convoy of Israelites from Merignac to Drancy dated 1 February 1943 and a document
authorizing the seizure of an apartment belonging to an individual of the Jewish race dated 3 March 1943.
Both documents bear the signature of Maurice Papon. All newspaper articles, unless otherwise noted, were
reproduced with permission from the Dossiers de Presse, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques,
Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris, and translated by the writer.
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zealously protecting its colonial hold in both Algeria8 from 1949 to 1954, and again from
1956-1958, and Morocco,9 from 1954 to 1956. Recalled to Paris in 1958 he was then
nominated as Prefet de police de Paris,10 a post he held for almost ten years, his public

service culminating in the portfolio of Minister of Finance from April 1978 until May

1981
The trial of Maurice Papon re-opened a chapter in French history the nation would

perhaps have preferred not to have known about. The trial brought into sharp focus a

picture that had not been publicly accepted before.11 In 1997 after sixteen years of legal
wrangling, Maurice Papon finally stood before his judges and the Gaullist construction of

history received its most public and wide-spread discrediting. The trial brought to the

forefront the distance between the historical and legal professions. At the center of the
heated debate was the testimony in the trial of historian Robert Paxton. Paxton’s account
of “les annees noires” before the court was in effect perceived by many as a history

lesson.12 The court would have been at a distinct disadvantage in the partisan atmosphere

8 In October 1949 Papon was appointed Prefet de Constantine, Algeria, until 1954 when he was
recalled to Paris. In May 1956 Papon returned to Algeria where he was nominated as Inspecteur general de
I 'administration en mission extra-ordinaire a Constantine, Algeria, until 15 March 1958, when he was
recalled to Paris..
9

From June 1954 to March 1956 Papon was Secretaire general du Maroc.

io

From March 1958 to January 1967 Papon was Prefet de police de Paris.

11 Liberation (Paris) 3 octobre 1997. “Those who organized the trains knew there would be the
dead.” Herald Tribune (Paris) 24 October, 1997. “Papon Trial: A Big whirlpool. Gaullist Politics, Even de
Gaulle, Being Sucked In. Le Monde (Paris) 15 mai 1998 “A family secret exposed. The reasons for such
long impunity.”
12 L ’Humanite (Paris) 31 octobre 1997. “Robert Paxton gave an overwhelming history lesson.”
Note: This newspaper is the organ of the French Communist Party. The article in question reflects the need
in France for an unbiased, non-partisan account of historical facts that the French knew they had been
deprived of. As the facts unfolded for the first time for many outside scholarly circles, Paxton, in a precise
academic manner, addressed issues such as the Vichy initiatives surrounding fat Statutes anti-juifs, coupled
with the overwhelming evidence Paxton offered of Italian protection of the Jews, including no deportations

79

surrounding “les annees noires" to litigate such matters without referring to long
established and highly respected historical scholarship as evidence. Drawing upon his

own research and others, Paxton testified to the active role of the Vichy regime

immediately after the armistice.
Citing the Vichy regime’s quest for sovereignty, which led to its close collaboration

with the Nazis in the deportations of Jews from areas out of Nazi jurisdiction, Paxton
showed that deportations on such a scale could not have taken place without the aid of the

French administration. Thus Paxton was instrumental in producing a solid historical
framework with which the court and its legal practitioners could support their legal

arguments.13 Concerning the credibility of the Vichy regime’s image as a “shield,”

Paxton stated that the regime encouraged this belief with substantial success. Yet

Paxton’s testimony effectively refuted the victim/shield myth by unequivocally placing

the responsibility for the policy of deportation on Vichy officials. Paxton testified that:
On the 27 March 1942 the first train left France for the death camps in Poland. To
carry out their policy the Germans demanded the aid of Vichy.... [t]he Vichy
Government decided to participate in the project. During the summer of 1942 the
Vichy government negotiated with the Germans. The Agreement Oberg-Bousquet14
granted a certain autonomy to the French Police who consequently participated in the
repression of the enemies of the Reich including the Jews.... On 27 March 1942 when

until Italy was fully occupied; these issues, among others, were in contradiction to most French history
lessons covering "les annees noires. " Paxton also delivered his non-partisan testimony of almost four
hours without access to the documents of the court specifying to the court that he had no prior knowledge
of the case, nor was he a specialist of the Gironde under occupation, and further, that he had never worked
in the departemental archives of the Gironde nor on the administrative career of Maurice Papon.
13 Erhel et al., Le Proces de Maurice Papon, tome 1, 337. The President of the court, Jean-Louis
Castagnede, rejected Papon’s defense request to cancel Paxton’s testimony stating that due to the historical
content of the facts surrounding the accusation and that the evidence of Paxton conformed to this necessity,
his evidence would stand as such.

14 Oberg-Bousquet Agreement July 1942. Cited in Robert O. Paxton and Michael M. Marrus,
Vichy France and the Jews, with a foreword by Stanley Hoffinan (New York: Basic Books 1981 reprint
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 249. All page citations are to the reprint edition.
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Bousquet15 learnt that the Germans had decided to expedite a train of Jews to the East,
he alone offered to transfer to the German authorities the foreign Jews found in the
Unoccupied Zone.... The Oberg-Bousquet agreement included the possibility of
round-ups in the future. This developed into a frenzy of deportations in which the
French police furnished to the Germans, the Nazis, Jews from areas where there were
no occupation troops. There are few comparable instances in occupied Europe. The
Nazis needed the French administration to apply their desires right up to the last
French village.16

The extensive press coverage of Paxton’s testimony brought to the popular imagination

scholarly work that had long refuted the victim/shield myth.

Other historians also testified in Papon’s trial and participated in the realignment of
popular consciousness. Evidence offered by the historian Marc Olivier Baruch gave

detailed testimony highlighting the roles undertaken by the French administration of the
Vichy regime.17 Historian Jean Pierre Azema’s testimony clarified the application of the

Vichy regime’s anti-Jewish statutes contextualizing them within the Vichy regime’s
national revolution.

1R

Henri Amouroux’s testimony for the defense centered on the

argument that the lack of knowledge as to Vichy’s policies of ostracism by the

population, was generally because of a total preoccupation with survival after defeat.
Amouroux further attested to a lack of knowledge among the population and the

administration of the Final Solution.19 Raising ethical questions of objectivity some

historians such as Henry Rousso and Pierre Vidal-Naquet refused to testify.

20

15 Rene Bousquet, General Secretary of the Police in the Vichy Regime. He was charged with
crimes against humanity in 1991. He was never brought to trial and was assassinated on 8 June 1993.
16 Erhel et al., Le Proces de Maurice Papon, tome 1. 307-310. Testimony of Robert Paxton.

17 Ibid., 415-436. Testimony of Marc Olivier Baruch. Baruch’s findings were based on 20,000
documents contained in the National Archives of France. He was refused archival access to 3 boxes.
18

Ibid., 339-368. Testimony of Jean-Pierre Azema.

19 Ibid., 320-336. Testimony of Henri Amouroux. Note: Henri Amouroux is a journalist and a
prolific author specializing in "les annees noires. ”
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One could argue that institutionalized antisemitism enacted by the Vichy regime

compromised the French legal system and its practitioners. At the liberation the French
legal system had became a tool for the implication of the process of epuration which did

not examine institutionalized anti-Semitism Apart from the few show trials of prominent
leaders of the Vichy regime after the liberation, judges became resigned to the political

messages of the necessity for state continuity, rather than a deliverance of harsh punitive
sentences flushing out collaboration. Aided by a complex legal system, many

collaborators, including the state’s own servants, slipped through the net. The French

legal system was thus one of the vehicles for the construction of a version of

contemporary French history surrounding “les annees noires." But in the 1980s and 90s,

the French legal system has also been the conduit through which Vichy collaborationists
had been brought to public attention. Trials such as those of Paul Touvier,21 and the legal
wrangling and subsequent death before trial of both Jean Leguay 22 and Rene Bousquet,23

20 Henri Rousso, La Hantise du Passe (Paris: Les Editions Textuel, 1998), 12,101-9, argues that
historians who do give evidence should do so without knowing or referring to the charges or the accused, to
preserve objectivity. Historians were not necessarily more objective in their academic scholarship than in
court, but were not under pressure as in a court where history and justice do not go hand in hand. Further,
at Papon’s trial historians were asked to give evidence on events to which they had no first-hand
knowledge, or access to archival sources used by the court. Refer to Rousso’s letter to the Court. Erhel et
al., Le Proces de Maurice Papon, tome 1, 77-78. Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Nouvel Observateur (Paris) 23
octobre 1997 states he refused to give evidence at Papon’s trial due to his own lack of objectivity. VidalNaquet lost both parents to deportation. Still, he argues that historians should not become judges or
paparazzi, as by definition a historian is a person of context and therefore cannot judge history.

21 Paul Touvier, Regional Head of the Milice of the Rhone was condemned to death on two
occasions in absentia in 1946 and 1947 for treason and intelligence with the enemy only. The Catholic
Church of France hid him. Finally, after extensive legal wrangling lasting many years, he was convicted in
1994 of crimes against humanity concerning the execution of seven Jewish hostages in Rillieux-la-Pape 29
June 1944. Other charges were dropped.

22 Jean Leguay, delegue en zone occupee de Rene Bousquet. He was charged with crimes against
humanity for his role in the organization of the Vel'd'Hiv roundups of July 1942. He was never brought to
trial and died on 2 July 1989.
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all demonstrate that the French legal system, though charged with adjudicating the legacy
of “les annees noires,” was in some ways as hard pressed as the state itself to do so.

Yet in the trial of Maurice Papon the French legal system imposed upon historians
the role of litigating and re-writing the history of “les annees noires.” Though a

significant portion of the public still adhered to the Gaullist construction of France’s past,
professional historians in Papon’s trial found themselves raising the deeply sensitive and
ethical problem of French policies and atrocities which led to deportation and death for

many of France’s own citizens. This contradicted traditional and conceptual
representations of “ les annees noires. ” 24 The story of Maurice Papon’s career as a
Vichy collaborator and direct participant in genocide personalized the falsity of the

Gaullist construction and popularized that which some historians and journalists had been
arguing for several decades in a way that no previous history text, film, or journalist

account had been able to do.

Maurice Papon’s career in Bordeaux as the newly appointed secretaire general de la
prefecture de la Gironde coincided with the instigation by Vichy of an official oath of

2-5 Rene Bousquet, General Secretary of the Vichy Police in the government of Laval. Charged
with crimes against humanity in March 1991 for his role in the roundups of Vel'd’Hiv. He was never
brought to trial and was assassinated on 8 June 1993.

24 In July 1982 charges were laid. On January 1983 Papon was charged with crimes against
humanity. In March 1984 further charges of crimes against humanity were laid. In February 1987 first
charges for crimes against humanity were dismissed due to errors of procedure. A New Judge was
appointed. In July 1988 charges for crimes against humanity were laid again. In October 1990 further
charges of crimes against humanity were laid. In June 1992 a new Judge was appointed concerning further
charges of crimes against humanity laid on June 1992. In December 1995 Papon was pursued for
complicity in crimes against humanity for only certain convoys and arrests in Bordeaux. In January 1997 a
legal basis to pursue for crimes against humanity was recognized by the Criminal Division of the High
Court of Bordeaux, but crimes against humanity was amended. This court concluded that it was no longer
necessary for the accomplice of crimes against humanity to ‘‘adhere to the politics of ideological hegemony
of the principal authors of the crime.” In August 1997 Papon was placed under “judicial control. Papon
finally came to trial in October 1997. See Erhel et al., Le proces de Maurice Papon, tome 1. 9-13.
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allegiance to be sworn by all the prefectorial body25 to the new Head of State, Marechai

Petain. Thus on Friday 5 June 1942 in 1‘hotel de la prefecture de Bordeaux, in the
departement de la Gironde. Maurice Papon took the oath.26 Nominated by Pierre Laval,

head of the Vichy Government and Minister of the Interior, Maurice Papon strictly
adhered to his role as servant of the state.27 His rank and the confidence placed in him by

the Prefet, Maurice Sabatier, gave him the right of signature on decisions concerning all
matters of war in the departement of the Gironde, and notably from the 20 June 1941 the

right of signature over all Jewish questions. A law of 23 April 1941 and a decret of 7
July 1941 conferred upon the Prefet the direction and coordination of all Police
personnel.

*7 R

This too came under the direct orders of Maurice Papon.29

From the onset Maurice Papon carried out his orders without question and with zeal.

In July 1943 Feldkommandantux 529 du Venvaltungstrupe considered Papon a

“[c]ompetent administrator who knows howto face up to difficult situations.... His

25 Gerard Boulanger, Maurice Papon un technocratefrancais dans la collaboration (Paris:
Editions du Seuil, 1994), 25, cites the refusal to swear allegiance to Marechai Petain by a Magistrate,
M.Didier and a State Counselor, M.Blondea.
26 Oath of Allegiance was formulated under a Constitutional Act No. 7,27 janvier 1941. A
further Constitutional Act, no. 10, 4 octobre 1941 and a law of 10 avril 1942 to swear allegiance was
imposed on all members of the civil service. Further, a decree of 6 avril 1942 imposed an oral sweanng of
the oath of allegiance be administered. Refer to Gerard Boulanger, Maurice Papon, 25-26, for precise
details.
27 Pierre Laval, Prime Minister in Third Republic in 1931, foreign minister from October 1934 to
1936 as well as Prime Minister June 1935 to February 1936. 27 June 1940 vice-President du Conseil
(deputy Prime Minister of Petain) until 13 December 1941. Removed from power by Petain he formed a
new Government of Vichy 26 April 1942 and became Head of Vichy Government after strong German
pressure; in fact he became the principal contact of the Germans with Vichy. He remained in this position
until the collapse of Vichy. Laval nominated Papon during his second term of premiership. Laval was
executed on 15 October 1945 for treason
28

Erhel et al., Le proces de Maurice Papon, tome 1. 95.

29

Bernard Violet, Le Dossier Papon (Paris: Editions Flammarion, 1997), 29.
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attitude is correct and he is easily cooperative....”30 The evidence in the trial showed
that there was no doubt that Papon was a highly efficient civil servant, motivated by his

career to cooperate willingly. But in administrating France on a daily basis under the

Vichy regime and Nazi occupation, French administrators, such as Maurice Papon,
played a crucial role in dissimulating state collaboration, thus retarding an awakening of a

subjugated national consciousness to the reality of genocide committed in its name by its
servants.

The trial also brought to light to a broad public that a special department, headed by
Xavier Vai let, was created by the Vichy regime under the law 29 March 1941 to manage

Jewish affairs independently of the Germans.31 Vallat’s objectives were to enforce the
Statuts des Juifs and to extend a census of all Jews to the unoccupied zone.32 Each

Prefecture had its own “Service des Questions Juives. ” Papon’s duties consisted of the
maintenance of a list of registered Jews, the organization and implementation of

roundups, and the organization of convoys containing Jews transported from Bordeaux to
Drancy.33 On 16 July 1942 Maurice Papon informed his superior (Prefet Sabatier) that
during the night 15 and 16 July 1942, he ordered a roundup of foreign Jews between the
j0 Archives Departementales de la Gironde, Bordeaux. All documents referring to Maurice
Papon are held by Michel Slitinsky and are contained in Serge Klarsfeld, Les Deportations desjuifs de
Bordeaux. Published by L Association des fils etfiles de deportesjuifs de France 1986. Cited by Violet,
Le dossier Papon, 37.
31 Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France, 82-83. German archives consulted by Marrus and Paxton
show initial German demands were for an agency to cover only the Occupied Zone, Vichy proposed to
extend the scope of the new agency to cover both zones, in pursuance of their policy of maintaining
sovereignty.
32

Ibid., 100.

33 Erhel et al., Le Proces de Maurice Papon, tome 1. 99-108. This information is extracted from
the “Faits ” (background information) presented to the court in Bordeaux during the opening sessions by
court officials on behalf of the Procurer General Henri Desclaux. Also cited by Boulanger, Maurice
Papon, 115.
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ages of 16 and 45 in Bordeaux. This roundup produced 171 Jews including 2 minors,
who formed the convoy of 20 July 1942 from Bordeaux to Drancy and then to

Auschwitz.34 A letter addressed to the Stationmaster of Saint-Jean Station in Bordeaux
evidences the precision of Papon’s organization. Papon’s demands included that by the

afternoon of 18 July 1942 sufficient wagons be ready to transport about 200 people to
Drancy.

•5 C

Papon’s responsibilities also included matters concerning foreigners. On 27

June 1942 Papon ordered the arrest and sequestration in Merignac of three foreign bom

Jews and one non-Jewish foreigner with a view to their transfer to Drancy.36 Overall
Papon played a determining role in the deportation between June 1942 and May 1944

from Bordeaux of 1,690 Jews, French and otherwise, including the aged and young
children.

T*7

Papon’s duties were consistent with the goals of the Vichy regime.

L ’acte d'Accusation de Maurice Papon shows that the Statuts des Juifs were applied

vigorously in the Vichy regime removing French citizenship from foreign-bom Jews
o

whom were then deported.

Between June 1942 and August 1944 ten convoys left

Bordeaux filled with Jews for Drancy, from where they were transported to Auschwitz
and extermination. Most of these convoys were preceded by roundups; other convoys

were filled with the inmates from Merignac, notably those with children. French Jewish
citizens, such as Leon Librach, who, though bom in Warsaw, was a French citizen, were

34

Violet, Le Dossier Papon, 246.

35

Ibid., 244.

36

Ibid., 241.

37

Erhel et al., Le proces de Maurice Papon, tome 1. 108.

38 L 'acte d Accusation de Maurice Papon contained in Erhel et al., Ze Proces de Maurice Papon,
tome I. 78-181
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deported to Auschwitz from Bordeaux. Children such as Ita and Jacky Junger were
contained in convoy number 26 which left Drancy 26 August 1942 and on 31 August
1942 they were deported to Auschwitz. Ita was 7 years old and Jacky was 3 years old.

Maurice Papon signed all the deportation orders. L’Acte d’Accusation evoked irrecusable
evidence that young children left Merignac for Drancy under the orders of Maurice

Papon.39
The trial also drew attention to Vichy persecution of refugees from the Spanish civil
war, who were suspected of being communists and were rounded up by Vichy
functionaries throughout France and sequestered in French internment camps, including

Merignac. From the departement de la Seine et Oise a list of “espagnols rouges” dated
24 November 1942 shows 67 Spanish men and women were arrested in the departement

and sent to Merignac.40 Among the many interned by Papon41 in Merignac were Benito
Gonzalez, on 4 November 1942, and Mario Barrera, interned 13 March 1943.42 For the
most part, the Spanish refugees neither escaped the convoys nor deportation as political

prisoners of the Regime and National Socialism.43

39

Ibid., 177.

4l) Archives Departementales des Yvelines (formerly Seine et Oise) Versailles. Cote 1W81.
Examined with permission under derogation granted by the Minister of Culture to the writer October 2000.
41 Accords Fredou-Hartmann 3 aout 1940 provided for the arrest of foreigners and Communist
suspects by the French Police. Law of 3 septembre 1940 permitted the internment by the Prefet of all
individuals dangerous to the national defense or public security in internment camps. The Vichy antiJewish Statutes of 4 October 1940 provided for the placement in internment camps of foreign Jews.
42 Erhel et al., Ze Proces de Maurice Papon, L 'acte d'Accusation de Maurice Papon, tome 1. 97.
43 Anne Grynberg, Les camps de la honte: Les internesjuifs des campsfrancaise 1939-1944
(Paris: Editions La Decouverte 1999; La Decouverte/Poche, 1999), 40-63, refers in detail to the Spanish
refugees in the French camps.
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The trial also revealed Papon’s political dissimulation near the war’s end. By

autumn 1943 the Comite francais de la Liberation headed by General Charles de Gaulle
was installed in Algers. This period also saw Maurice Papon declining promotion to a
higher grade, that of Prefet du Lot,44 and later in January 1944 refusing the post of Prefet

des Landes,45 thus distancing himself from an ailing Vichy regime. It is at this moment

that Papon alleges that he joined the Resistance, the network known as Marco du SR
Kleber*6

The evidence suggests that the failures of I’epuration worked well for Maurice
Papon. As a latter day Resistant he slipped from Petanism into Gaullism, finally taking
the post of Prefet des Landes in August 1944. His protector and savior during this period

was Gaston Cusin, holding the title, Commissaire de la Republique, and serving as De
Gaulle’s representative for the Region of Aquitaine. Cusin was a member of the

Resistance and closely tied to De Gaulle.47 Cusin had also been a top civil servant before

the armistice and in the corridors of power had met Papon. Papon stated that he renewed
contact with Cusin three or four months before liberation during Cusin’s frequent visits to

44 Boulanger, Maurice Papon, 246-247. A Prefet is a top civil servant nominated by the
Government who is the principal representative of the Republic in a given departement, thus Prefet du Lot
represents the Republic of France in the departement of Lot, situated in the south west of France. This title
was retained by the Vichy Regime though the Prefets were of course representatives of the Vichy regime
with a sworn allegiance to Petain, and not the Republic.
45 Ibid. Prefet des Landes is the representative of the Republic for the departement of des Landes
situated in the lower south west of France bordering Spain. Prefets are appointed by departement not
region.
46 Erhel et al., Le Proces de Maurice Papon. L ’acte d’Accusation de Maurice Papon, tome 1,
169-70, states that the outcome of the preliminary investigation did not show with any certainty that Papon
had been a member of the Resistance. It further noted that Papon’s Resistance credentials had been issued
only some months after he had entered the Prefecture de Police de Paris.
47

Boulanger, Maurice Papon ,18.
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the Bordeaux region concerning his clandestine activities.48 Papon appears to have

negotiated a smooth and highly successful transition without being stigmatized, from the
Prefecture of Bordeaux in 1944 to the Ministry of Finance in 1981 when fortuitous
circumstances brought Papon’s Vichy record to light.

In February 1981 historian Michel Berges had discovered a series of documents
which authorized deportation of Jews from Bordeaux between 1940 and 1944.49 These

documents bore the signature of Maurice Papon, then the General Secretary of the
Prefecture de la Gironde in Bordeaux. Two of the documents were published 6 May
1981, in the Parisian newspaper Le Canard Enchaine™ The publication encouraged

charges to be laid against Maurice Papon on behalf of the victims. On 8 December 1981
the slow process of bringing Maurice Papon to justice began.

Alleging membership of the resistance, Maurice Papon requested a hearing before a

Jury d’honneur composed of ex-resistance members. The conclusion of the jury was

only that Maurice Papon should have resigned from his functions in Bordeaux in July
1942.51 But ultimately, in October 1997 after much effort on the part of his accusers,

48 Details concerning Maurice Papon’s career as a top civil servant of both the Vichy regime, 4'th
and 5th Republics are cited from Erhel et al., Le Proces de Maurice Papon, tome 1. Maurice Papon,
interrogatoire de Curriculum Vitae, le 9 decembre 1988 devant Francois Braud, le conseiller a la chambre
d'accusation de la cour d’appel de Bordeaux. Also cited by Violet, Le Dossier Papon, 42.
49 Michel Berges, a historian examining the economic role of the Vichy Regime in Bordeaux,
accidentally found deportation orders and other documents bearing the signature of Maurice Papon
concerning round ups, arrests, sequestration of victims in Merignac, and deportation, in the departemental
archives. Berges handed these documents to Michael Slitinsky, a historian and victim of persecution in
Bordeaux, whose name appeared in the documents. Realizing the historical and political importance of the
documents, Slitinsky informed Le Canard Enchaine newspaper. After verification, two of these documents
were published. Le Canard Enchaine (Paris) 6 mai, 1981. See also Violet, Le Dossier Papon, 9-14.
50

Le Canard Enchaine (Paris) 6 mai, 1981.

51

Le Matin (Paris) 16 decembre 1981.
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Maurice Papon was finally brought before the High Court of Bordeaux to answer charges

of crimes against humanity and complicity to assassination.
Papon’s defense in the fact of such accusations was to deny knowledge of the

application of the final solution. Maitre Amo Klarsfeld, a lawyer for the civil litigants,
during his interrogation of Papon, vehemently contested this.52 Writing after the trial

Klarsfeld demonstrates that even the local newspaper, La Petite Gironde, frequently
reported on the subject at the time.53 The edition of the 16 September 1942, for example,

clearly stated that the Jewish question would be solved in one swoop and in a general
manner, and that Europe in its need to be healthy would apply the law of collective

responsibility. Klarsfeld also contested the long-standing excuse that the Vichy regime
deported only in order to comply with the Nazi occupation demands for labor. The
extensive evidence of the presence of young children, the aged and women in the

convoys reveals that other objectives had driven deportation?4

Defense lawyers laid particular stress on Papon’s alleged membership in the
Resistance. However, Jean Pierre-Bloch, a distinguished Resistant, member of the

Intelligence Section of the Resistant network, also member of Papon's Jury d’honneur,

stated before the court that “Papon had never been a Resistant.”55

52 Maitre Amo Klarsfeld represented the association Fils et Filles des deportes juifs de France
on behalf of some of the victims. Cross examination of Maurice Papon by Maitre Amo Klarsfeld. Erhel et
al., Ze Proces de Maurice Papon, tome 2. 63-64.
53 La Petite Gironde (Bordeaux) 16 septembre 1942. Cited by Amo Klarsfeld, La Cour, les
Nains et le Bouffbn, 199.
54

Klarsfeld, La Cour, 201.

55

Testimony of Jean Pierre-Bloch. Erhel et al., Le Proces de Maurice Papon, tome 2, 642-648.
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The trial of Maurice Papon set off a furor and outcry that echoed throughout the
population, media and political scene. French public reactions varied depending on the
level of discomfort the trial incited. A group of high school students56 for example,

attended the trial on 19 October 1997. They questioned the length of time taken to search
out the truth. They asked if it were due to a cover up of shameful events. They also

thought a lack of knowledge on their parents’ part was due to the presence of a taboo on
the subject. One student expressed shock at Papon’s attempts to avoid any culpability.57
In reaction, historian Georgette Elgey expressed a profound sense of unease that the

public could judge the outcome of the trial as if it already knew the results. Elgey sought
to defend the Vichy generation when she referred to the lack of reaction to the regime’s

anti-Jewish laws during the period as due to a people traumatized by defeat and daily
difficulties?8
Many young people, in contrast, responded to the trial with outright condemnation in

reaction to the trial. The political factions did not absolve themselves from the
disputatious backlash Papon’s trial had engendered. According to the right-wing

newspaper Le Figaro, Jewish activists were benefiting from the outcry the trial had

brought about by encouraging guilt feelings among the public in favor of the State of
Israel. Le Figaro also maintained that the French left wing were provoking xenophobic
reactions among the population in order to increase extreme right wing support, thus

56 Students from the Lycee Tivoli, Bordeaux, interview by Jean-Charles Duquesne in La Croix
(Paris) 19 octobre 1997.
57 Anne-Sophie, 15 year old student of Lycee Tivoli, Bordeaux, interview by Jean-Charles
Duquesne in La Croix (Paris) 19 octobre 1997.
58

Georgette Elgey interview by Sophie Huet in Le Figaro (Paris) 18 octobre 1997.
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dividing the right wing element.59 The leader of the right wing RPR Party, Philippe

Seguin, denounced the trial of Papon as “neo-revisionism of bad taste tending to give
credit to the idea that France was Vichy.”60 Clearly, the trial revealed a France in which

contested interpretations of the past could have profound implications for its
contemporary political struggles.

The trial not only addressed embarrassing aspects of the Vichy regime, but also
raised questions about the Fourth and Fifth Republics. For the first time in public,

contradictory versions of events surrounding a demonstration of Algerians in Paris in
October 1961 came to light. Maurice Papon was the Prefet de Police de Paris on that
night. Though there is limited documentary evidence, the testimony of the historian
Jean-Luc Einaudi was of tremendous significance in bringing an alleged massacre of

Algerians by French police to the notice of the public. He testified to the events of
October 1961 surrounding a demonstration held in the evening of 17 October 1961 by

Algerians, protesting against the installation of a curfew.61 Einaudi testified that these

events were covered up from the press and public by the government. His testimony of
as to the details of the event attested that a high number of bodies were found floating in
the River Seine at various points along the way. Einaudi revealed the contradictory

account of the number of victims, estimating the number between 200 and 300. Roger
Chaix 62 Director of Algerian Affairs in the Prefecture de Police de Paris, corroborated

59

Le Figaro (Paris) 22 oclobre, 1997.

60

Nouvel Observateur (Paris) 123-29 octobre 1997.

61

Erhel et al., Le Proces de Maurice Papon, tome 1., 225-244/282-283. Testimony of Jean-Luc

Einaudi.

62 Ibid., 277-283. Testimony of Roger Chaix, Director of Algerian Affairs, Prefecture de Police
de Paris, during the relevant period. The Prefecture is the government office of the Prefet and Chaix
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Einaudi s assertion as to the pacific element to the demonstration but claimed the number
of victims as being 77.63 Papon, on the other hand, asserted that there were 3 victims,
with one due to a heart attack.64 Interrogated by the President of the Court, Einaudi

explained that his sources were collected from a wide variety including oral and written
accounts, but that there could be no further analysis as the archives were not accessible.65

An important indication of the French government’s reluctance to undergo a full
reshaping of its contemporary distorted historical narrative was revealed in the trial in the
lack of access to National Archives concerning the events of 17 October 1961.

Contained in the newspaper Le Monde is an extract of a judicial enquiry concerning
access still being debated in the press as recently as 1998.66 This lack of access has been
primordial in limiting research in the subject of the Algerian Massacre.67

worked in close collaboration with Papon during this period. The Prefecture de Police de Paris is situated
on the He de la Cite in the centre of Paris connected to both banks of the River Seine by bridges.
63 Ibid., 280. Testimony of Roger Chaix, Director of Algerian Affairs, Prefecture de Police de
Paris during the relevant period. Roger Chaix asserts in his testimony that the figure of 77 represents the
number of dead victims of Algerian origin transported to the Paris Mortuary during the month of October
1961. See also Liberation (Paris) 22 octobre 1997. The article cites the visit to the National archives on 20
October 1997 by the historian David Assouline. He obtained brief incomplete access to files concerning
the incident of 17 October 1961, and made a provisional calculation of 70 victims. Liberation also
published an extract from the archives, which shows a list of names together with the cause of death.
Assouline was not granted further access to other archives.
6-1

Interrogation of Maurice Papon on this issue by the President of the court. Ibid., 285.

65 Einaudi in fact obtained access to the FLN archives in Paris but these were incomplete and
covered only a short period. Einaudi did not obtain access to the National Archives of France or other
archival sources. Note: Front Liberation National (National Liberation Front), Algerian political party.
After independence from France 31 July 1962, the FLN formed the first and only government, to date, in
Algeria. See Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Face a la raison d’Etat: Un historian dans la guerre d Algerie (Paris:
La Decouverte, 1989) also Bernard Drox and Evelyne Lever, Histoire de la guerre dAlgerie 1954-1962
(Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1991).
66

Le Monde (Paris) 5 mai 1998.

67 Jean-Luc Einaudi, La Bataille de Paris (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1991). See also Jean-Luc
Einaudi, “Les mensonges de Maurice Papon, ” Le Monde (Paris) 25 octobre 1997. Jean-Luc Einaudi,
“Octobre 1961: pour la verite enfin,” Le Monde (Paris) 20 mai 1998 evidences a continued lack of access to
relevant archives.
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Papon s trial also revealed a younger generation within the nation wanting to use

history to re-tell its past, in effect to reconstruct its memory. This is evidenced by the
fact that the trial was held, even after fifty years and despite numerous efforts to delay. It

is also strongly evidenced by the Court’s use of reputed historians to reconstruct a

scholarly account of the past. Litigating the French role in genocide requires historical
input as Papon’s trial clearly demonstrates. Conflicting interpretations driven by other
interests have shown that the skilled advocacy of lawyers and the ultimate guidance and

decision making of jurists have deeply affected the history of these years. The debate as

to historians giving or refusing their knowledge and expertise to a court is ongoing. The
historians who gave evidence did a great service to the goal of sorting out the foggy
obscure shapes of the past, demolishing the vestiges of the Vichy syndrome.

The trial of Maurice Papon gave rise to recognition of the presence of myths as a

foundation for a historical narrative which enabled the creation from the ruins of
collaboration of a Gaullist French state that asserted continuity with the past. The state,
under the auspices of the Vichy regime during the Nazi occupation, was revealed to be

co-author of genocide and not a coerced servant of the Nazis. Despite being abandoned

to the dust and decay of inaccessible archives, the trial allowed before a mass audience
the very nature and contours of historical truth as experienced over the post war years to

be contested. There is no denying the importance of the trial of Maurice Papon in
opening up for discussion subjects long laid to rest, nor of its importance in revealing
publicly the French state as a manipulator of historical memory.

The trial of Maurice Papon has further expanded into deeper questions being raised as
to the role a distorted historical memory played with regard to France’s role in genocide.
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Linking deportation to genocide, Annette Wieviorka argues that under the umbrella of

memory that the word Auschwitz provides, other concentration camps in France were
dissimulated into the collective memory without addressing the specificity of repression
which Jewish populations suffered.68 Though the trial of Maurice Papon refers to

Merignac, many other camps existed throughout France.69 In particular the lack of
hygiene and food in the camps of Pithiviers and Beaune-la-Roland situated in the

departement du Loiret, led to death of children before deportation.70 In a report dated 20

July 1942 a French Gendarme attests to a lack of food.71 In Beaune another report dated
5 August attests to the first deaths among children rounded up in Paris in July with the
presence in the camp of diphtheria and dysentery.72 The Prefet du Loiret attests to fears
of disturbances among the civilian population but adds that for the most part the denizens
of the area watched the convoys arrive with passivity.73 The concentration camp
Natzwiller-Struthof, situated in Alsace Lorraine and consequently under German control

from 1940 to its liberation, came under the direct orders of Reichsfuhrer SS Himmler.
Though this thesis does not address the problem of the Final Solution outside of France,

this camp was geographically situated in France and furthermore, many French political
68 Annette Wieviorka, Deportation and genocide. Entre la memoire el I 'oubli (Paris:Editions du
Seuil, 1998), 20.
69 Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France, 171. Grynberg’s more recent study gives a revised figure of
93 French concentration camps. See Anne Grynberg, Les camps de la home: Les internesjuifs des camps
francais 1939-1944, for precise details. Though not addressed in this thesis Gypsies were also interned and
persecuted before deportation. See Marie-Christine Hubert, Les Tsignanes en France,1939-1946 (Paris:
Editions du CNRS, 1994) directed by Denis Peschanski.
70

Conan, L 'Express (Paris) 27 avril 1990,60-70.

71

Conan, L 'Express., 63.
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Conan, L'Express, 63.

73

Conan, L 'Express, 63.
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prisoners transferred from Vichy jurisdiction were among the population incarcerated

under particularly draconian conditions there, which included forced labor and death
resulting from medical experiments.74 Though not a mass extermination center,

inhumane conditions led to death at Natzwiller-Struthof. Having only a list of names of
SS Guards and personnel to examine, the writer found no trace of any French names
among the camp personnel.75

The trial of Maurice Papon also turned into a broader indictment of the French state
and of Gaullism. In emphasizing the illegitimacy of the Vichy Regime, de Gaulle erected

a myth which officially lasted until 1995 when President Jacques Chirac, before an
audience gathered at Vel’d’Hiv, conceded that terrible mistakes had been made under
Vichy.76 This concession marked a break with the ambiguities of President Mitterrand.

At the same time Chirac rejected the Gaullist myths, while carefully preserving a
fundamental element by still placing responsibility on the shoulders of the state, not the

Republic. Chirac’s concession seen by many as an astute political calculation designed to
respond to the demands of public opinion, was in essence an attempt to protect the

Gaullist tradition from further encroachment. Did General de Gaulle turn a blind eye to
Vichy officials’ records in his haste to build up post-war conservative opposition to a
i

powerful Communist Party, which claimed heroism within the Resistance? Did the Nazi

74

Conan, L 'Express^ 63.

75 Camp Records of KK Natzwiller-Struthof contained in RG 153 declassified by Order 12356
Section 3.3. 735227. 1973. Records examined and reproduced by the writer with permission from the
Archives of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington DC., 18 May 2000.
76 President Jacques Chirac, Speech given at commemorative ceremony held at Vel'd’Hiv^ 16
July 1995. Conan and Rousso, Vichy, 444-457. Note: President Jacques Chirac was the first President of
the Republic to speak at this commemorative ceremony. He was heavily criticized for this speech
particularly by the political milieu.
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Occupation forces of France operate without the Vichy Regime’s involvement? The

French Nation received its answers. The presence of Vichy’s antisemitisme d'etat, sown
in the past harvested in the mass deportations from France by servants of the Vichy
regime, is, in the light of the trial, difficult to contest. The regime’s willing assistance
that contributed to the high number of deported cannot now be extirpated from French

history
On 2 April 1998 the trial of Maurice Papon came to an end when the jury
pronounced a verdict of guilty to crimes against humanity and not guilty of the crime of

complicity to assassination. Papon received a prison sentence of ten years. Both the

verdict and the sentence expressed the uncertainties and confusion surrounding the trial.

For Maitre Arno Klarsfeld, a lawyer for the civil litigants, the verdict of guilty of crimes
against humanity was certainly a victory, but at the price of a lesser sentence. On the

other hand, the acquittal for complicity to assassination was a bitter defeat. The

prosecution demanded a life sentence, the maximum penalty under French law. The jury
handed down a ten-year sentence only. Though to some extent this was a victory for

Maitre Jean-Marc Varaut, defending Papon, this sentence was obtained in part due to the
pleading of Maitre Klarsfeld, who, despite criticism from the defenders of memory,
argued for a “graduated” sentence for crimes against humanity.77 Eric Conan observed
that Maitre Klarsfeld’s solution for a “graduated” sentence was the only one possible to

avoid Papon being acquitted.78 Others, including Maitre Zaoui, also a lawyer for the civil

litigants, disagreed. He declared that “the supreme crime of all can only be punished by
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Erhel et al., Le Proces de Maurice Papon, tome 2, 703.
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Eric Conan, Le Proces Papon: Un Journal d’Audience (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1998), 265.
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the maximum penalty.”79 He subsequently argued accordingly. It is interesting to note
that Maitre Klarsfeld’s strategy arose from his considered opinion that the court was

leaning towards acquittal not because of its impartiality, on the contrary, Klarsfeld was
more afraid of the judicial precision exercised by this court due to the uncertainties of the

charges laid against Papon.80 Both the verdict and the sentence ultimately engendered
dissatisfaction and ambivalence. Maitre Vaurat, defense counsel, writing after the trial,

proclaimed:

This equitable but unreal production of an expiatory sacrifice liberating us from our
shame has very little to do with justice. Neither history, nor politics, nor memory,
nor even justice has been satisfied by this trial, no matter how long it was, and it was
the longest in the history of France.81
Beyond the obvious problem for France that the trial had not fully satisfied all the

demands made upon it, the verdict, inadvertantly, had created jurisprudence around the
“graduation” of sentences concerning crimes against humanity under the present

definition. For many in Bordeaux however, the acquittal for complicity to assassination
was beyond comprehension and judicial concerns as to objectivity. Rather, it was a
fallacious rendering of justice, denying the voices of the victims and survivors of the

Final Solution. For others, while abhorring the horror and hideous crimes of the past, a
miscarriage of justice had been avoided, giving the benefit of doubt to the accused. The

jury had pronounced in this sense, unsure as to the extent of Papon’s knowledge of the

79

Ibid., 266.
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Ibid., 153.

81 Maitre Jean-Marc Varaut, “The Papon Trial, Three months later,” in Memory and Justice on
Trial: The Papon Affair, ed. Richard J. Golson (New York: Routledge, 2000), 216.
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1

Final Solution. Eric Conan noted that the verdict was sadly consistent with the

impossible situation in which jurors found themselves.82
Despite the trial and its demands that a collective memory be rectified, a

contradictory endeavor is still present to keep silent about the past and simultaneously
make this silence resonate in a national need to come to terms with the past. The motives
that prompted the silence are found in the repositories of memory, both collective and

individual, evidenced in the population by a strong argument to leave the past alone.

Like Austria today, the former Yugoslavia and other European countries of tomorrow,
France has a dire need to address its distorted memory, which has disintegrated into

denial and denigration.
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Conan, Le Proces Papon, 314.
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CONCLUSION:

THE HISTORICAL AND LEGAL LEGACY IN THE AFTERMATH
OF THE TRIAL OF MAURICE PAPON.

The trial of Maurice Papon, which began in October 1997 and ended in April 1998
wrestled with the most explosive issues of recent French history. These issues included

not only the question of complicity by France in the Final Solution, but also the events
surrounding what some in the French press have called the “Algerian Massacre” of 17

October 1961. These issues, among others, had been dissimulated within a Gaullist
construction of history, which the trial of Maurice Papon finally discredited. From this
perspective the trial should be viewed as more than a judicial proceeding against atop

French civil servant, accused of crimes against humanity. It was a symbolic trial of the
Vichy regime. It ultimately became also a trial of the Fourth and Fifth Republics.

This thesis began with a consideration of events in France which led to the installation

and, moreover, the acceptance by the French of the Vichy regime after the fall of France.
To fully grasp the contested nature of French World War II history the processes of

French nationalism must be examined. It was during the 19th and 20th centuries that
French nationalism began to impact on the French population.1 In particular the

contested, complex, and divisive issue of French national identity long debated around
the Dreyfus affair reappeared in the Vichy regime.2 It was embedded in the long

established interpretative frameworks the Vichy regime relied on to ensure its acceptance

1 Michel Winock, Nationalisme, antisemitisme etfascisme en France (Paris: Editions du Seuil,
1982).

2 Alfred Dreyfiis was a French army officer. He was convicted of treason in 1894. Evidence
later revealed that Dreyfus, a Jew, had been wrongfully accused by the army.
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and thus continuity. French fascism, one such framework, resuscitated itself from its

moribund state through the impact of the Depression, not through Vichy, as is sometimes

presumed. Though French fascism certainly had its followers at Vichy and played a role
as an ideological component fueling the Vichy regime3 it was not the only component.

This thesis evidences that generic antisemitism, as a process of continuation in the

political and social culture of the past, came to a climax in the cataclysm of Vichy’s own
antisemitisme de Petal. Thus the Vichy regime legislated exclusion from French
nationality of Jews as an expression of the nation at that time.

Chapter one of this thesis evidences that the Gaullist construction of history began at
the liberation of France with a series of carefully laid myths. Aided by the events

surrounding the chaotic period of the Liberation, the myths slipped into the national
consciousness as a welcomed relief for many. Reinforcing these myths, the historian

Robert Aron produced an official version of events based on the trial records of the Vichy

leaders.4 In revitalizing the foundation of the nation de Gaulle relied on the process of
epuration. Still heavily debated today by historians, who have an eclectic array of

contradictory figures and facts to work with, research has tended to highlight the
unofficial epuration. The argument emphasizing the unofficial epuration does not

enhance the scholarship, but rather it stagnates it within a partisan inspired debate.

Rousso argues for an elucidation on the official epuration by the historical community to
readdress this issue.5 Today it is safe to assume there were many inaccuracies in the
3

Winock, Nationalisms, 292.

4

Robert Aron, Histoire de Vichy 1940-1944 ( Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1954).

5

Henry Rousso, “L’epuration en France,” Une histoire inachevee” Revue d’histoire (323)
janvier-mars 1992: 78-105.
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official version of / ’epuration, which continue to weigh heavily on the scholarship. It is
clear that there was no separation of powers between the judiciary and the state

concerning the official epuration. The priorities of the state, in essence, dictated both the
application and the punishment applied to offenders. The collaboration d'etat, both
voluntary and involuntary, could not be examined under the protective safety net the

judiciary employed. Using Article 75 of the 1939 Penal Code, the Vichy leaders were
prosecuted without any examination of their ideological motivations.6 This raises the

question of distinguishing in the historical record, the difference between servile and

ideological collaboration. It was easy to seek out and punish the fascist writer Robert
Brasillach, as a scapegoat of ideological collaboration.7 Not so with regard to the

collahorateurs d'etat, the elite of the state machinery, schooled in cautious management,

personified by Maurice Papon. These technocrats were necessary for de Gaulle’s France,
to ensure the continuite de I ’etal and to maintain order. Thus, the epuration was uneven

and unjust, attempting, as we have seen, to cleanse the nation of its collaborators, but

ultimately, failing.
The parallel unofficial epuration of summary executions involved a bloodbath as
argued by the maximalist historians such as Robert Aron8 and Herbert Lottman.9 The

6 Robert O. Paxton, “Vichy Fifty years after, in Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the
Western Societyfor French History 1994. 212: 236.

7 Alice Kaplan, The Collaborator: The Trial and Execution ofRobert Brasillach (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press), 229.
8 Aron, Histoire de la Liberation de la France, juin 1944-mai 1945 ( Paris: Artheme Fayard,
1959). Cited by Rousso in “L’epuration en France,” 78-105. Aron gives a figure of 30-40,000 summary
executions.
9 Herbert Lottman, L 'epuration. 1943-1953 (Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1986). This work
exemplifies the argument for a bloodbath around the summary executions.
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images and figures arising from this argument tended to efface objective scholarship.10
Much remains to be done in this respect. The gender-based epuration known as “les

femmes tondues” which singled out women whose crime was the alleged or known
' sexual association with Germans has been unjustly neglected.11 This thesis has

attempted to demonstrate to some extent these dramatic and unsavoury reprisals against

women,12 but work on this subject is hampered by the absence of a direct trace in the

archives. New scholarship has recently appeared which enlightens many aspects of the
phenomenon.lj Still the voices of these women remain unheard by historians.

In the short term, the official version of events surrounding “les annees noires” could
be interpreted as a theraputic process of a nation recovering from occupation and

collaboration. This argument carries some weight in the light of evidence of fratricidal
strife, and an atmosphere that was decidedly undemocratic. Weaknesses appear in the
debate however, with the process of epuration. It failed miserably to legitimize the need

for the myths. In the long term, twenty years elapsed before the historical narrative laid

down by the Gaullists could be challenged. By that time the national consciousness had
fully assimilated the distorted Gaullist construction of history. However, it must not be

forgotten in the analysis, that initially there was little evidence available which could
10 Peter Novick, L ’epurationfrancaise 1944-1949, with a forword by Jean-Pierre Rioux, trans.
Helene Temois (London: 1968, trans.ed. Paris: Editions Balland, 1985). All page citations refer to the
translated version. Novick’s work represents a more objective approach than Aron and Lottman.

11

Rousso, “L’epuration en France,” 84-85.

12 Alain Brossat, Les Tondues: Un carnaval moche (Paris: Editions Manya, 1992), and
Liberation, fete folle, 6juin 44-8 mai 45: mythes et rites ou le grand theatre de passions populare (Paris:
Editions Autrement, Serie Memoires, no. 30, 1994). Brossat’s provocative study, Les Tondues, includes a
discussion on the film of Alain Resnais, Hiroshima, mon amour. Other images exist in newsreel and
glimpses also appear in Le Chagrin et la Pitie of Marcel Ophuls.

13 Fabrice Virgili, La France “virile. ” Des femmes tondues a la Liberation (Paris: Editions
Payot, 2000).
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have counteracted the Gaullist narrative. The Vichy syndrome easily installed itself,
strongly responding to the nation’s needs at that time. The personal memories of the

victims of ‘les annees noires, ” the unsavory images and the symbols, were all
assimilated into the collective consciousness and confined within the safety net
conveniently provided by the Vichy syndrome.

There were symbols, such as war monuments, that depicted a nation which had been
at war, but these symbols for the most part were in symbiosis with the Gaullist
construction of history. The brutal Nazis had occupied France. The official version

leaned heavily on this fact. This provided the nation with a sense of honor and rebirth
around selected monuments which could attest to this. One such example is the
monument dedicated to the civilian massacre by the Germans at Oradour-sur-Glane.14

But as the national honor could not include reference to its shame, other sites of
commemoration of “les annees noires” were dissipated through the edifices of nation

building the Gaullists chose. There was no monument to the victims of Vel’d’Hiv.
With the American historian Robert O. Paxton’s revolutionary work in 1961,13

however, a slow reshaping of the narrative occurred. This challenge to the myths could

be said to be the first in a series of processes that undermined the Gaullist construction of
history. The notion that a series of processes led to the demythification of French history
is more fully argued in chapter two of this thesis. But it was the watershed provided by
the events of 1968 which gave full impetus to the other processes involved in the

14 Sarah Farmer, Martyred Village: Commemorating the 1944 Massacre at Oradour-sur-Glane
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
15 Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order 1940-1944 (New York: Knopf, 1972,
reprint, Columbia University Press, 1982). Page citations are to the reprint edition.
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demythification of the Gaullist construction of history. Though the scope of this thesis
does not address directly the events of May-June 1968, this is not to undermine their

importance in the demythification process.
Bypassing the lack of access in France to archives and using those in Germany,
Paxton began to unravel the official version of Vichy. Later, with Michael M. Mamis,
these two historians became the principal probers dismantling the myths.16 The major

achievement of the scholarship of Paxton and Marrus was re-discovering the importance

of Vichy’s antisemitism, hidden away in the historical narrative, and thus bringing to
light Vichy’s autonomous participation in the Final Solution. While not forgetting other
•

•

•••

•

early historians on whose scholarship Paxton initially expanded,

Klarsfeld, both as a lawyer and a historian,

1Q

17

or the work of Serge

it is to Paxton and Marrus that we owe our

early awareness of the magnitude of the Vichy regime. Paxton and Marrus fully

integrated antisemitism with an overall interpretation of the regime and the period,
forever associating one with the other.19

Literature also played a role in undermining the Gaullist construction of history. It
carried a responsibility in demolishing the myths centered around the works of Patrick
>

16 Michael R. Marrus and Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, with a foreword by
Stanley Hoffman (New York: Basic Books, 1981, reprint, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995). Page
citations are to the reprint edition.

17 Early historians were Eberhard Jacket, La France dans I ’Europe de Hitler (Paris: Fayard,
1968), Henri Michel, Vichy annee 40 (Paris: Editions Robert Laffont, 1966), and Yves Durand, Vichy 19401944 (Paris: Editions Bordas, 1972).
18 Serge Klarsfeld, ed., La Memorial de la Deportation des Juifs de France (Paris: Centre de
documentation juive contemporaine de Paris: 1978). Also of importance, Vichy-Auschwitz: the role de
Vichy dans la solution finale, tome I, 1940-1942, tome II, 1943 (Paris: Fayard, 1983 and 1985).

1

19 Rousso, “The Historian, a site of memory,” in France at War: Vichy and the Historians, eds.
Sarah Fishman, Laura Lee Downs, loannis Sinanoglou, Leonard V.Smith and Robert Zaretsky, trans. David
Lake (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 294.
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Modiano, among others, and work written by the children of the Vichyists, closely
followed by the literature of children of the victims of Genocide. This literature mirrored
the falsity of a unified France, and thus began to diffuse contradictory messages of “les

annees noires” more readily acceptable to a wider audience than the literature of the
intelligentsia could be.

The decade of the 1970s revealed the cinema’s role in dismantling the Gaullist

construction of history. In particular, the 1971 film Le Chagrin et La Pitie became the

center in the debate for or against the continued presence of the myths.

70

Because Le

Chagrin et La Pitie was not a film of fiction but an accusatory documentary, it could not
escape the censor. As a documentary, with its interviews embedded in unspoken
historical events which slowly revealed themselves before the camera, the film shocked

the nation’s political and cultural establishment. Since Le Chagrin et La Pitie portrayed

France as a series of irreconcilable positions containing specific tensions and fault lines,

such as the visible disunity of the Resistance, the Gaullists were loath to allow its
diffusion. Scenes which tarnished the national memory of the Liberation affronted the

sensibilities of a generation now out of synchronization with the Gaullist construction of
history.
Added on to the catalystic events of 1968, the role of the press also played a

prominent role in the realignment of the French national consciousness. This role,
examined in chapter two, permitted many of the hidden or distorted events to surface. As

a detonator, the press played a distinct and important role in the process of historical
rectification, the publication of the presidential pardon granted to Paul Touvier is but one
20 Marcel Ophuls, Andre Harris and Alain Sedoy, Le Chagrin et la Pitie. Chronique d’une ville
francaise sous Poccupation (France: 1971) 4hrs. 6mins.
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example.21 The detonating article written by Jacques Derogy and published by L "Express
5 June 1962, ultimately began the long drawn-out judicial and political process, which
resulted in Touvier’s conviction on the 20 April 1994 for crimes against humanity

committed by a French citizen. Touvier’s long flight from justice was closely reported in
the press. In April 1992 the French Court of Appeals in Paris acquitted Touvier of

charges of crimes against humanity. This acquittal caused an outcry in the press and
subsequently public opinion. As the historian Tvetzan Tordorov commented, tcBeyond
judicial considerations, and beyond the Touvier case itself, the Court sought to absolve

and even to exonerate Vichy.”22 Investigative journalism became an important tool in
reshaping French national consciousness. The work of Eric Conan of L "Express, is an
example of the investigative journalism which probed “les annees noires. ”23 His

investigative journalism has added to the ongoing debate. Without a doubt the
importance of the press is epitomized by the revelations in the press in May 1981
concerning the role of Maurice Papon, a courageous move to publish, but also perhaps

one with an ulterior motive. The article was published 6 May 1981 denouncing a
minister of President Giscard d’Estaing between two rounds of the Presidential

elections.24 On 10 May 1981 Francois Mitterrand, President Giscard d’Estaing’s

21 Jacques Derogy, L ’Express (Paris) 6 juin 1962. All newspaper articles unless otherwise noted,
were reproduced with permission from the Dossiers de Presse, Fondation Nationale des Sciences
Politiques, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and translated by the writer.

22 Ttzvetan Todorov, “The Touvier Affair,” in Memory, the Holocaust, and French Justice. The
Bousquet and Touvier Affairs, ed. Richard J.Golson, trans. Lucy Golson and Richard J. Golson (Hanover,
NH: University Press of New England, 1996), 119.
23 Eric Conan, Sans oublier les enfants: le camps de Pithiviers et Beaune-la-Rolande, 19juillet-10
septemhre 1942 ( Paris: Grasset, 1991). Cited by Paxton “Vichy Fifty Years After, " 233-243.
24

Canard Enchaine (Paris) 6 mai 1981.
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opponent, was declared the winner. French justice either under the control or influence

of which ever President is in power was no different under the Socialist President

Mitterrand. It took nearly twenty years of legal and political wranglings, as this thesis
has demonstrated, for Papon to face his judges.

Turning to Papon’s trial chapter three sets out the intensive debate it generated, not

only on the historical issues at stake, but around moral and legal issues as well. As
Papon’s career as an official of the fourth and fifth Republics came under scrutiny, his

role in the events of 17 October 1961, since referred to generally in the press as the
“Algerian Massacre” was revealed by the historian Jean-Luc Einaudi before a stunned

courtroom.25 The judicial debate immediately shifted towards a historical debate

surrounding these events, with the court demanding a judicial enquiry into lack of
•

•

•

•

archival access raised by Jean-Luc Einaudi’s testimony.

The outcry from the

courtroom, further exploited by the media, ultimately led the French government to order

25 Testimony of Jean-Luc Einaudi. Catherine Erhel, Mathieu Aucher, Renaud de La Baume, eds.
Le Proces de Maurice Papon, compte rendu stenographique, tome 1, (Paris: Albin Michel, 1998), 225244/282-283. See also Le Monde (Paris) 13 aout 1999. This article refers to a civil action brought against
Jean-Luc Einaudi by Maurice Papon for defamation with regard to Einaudi’s use of the word “massacre”
to qualify events of 17 October 1961. The tribunal correctionnel de Paris dismissed the charges but
recognized that “extreme violence was used by the Police.

26 Jean-Luc Einaudi asserted during his testimony that his research which included cemetery
lists, eyewitness accounts and hearsay evidence, plus access to the Paris archives of the FLN (Front
Liberation Nationale d’Algerie) led him to give an estimated figure of more than 200 dead. National
archives and other government sources were either incomplete, or Einaudi could not obtain access.
Liberation (Paris) 22 octobre 1997 published extracts from the incomplete records of the Institute of
Pathology. These extracts revealed an unusual high number of bodies retrieved from the Seine around this
period, identified generally only as “French Muslims.” See Jean Geronimi, avocat general a la Cour de
cassation, report on the judicial archives relating to the demonstration of 27 October 1961. Cited by Le
Monde (Paris) 13 aout 1999. This investigation revealed 48 dead. Prime Minister Lionel Jospin ordered
this report.
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an enquiry into the event.27 Despite this, historians’ access to archival documents
remains unresolved in this issue. Scholarship is ongoing.

For many, listening to the unfolding of the events surrounding the “Algerian
Massacre,” the testimony was synonymous with the crimes committed by Papon under

the Vichy regime; the same actors appeared to be in place with suppression of facts,
manipulation, and distortion inserted into the collective memory, and which could only

be nourished in rumor. The “Algerian Massacre,” thus featured all the ingredients of the

Vichy syndrome. “Les annees noires” transformed into “la guerre sans nom” of
Algeria,28 could not, however, be fully addressed by the court at Bordeaux. The court
was judging Papon’s implication in crimes against humanity, which under the French
definition could only address crimes committed during World War II. The readjusted

historical record relating to “les annees noires” could be addressed by the court in
Bordeaux, however.

Summoned to the court as expert witnesses historians appeared in a judicial context
unfavorable to the historian. As witnesses, the historians for the most part did not have
personal first hand knowledge of “les annees noires. ” They could only reconstitute a

credible account of events based on historical research of the available traces. Justice on
the other hand required an exactitude on which to balance judgement. The evidence
presented by Marc-Olivier Baruch, a reputed historian of the Vichy administration, was

27 Mandelkern Report, May 1998 - (named after State Councilor, Deidonne Mandelkem who led
the investigation) concluded that between thirty and forty demonstrators had been killed. The figures and
lack of impartiality in the use of sources to obtain the figures are still being questioned by historians today.
See Le Monde (Paris) 20 mai 1998.
28 "La Guerre sans nom ” - the war without a name, describes the Algerian civil war 1954-1962
which was not officially recognized as a “war” by the French government. See Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Face
a la raison d’Etat: Un historien dans la guerre d’Algerie (Paris: Editions La Decouverte/Essais, 1989).
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highly relevant to both the defense and prosecution’s conflicting arguments based on the

fact that Maurice Papon remained in his post until the liberation.29 Baruch’s research had
revealed isolated acts of bureaucratic revolt.30 Baruch’s testimony served to consider the

duress under which a civil servant might have operated or alternatively, the scope for
disobedience.31 Historians such as Baruch offered a historical framework which in a
historical setting could lead to wider debates on this issue, but within the judicial setting
lawyers seized upon this framework to persuade the jury or the judge. Baruch’s

testimony thus removed him inadvertantly from his role as a historian, which was solely
to enlighten the judge and jury as to the wider historical context of the Papon case.
Robert O. Paxton presented a dispassionate account of “les annees noires. ”

'V)

His

evidence clearly put into perspective that through the hegemonic practices of the Vichy

regime but removed the possibility that it had been either a victim of National Socialism
or the saviour of France. The counter argument given for the defense by Henri
Amouroux, a journalist and prolific author of the Vichy period, claimed that France and

its servants were ignorant of the Final Solution. 33 The defense in arguing Papon’s
innocence relied heavily on this argument. Chapter three of this thesis deals with this and
shows this argument proved persuasive, as ultimately Papon was acquitted on the charges

of complicity to assassinate.
29

Erhel et al., Le Proces de Maurice Papon, tome 1 .415-436. Testimony of Marc Olivier

Baruch.

30 Nancy Wood, “The Papon Trial in an “Era of Testimony,” in Memory and Justice on Trial:
The Papon Affair ed. Richard J. Golson, trans. Lucy B. Golson and Richard J. Golson (New York:
Routledge, 2000), 107.
3!

Ibid., 109.

32

Erhel et al., Le Proces de Maurice Papon, tome 1. 307-310. Testimony of Robert O. Paxton.

33

Erhel et al., Le Proces de Maurice Papon, tome 1. 320-336. Testimony of Henri Amouroux.
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Defense arguments alone did not allow the Court to draw accurate and conclusive

evidence on the Final Solution without going to the source materials. For the most part
the source materials in Papon’s case were the many victims’ long since silenced. Other

sources, such as the deportation orders, attested to the victims existence and forced

removal to extermination by the Vichy regime. However, the historical documents
attesting to knowledge of the Final Solution became inadequate in the hands of skilled

defense lawyers in the absence of any survivors from the deportation orders. Conclusions
as to the horrendous nature of the Final Solution, however, must be obtained within the

framework of a solid historical footing with no doubt or question as to historical

accuracy. In the trial of Maurice Papon historians and jurists were obviously not in
accordance.

The key issue in the defense of Maurice Papon against the charges of crimes against

humanity lay in the subtle demands of the French definition of the crime which must

show a personal adherence to Nazi ideology and its objectives. Chapter three of this
thesis discusses Papon’s role in the Prefecture of Bordeaux and clearly shows the level of
his responsibilities, including Jewish Questions at the Prefecture. Lawyers for the civil

litigants pleaded that simply by working in the department of Jewish Questions Papon

was guilty. Papon’s sentence of ten years obviously reflects the uncertainty of the jurors

as to Papon’s full intent to exterminate his victims.
The impact of both the verdict and the sentence dealt with in chapter three, like other
aspects concerning the trial of Maurice Papon, did not fail to create public outcry. The

verdict of guilty to crimes against humanity did lay to rest the Gaullist construction of

history so long a rampart of protection against the invasion of truth. Nevertheless, it was
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still a verdict which expressed compromise and contradiction. The verdict of not guilty
to complicity to assassination of the deportees from Bordeaux remains morally,

judicially, and historically debatable. But “[m]orality is not justice” states Tzvetan
Todorov,34 writing after the verdict. Todorov asserts that the court obviously made its

decision based on the “[d]egree of Papon’s responsibility.”35 Robert Paxton asserts that
“The trial did not impact pedagogically as it did not provide a clear and precise lesson.”36
Still, the trial did have some impact in the rectification of some historical inaccuracies,
•

•

•

such as a deeper understanding of the role Vichy played in the Final Solution.

^*7

However, as Todorov pointed out “[t]he difference between justice and history
conditioned every procedure,”38 in essence complicity to assassination remains locked in

this difference.

The presence of historians at the trial strongly implicated in the realignment of popular
consciousness raised objections both from the historians themselves, who became

embroiled in legalities, and the public. The historians who testified were also at a distinct
disadvantage in an atmosphere not at all adapted to historical presentation of facts.39

34

Tzvetan Todorov, “ Letter from Paris: The Papon Trial,” in Golson, ed., Memory and Justice
on Trial, 217.
35 Ibid., 218.
36

Paxton, “Les lecons du proces Papon” in L’Evenement duJeudi (Paris) 6-12 janvier 2000.

37 “Ce proces ne pouvait etre que decevant,” Le Point (Paris) 4 avril 1998, interview of historian
Rene Remond. See also Paxton, ibid., who argues against the simple approach ofjudging Papon according
to whether or not he knew or did not know of the Final Solution but rather a deeper analysis of the
information surrounding the Final Solution available during the period which would come to the notice of
Papon should be examined. He further reiterates, among other facts, that without a doubt France was the
only western nation to deliver Jews from roundups in non-occupied zone to the Nazis.
38

Todorov, “Letter from Paris,” in Golson, ed., Memory and Justice on Trial, 221.

39 Henri Rousso, La Hantise du Passe (Paris: Les Editions Textuel, 1998), specifically includes
a long discussion on the ethics and practicality of historians subjecting their work to legal scutiny and
exploitation. He refused to give evidence at the trial of Maurice Papon.
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Historians giving evidence for example, were not allowed to use notes, a rather daunting
task given that the testimony of Robert O. Paxton lasted almost four hours. Moreover,

the historians were subjected to cross-examination, which often had no relevance to
historical scholarship. When asked to pronounce on Henri Amouroux’s debated past, for

example, Paxton refused.

Avoidance of the past, a national preoccupation, is symtomatic of the duality of

France. The trial did not settle this contradictory nature present in French society,
expressed by a strong desire to keep silent about the past and simultaneously make this

silence resonate in a national need to come to terms with the past. Despite a re
interpretation of Vichy among the scholarly community and to a certain extent among

French public opinion, in particular with regard to Vichy’s role in the Final Solution for
example, these contradictory overtures continue to reemerge today in France, but more

often around the ongoing debate inspired by the Algerian issue. As recently as February
2001 the newspaper, Le Monde Diplomatique, denounced the difficulty of lifting the veil
of silence surrounding the Algerian problem, still presented and taught in history

textbooks in France today as “une belle aventure intelllectuelle, dont le bilan serait
globalement positif. ” 40 As Maschino points out, “teachers are trained by the state so
they do not possess all the elements to stray from the established path.”41

The national memory cannot remain as it was after the verdict of confrontation at

Bordeaux. As France, a major European player, begins the twenty-first century “les

40 Maurice T.Maschino, Le Monde Diplomatique (Paris) fevrier 2001, 8-9, - A nice intellectual
adventure, the outcome will be globally positive. The article examines scholastic textbooks in use for
students of 15-18 years (3em et de terminale) and published either in 1995 or 1999.
41

Ibid., 9.
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annees noires” and “Ze guerre sans nom” must both be addressed by the French state.
Leila Nadya Sadat, writing on the legal legacy of Maurice Papon, states that the
prosecutions under crimes against humanity in France of Klaus Barbie, Paul Touvier, and
Maurice Papon,

Represent important contributions towards the task of building a legal culture where
government leaders are held accountable for their actions and are unable to commit
human rights abuses on a massive scale cloaked behind the power and legality of the
state.42

Perhaps one can argue that the French cases do not fully address human rights abuses, but

as Sadat points out “France is one of only ten countries in the world reported to have any
legislation at all criminalizing the crime against humanity.”43

But the legal legacy leaves the question of complicity to assassination unresolved.
Neither does the legal legacy account for 206 individuals who left Merignac for Drancy

and disappeared.44 For these silent victims of the Vichy Regime, the grave miscarriage of
justice remains a poignant reminder to the French that despite the trial of Maurice Papon
all is not well, and that the wounds remain unhealed in the French national consciousness

of today.

42 Leila Nadya Sadat, “The Legal Legacy of Maurice Papon,” in Golson, ed.,
Memory and Justice on Trial, 147.
43

Ibid.

44 Eric Conan, Le Proces Papon: Un Journal d‘Audience (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1998), 144.
The Acte d’accusation of Maurice Papon does not refer to these victims. Conan points out that these
victims, contained in two convoys which left Merignac for Drancy the 2 February and 7 June 1943, could
not be evoked in the Court as there were no civil litigants to depose a complaint against Papon for or on
behalf of these victims. Conan further points out that under French law in the absence of civil litigants the
prosecution could depose a complaint, this did not occur at Bordeaux.
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